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Abstract
Iran is a country with a rich history of successful social movements and not so
successful ones. The two most recent ones—1979 and 2009—set up a very unique
puzzle that sheds some light not only on the factors of micro-variation (in levels of
violence against protesters) within states over time, but also on the factors that drive
variation within a protest wave—factors that are related to the design of a state’s
security system (for example, multiple security force actors that provide options for
protest policing). Explaining variation across and within these two cases requires
that we think about the ensuing potential for violent conﬂict as inter-group related.
In order to predict violence on protesters in Iran, it is necessary to measure the level
of representativeness in the military organization, which I disaggregate at the level
of the security force actor (Basij/IRGC/Artesh), and consider this in relation to the
composition of the protesting crowd. The more representative a security force body
within the military, the less likely is the outbreak of violence in any given protest
event if that body is involved. This is because representative entities are less likely
to view crowds as part of a threatening other.
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vi| Introduction
How do quasi-democratic states design security institutions that are capable of
violence against unarmed citizens who are protesting? The most eﬀective design is
one that exploits a signiﬁcant social cleavage in society. Even a quick analysis of the
Arab Spring demonstrates this point. This revolutionary wave of demonstrations that
swept through the Middle East from 2010-2012 (some argue is still ongoing) changed
the political landscape in the region. The cause of the dissatisfaction stemmed from
something very basic: inequality. Whether this was inequality because of the concen-
tration of money or power does not really matter—the causes were many, and they
were all interrelated. What is signiﬁcant is the mobilization of people that ended up
changing the structure of politics. In some cases, the people succeeded. In other cases,
they did not. The most glaring diﬀerence among all these cases is the response of the
state’s security apparatus to the protests. Some militaries were willing to shoot, and
others were not.
1Syria’s and Tunisia’s uprisings started oﬀ in similar ways: mass street protests
against the governments. However, the most signiﬁcant diﬀerence between Tunisia
and Syria was the nature of the state’s response via its military and security appara-
tus. In Tunisia, the military refused to ﬁre on protesters, standing back and allowing
the movement there to be successful. This did not happen in Syria, where the military
responded with violence very early in the crisis (March 2011).
This pattern extends to most countries during the Arab Spring. The ones in
which the military refused to ﬁre on protesters saw transitions (the success of which
remains to be seen in many cases): Tunisia and Egypt. In a similar vein, the ones
in which signiﬁcant government concessions were made, which peacefully suppressed
protests, ended up being countries with representative militaries (Jordan, Oman).
The countries with unrepresentative militaries that were willing to ﬁre on protesters
were those that either fell into civil war or teetered on the edge of civil war (Syria,
Yemen, Bahrain, Libya).
The Arab Spring created a ﬂurry of scholarly research on regime cohesion, dura-
bility, and military defection. Researchers were eager to ﬁll the gap on civil-military
relations in the Arab World. Many attempted to explain the variation during the
2Arab Spring, and they were successful to a certain extent. The focus on macro-level
variables like food prices (Lagi et al. 2011), climate change (Slaughter, Werrell, and
Femia 2013), ethnic representativeness (Droz-Vincent 2011), economic penetration
(Springborg 2011), institutionalization (Bellin 2012), coup-prooﬁng (Makara 2013),
and regime legitimacy (Barany 2011) has been fruitful. These factors have provided a
framework within which to partially understand the inter-state variation in military
behavior during periods of mass protest.
However, these macro-level variables fail to explain intra-state variation, partic-
ularly between periods of time during which they do not change. This includes not
only the short periods of time between protest waves within a country, but also the
day to day variation that occurs within a protest wave. This variation is puzzling
because we might expect similar outcomes in similar situations if we only consider
the macro-variables. For example, why the same military organization that might
be willing to ﬁre on crowds that are big and threatening falls apart in the face of
diﬀerent protests a few years later is problematic for these variables. There is a need
to look beyond just the security force actor and its relationship to the state. It is
important to also consider the relationship the military has with society as well as
3the ideological foundations of the state system.
To understand intra-state variation, both across protest waves and within protest
waves, we have to assess the actors within a protest event and their relationships to
each other. These micro-level variables aﬀect the probability of violence at the level
of each protest event. Chapter 1 lays out the theoretical framework of this project.
Here, I claim that representativeness aﬀects the likelihood of military violence during
protest movements. More representative militaries are less likely to inﬂict violence
on protesters because they are less likely to view crowds as a threatening “other."
This is particularly true if the protesting crowd is broad, composed of more than one
subgroup of society.
Furthermore, an additional contribution of my theory is to disaggregate the mili-
tary organization, recognizing that states design their security apparatus’ with both
internal and external threats in mind. This can be clearly seen in Iran today. The Ira-
nian security apparatus is comprised of three entities: the regular Artesh, the IRGC,
and the Basij. Representativeness varies across these three bodies. To the extent that
the Basij is the most unrepresentative entity within the Iranian security apparatus,
and given paramilitary characteristics that condition the eﬀect of group cohesiveness
4in a perverse way, I expect the worst forms of violence to occur when the Basij is
present at a protest event.
Chapter 2 considers alternative explanations for the likelihood of military violence
during a protest event. This chapter looks at three alternative explanations. All three
are rationalist, but the third is also realist to the extent that it traces the source of
variation in the levels of international pressure between 1979 and 2009 to realpolitik
concerns (or lack thereof). The ﬁrst alternative assesses the role of professionalization
through a rationalist framework. This version of a rationalist argument focuses on
the costs of engaging in high intensity coercion by the military. The main factor in
the “utility function" is the concern for survival. The alternative (i.e., what the cost
of engaging in high intensity coercion is compared against) is what life would look like
for the military as an institution after the potential fall of the current regime. Is the
military institutionalized enough to survive beyond the collapse of any given regime?
The second alternative is also rationalist, but the focus is on incentives at an elite
level. The alternative “strategy" depends on the possibility of material gain under a
diﬀerent regime. In this scenario, a military elite is comparing his access to resources
under two diﬀerent conditions—one that may extend the length of his time horizon
5(assuming no change in the discount factor), thereby fostering “loyalty" to the current
regime. Finally, the third alternative explanation discusses the role of international
pressure on domestic politics. Is is possible that the pull (or lack thereof) of material
and security ties with a powerful nation—the U.S.—is driving the military’s use of
violence against protesters? Though my approach is socio-psychological, and this
chapter hints at the merits of such an approach given the problems with the dominant
approaches, I do not claim that other methods or perspectives have no merit. I believe
that my framework can work alongside a rationalist one, since multiple motivations
can co-exist, leading to the same outcome.
Chapter 3 examines the Iranian Revolution using the theoretical framework. The
main thrust of this chapter is to set up a puzzle that highlights intra-state variation
across protest waves, even though variation during the Revolution itself is also con-
sidered. The Iranian military under the Shah responded forcefully, cohesively, and
violently against a series of large protests that broke out during 1963. However, de-
spite expectations to the contrary (and holding many variables ﬁxed), it fell apart in
1979. I draw on two interviews with high ranking oﬃcials in the Shah’s cabinet and
the opposition, as well as primary and secondary sources. I argue that the represen-
6tative nature of the Iranian Armed Forces at the time did not facilitate the use of
violence against protesters because members of the military organization identiﬁed
with protesters who were perceived to be part of the in-group. This chapter is also
historically focused in order to provide the context for the theory.
Chapter 4 looks at the Green Revolution under the current regime in Iran. Why
was the Islamic Regime able to crush protests using the armed forces in 2009 while
the Shah failed to do so in 1979? By highlighting, politically and ideologically, the
role of Iran’s religious rural population, the security apparatus exploits a key cleavage
in Iranian society: the urban/rural divide. Representativeness along this cleavage is
the right context in the Iranian case—ignoring this element means that we would miss
much of the interesting variation present throughout the Iranian security system. This
chapter uses an original dataset on protest events during 2009-2012 to look at the
eﬀect of representativeness on the use of lethal force against protesters. As opposed to
the previous chapter, the main contribution of this chapter is its focus on intra-state
variation within a protest wave. I also draw on interviews with two former Basijis to
highlight the mechanisms of the theoretical framework.
Why the focus on Iran in this work? First, testing this theory requires a focused
7approach. Choosing one country permits a comprehensive analysis of all the cultural,
historical, societal, and political factors that impact the theoretical framework. Sec-
ond, Iran makes sense given my language skills and network connections. Some of
the interviews were conducted in Farsi, and it was helpful to have a sense of the lan-
guage for the media materials. Most importantly, the comparison between the 1979
case and the 2009 case is a useful one for many reasons, especially methodologically.
Many of the background variables can be held constant or ﬁxed, allowing for a rigor-
ous analysis when it comes to determining which factors may have actually caused a
diﬀerence in outcome.
Given the most relevant factors, it would have been reasonable to expect a similar
outcome across both cases. There were four important factors that were constant
in 1979 and 2009. First, both movements occurred in the context of a serious eco-
nomic downturn and high levels of political and economic dissatisfaction. The oil
boom of the 1970s produced an alarming increase in inﬂation and growing inequality.
Economic austerity measures to ﬁght inﬂation in 1977 ended up disproportionately
aﬀecting poor and unskilled labor (Graham 1980). By 1978, Iran’s economy was in
shambles, and people from all levels of society (including the middle class) were dis-
8satisﬁed because of unmet political and economic expectations. Similarly, the global
recession in 2009 as well as strengthened international sanctions deeply aﬀected Iran’s
already ailing economy. The steep decline of Iran’s oil revenues in 2009 led to rising
unemployment, runaway inﬂation and a stagnating GDP (Douthat 2009). Further-
more, after four years of the ultraconservative Ahmadinejad government (and eight
years of a “reformist" president who delivered no political changes), Iranian domestic
political support was at an all time low (Sigarchi 2008).
Secondly, the scopes of both movements were comparable. 2009 was the biggest
and most threatening display of civil dissatisfaction since 2009. Hundreds of thou-
sands of protesters poured into the streets by mid-June. The regime had never wit-
nessed such numbers; in fact, the last time numbers like this had turned out had
been in support of the current regime in 1979. Furthermore, demonstrators were
chanting phrases such as “Down with the dictator," “Death to the dictator," “Death
to Khamenei" (Cohen 2009). This was the ﬁrst time in the history of the regime that
protesters had ever so directly threatened the Supreme Leader. Given the scope and
intent of crowds during the Green Revolution, the level of threat perceived by the
state in 1979 and 2009 is comparable.
9Thirdly, if assessed compositionally, the Iranian Armed Forces in 1979 and 2009
were essentially identical. Both had recruitment strategies based on universal con-
scription, which meant similar levels of representativeness. Furthermore, the state’s
capacity for repression was also comparable across the two cases. Iran, in the modern
era, has always been a strong, centralized state with a massive security apparatus
(Wright 2010). In fact, the Iranian government’s capacity to protect itself in 1979
had never been higher: SAVAK had just emerged victorious after defeating both of
the major urban guerrilla groups seeking to topple the state, and military spending
was at an all time high (Looney 1998).
However, the outcomes of the two cases could not be more diﬀerent. In 1979,
the Shah’s security apparatus fell apart in the face of mounting protests, and he
was forced to ﬂee the country. In 2010, after months of demonstrations, the Islamic
Regime’s security apparatus emerged victorious as hundreds of thousands of equally
dissatisﬁed citizens gave up, despite having been willing to bear enormous costs at
the start of the movement. How I explain this puzzle in the following chapters high-
lights the three broad contributions of this work. First, on a conceptual level, this
framework broadens our understanding of actors. In the case of the use of force, it
10disaggregates the military in order to reveal the agency of state design. For example,
under the Islamic Regime, the state designed a security system with multiple actors,
all with varying levels of representativeness. In the case of the protesting group, the
framework encourages a more general understanding of groups that goes beyond eth-
nicity. Second, the main argument blends together literature in two diﬀerent ﬁelds
(political sociology and social psychology), and applies it to a topic in civil-military
relations. Finally, by focusing on intra-state variation, this project emphasizes the
military-society relationship—one that has received little attention, but is starting to
get more (see Barak and David 2010).
111 | Theoretical Framework
1.1 Introduction
When will a military organization inﬂict violence on protesters and when will
it not? Secondly, how do we deﬁne the military in the context of a state’s secu-
rity apparatus, particularly when threats are equally distributed domestically and
internationally? The military’s decision has important implications for the level of
violence against protesters as well as the possibility of civil war on the one hand and
movement success on the other. In some cases, mass protests lead to major regime
transitions (for example, Egypt 2011); however, in other cases, we observe severe in-
ternal violence, leading to civil war. In the case of civil war, we have seen examples
of a potentially diﬀerent model of civil war onset (Syria 2011, Algeria 1991).
In short, I claim that representativeness in the military aﬀects the likelihood of
12military violence during protest movements. More representative militaries are less
likely to inﬂict violence on protesters because they are less likely to view crowds
as a threatening “other." This is particularly true if the protesting crowd is broad,
composed of more than one subgroup of society.
Furthermore, an additional contribution of my theory is to disaggregate the mili-
tary organization, recognizing that states design their security apparatus’ with both
internal and external threats in mind. This is clear in the design of Iran’s current
security apparatus. The Iranian Armed Forces today are structured in a way that
can manage both mass internal threats (like threatening social movements) and ex-
ternal ones (from regional powers). There are three security actors within the Iranian
Armed Forces—the Basij, the IRGC, and the regular military. Each security actor
has a diﬀerent focus and function, which corresponds, I argue in an intentional way,
with its composition—i.e., how representative each entity is.
Thus, an implication of my argument is that certain entities within a security
apparatus, dependent on the extent to which they are or are not representative, may
be prone to particularly perverse forms of violence against protesters. To the extent
that paramilitaries are less representative, and given that they are also usually more
13ideological and less professionalized, I expect the worst outcomes of violence when
it comes to their protest policing strategies. This can be clearly seen in the case
of the Basij. The Basij is a paramilitary volunteer militia established in 1979 as a
formal body in the Armed Forces. It is also the most unrepresentative, ideologically
motivated entity in the Iranian Armed Forces. During the Green Revolution in 2009,
Basijis were responsible for the worst kinds of violence against protesters. Their
methods included sexual violence and strategies speciﬁcally intended to cause public
terror because of their perversity (for example, wearing plainclothes and walking
amidst protesting crowds in order to stab protesters unexpectedly).
This chapter lays out the theoretical framework in greater detail. It explains how
representativeness in the military aﬀects the likelihood of military violence, and why
a greater degree of unrepresentativeness (especially in paramilitary branches of the
Armed Forces) leads to a higher likelihood of military violence on protesters. The
mechanisms I put forward to explain this relationship between representativeness and
military violence are psychological. Representative militaries are less threatened by
broad protests because they are less able to view crowds as a threatening other. At
the heart of my theory is the notion that “us versus them" distinctions play a critical
14role in justifying violence, particularly in the context of power asymmetries—i.e.,
violence against the unarmed citizens of one’s own country. The value added of my
psychological approach over a more rationalist framework is the topic of the next
chapter, in which I consider alternative explanations of the phenomenon I am trying
to explain.
1.2 Linking Representativeness to Military Violence
During Protests: Us Versus Them Distinctions
Why are more representative military forces less likely to inﬂict violence on protesters?
This section discusses the mechanism linking representativeness to military violence
during protests. Here, I explain why I would expect more representative bodies in
the military to be less likely to inﬂict violence on protest crowds. The mechanism
draws on theories and concepts in social psychology. The next chapter explains the
value-added of a psychological approach over alternative explanations, showing that
there are still gaps in understanding despite the prevalence of more rational theories,
which certainly play a role as well.
15I discuss measurement and operationalization later in this chapter; however, it
is important to note a couple of things about the dependent and independent vari-
ables before I get into a discussion of the theory. The dependent variable in this
study is military violence. I deﬁne military violence as high intensity coercion against
protesters by actors or entities within the armed forces. High intensity coercion,
which I consider in great depth later, is measured through the use of violent strate-
gies and tactics of protest policing that are intended to promote fear and dissuade
further protesters. The independent variable in this study is representativeness in the
military: the extent to which the military reﬂects the various groups in society. Tra-
ditionally, representativeness has been deﬁned ethnically and in a certain structural
way, namely with respect to diﬀerences between services (i.e., representativeness in
the army versus the navy versus the air force) or ranks (i.e., representativeness in the
oﬃcer corps versus the rank and ﬁle). My contribution to the discussion on repre-
sentativeness in the military is twofold. First, I argue that representativeness as a
concept must be more contextualized—ethnicity is not a signiﬁcant cleavage in every
country. Second, I argue that representativeness must be broadened to include the
possibility of variation across entities within a military organization—entities that
16include parallel military institutions and paramilitaries.
Now, I can move on to discuss the actual theory. I begin by framing my psycho-
logical approach, which leads to the signiﬁcance of the “us versus them" mechanism at
the heart of the theory. This psychological approach begins with the assumption that
group identiﬁcation forms a basis for justifying violence in a highly motivated setting.
However, it is important to justify this assumption. The context within which high
intensity coercion during a protest event is required is one that is highly motivated
because it causes extreme cognitive dissonance. A motivated setting in psychology is
a context within which individuals must unconsciously ﬁt their processing of infor-
mation to beliefs that suit some end or goal, otherwise there is unresolved anxiety
(Festinger 1957; Lerner 1978; Colm 2001).
So, what exactly are the conﬂicting beliefs and who holds them? In this context,
the holders of the beliefs are the security force agents, from either the regular military,
a parallel military institution, or a paramilitary unit/militia. Unlike regular police
forces, members of the Armed Forces, regardless of the orientation of any speciﬁc
agency (for example, the Basij is primarily focused on managing internal threat,
though it was a critical element of Iran’s defense during the Iran-Iraq War), have a
17stake in the national interest or the defense of the country and its citizens against some
overarching, more ideologically deﬁned threat. This belief system—i.e., the idea that
citizens must be protected—coupled with the highly asymmetric nature of protest
policing, which involves the use of force against unarmed citizens who are (usually)
peacefully mobilizing, leads to a highly charged, cognitively dissonant context.
How can dissonance in such a context be resolved? Social psychology points to
group identiﬁcation as an important part of how humans rationalize violence in disso-
nant settings, which is why my theory focuses on the causal power of representative-
ness and us versus them distinctions. In fact, the signiﬁcance of group identiﬁcation
as the basis of conﬂict in society has been a major topic of study in social psychol-
ogy. Social Identity Theory—ﬁrst posited by Henri Tajfel (1972, 1974)—suggests
that humans are naturally disposed to forming and joining groups. Furthermore,
threat perception at a basic, cognitive level is linked to group identiﬁcation; out-group
members are inherently more threatening, and in-group members receive preferential
treatment. Any subsequent violence is, therefore, inter-group related—justiﬁed be-
cause an out-group individual is easily categorized, blamed, or seen as threatening
(therefore, violence manifests as a form of defense and dissonance is resolved). In
18short, when it comes to legitimizing and inﬂicting violence, group identity is a sig-
niﬁcant, universal variable: all humans form groups, and it is in our disposition to
justify the resulting violence as an extension of that identiﬁcation (Sherif et al. 1961;
Tajfel 1982a; Tajfel and Turner 1986; Bar-Tal 2007; Bar-Tal 1989; Brubaker et al.
2004; Cehajic 2009; Correll et al. 2002; Henry et al. 2005; Hogg and Abrams 1988;
Leidner 2012; Milgram 1964).
As a quick summary of this section so far, I have framed my approach by showing
that it makes sense to consider a psychological argument to explain variation in
military violence because the context within which it takes place is highly motivated
(or dissonant). Thus, we might expect group identiﬁcation to play a role because,
based on extensive literature in social psychology, the principle way humans resolve
dissonance in settings that involve violence is by justifying the need for it through us
versus them distinctions—i.e., the out-group “deserves" the violence in some way or for
some reason. In sum, I have shown why the context in which high intensity coercion is
needed might be a source of cognitive dissonance, and I have demonstrated the validity
of my approach—in such a context, scholars of social psychology would expect group
identiﬁcation to play a role in reducing cognitive dissonance and inducing violence.
19The question is how? What are the speciﬁc conditions that increase or decrease the
likelihood of violence?
Us versus them distinctions induce violence because they allow individuals in
one group to justify violence against another group through the use of stereotypes
or other kinds of biases related to threat perception. The stronger this “us versus
them" distinction becomes, the more likely is violence. When the military is more
representative, members are less likely to view crowds as a threatening other because
the distinction between us versus them is not as strong. On the other hand, as the
military becomes less representative, group-based diﬀerences are magniﬁed as the
distance and distinction between crowds and the military expands. This is because
members of less representative entities tend to identify with one social category as
opposed to multiple categories. For example, given the homogenous nature of the
Basij, Basijis have one strong social identity that overrides all other ones—this stems
from the unrepresentative nature of the organization. Identifying strongly with one
social category (as opposed to multiple) has been shown to enhance us versus them
distinctions, leading to a higher likelihood of stereotyping and violence against out-
group members (Hall and Crisp 2005).
20So far, I have argued that group identiﬁcation, which is more prevalent or stronger
in unrepresentative militaries, makes (military) violence more likely against protesters.
However, how do we know which groups matter? It is not enough that objective group
diﬀerences exist. The same groups that coexist peacefully in one country at a partic-
ular point in time may turn on each other violently in other contexts (Posner 2004).
This is precisely why representativeness, as I argue earlier, must be understood in the
context of a longer political, cultural, and social timeline. In Iran, focusing on eth-
nicity (which varies greatly in the Iranian context), would not get a researcher much
causal leverage when it comes to explaining political violence; however, realizing that
urban/rural divisions, which are situated in the long-standing alliance between the
clergy and the countryside, are at the heart of the Iranian political process would
get the researcher much further. The existence of groups does not necessitate vi-
olence, but it is true that violence, at a systemic or institutionalized level, is the
result of group-based diﬀerences being made salient. In the Iranian case, the group-
based diﬀerences we care about are urban/rural (religious/secular) for reasons that
are described in Chapter 4 and 5. This is how representativeness in the military
organization is primarily assessed.
21To directly test this “us versus them mechanism," I would need to survey a repre-
sentative sample of members in each of the military units I assess in the case studies.
Based on this information, I could ﬁnd out with what group or groups these in-
dividuals identiﬁed, and, most importantly, how they perceived the crowds during
the protest periods—was it the case that members of more unrepresentative bodies
viewed crowds as part of an “other?" Unfortunately, getting access to this kind of
information is next to impossible. Iran guards this information, and it would be dan-
gerous to attempt to conduct a survey of this nature in the country. However, the
question is still an important and interesting one. It is possible to indirectly test the
“us versus them" mechanism by applying a related concept, and looking for evidence
that supports those expectations.
The related concept that can be applied, which gets at the us versus them dis-
tinction, is Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE). As an overview, before I get into
the details of this concept, a quick summary of how I apply this concept would be
helpful. FAE is a universal cognitive bias that is about how humans attribute cause
to behavior. It turns out that humans attribute cause based on group identiﬁcation.
Members of an in-group are more likely to view each other’s demands and actions as
22legitimate and non-threatening; the opposite is true for members of the out-group.
Since I am unable to do an actual survey, I can look for evidence of the expectations
of FAE bearing out instead. Thus, if I ﬁnd evidence of unrepresentative militaries
viewing protesters and their demands as illegitimate, extreme, and/or threatening
(and the opposite case for representative militaries), then I can argue that there is
some support for the assertion that us versus them distinctions play a role in the
likelihood of violence against protesters. Otherwise put, if we assume FAE is valid,
then we know that members of the in-group tend to view members of the out-group
diﬀerently—i.e., see them as more threatening and/or illegitimate. Using this logic,
I can look for evidence of how members of the military perceive protesters and their
demands. Based on this perception, I can make a claim about the extent to which
diﬀerent militaries may consider protesters part of an out-group (or not, depending
on representativeness).
How does FAE actually work? Why is it that humans attribute cause diﬀerently
based on group identiﬁcation? An FAE occurs when an individual ascribes meaning
and cause to another person’s actions and behavior based on that person’s disposition
rather than on his or her situation (Gilbert and Malone 1995; Kazdin 2000; Reeder
231982; Harvey et al. 1981). A common example is the judgment by one person that
another person must be speeding on the road because he or she is careless or “crazy."
Blame is rarely attributed to an individual’s situation—perhaps the speedy driver was
rushing because she was late for an important exam. An extension of this concept is
that individuals are more likely to judge in-group members favorably—the motiva-
tions for an in-group member’s behavior are more likely to be attributed to his or her
situation by another member (Pettigrew 1979; Betancourt 1979). An application of
this concept to a protest situation leads to the expectation that representative mili-
taries are more likely to view the demands of the opposition as less threatening and
more legitimate because such a group is perceived to be part of the “us." In certain
contexts, a representative military judges the opposition’s demands more favorably;
the situation plays some role in explaining these demands for the military (i.e., there
is a rationale or some legitimate cause of dissatisfaction), and these claims are per-
ceived to be more justiﬁed. On the other hand, unrepresentative militaries should
view protesters and their demands as illegitimate, extreme, and/or threatening. If
this is the case, then there is some support for the argument that unrepresentative
militaries are more likely to view protest crowds as part of an out-group, an “other."
24To summarize, I am testing the argument that representative militaries are more
likely to view crowds as part of the “us" by seeing if the expectations of FAE, given
this, bear out. Knowing that, based on FAE, members of the in-group judge each
other’s actions more favorably (as if they are legitimate or warranted, and not threat-
ening), we can say that, if representative militaries are truly more likely than unrep-
resentative militaries to perceive crowds as part of the in-group, then they should also
be more likely to view protesters and their demands more favorably. It is the latter
that I am able to assess in the following chapters, as well as some partial evidence
that members of unrepresentative entities within the military identify most strongly
with one social identity.
A ﬁnal aspect of the theory to discuss here is the context within which it is more
likely that a representative military will not inﬂict violence on crowds. The “us versus
them" mechanism suggests that certain types of contexts may be more conducive in
this regard. These contexts are ones in which representative militaries feel like crowds
cannot be singularly deﬁned1 and/or represent society more broadly. We can imagine
1There is research that suggests that singularly deﬁned crowds may be more likely to be ﬁred
upon. In this case, a singularly deﬁned crowd is one that is composed of one subgroup of society.
Social categorization—classifying others into broad groupings—is a useful shortcut for navigating
the social world and thus saving processing resources (i.e., mental energy. See Fiske and Taylor
1991; Hamilton 1979; Macrae and Bodenhausen 2001). However, as Crisp and Hall (2005) note, the
cognitive eﬃcacy of social categorization comes with some drawbacks: it is the mental prerequisite
25how these contexts make it more likely that a representative military, with members
that identify with multiple groups, would view crowds as part of the “us." Thus,
crowds that are broad, composed of more than one subgroup in society, are more
likely to be perceived as representative of society, which, for representative militaries,
makes this kind of crowd part of the “us." For unrepresentative militaries, this is
not the case because the “us" is diﬀerently deﬁned. Members of unrepresentative
militaries tend to identify very strongly with a singular, narrowly deﬁned group.
This connection to an in-group that is also narrowly deﬁned is stronger—everyone
else, no matter how broad, is seen as belonging to an out-group.
for intergroup bias and stereotyping, which leads to intergroup conﬂict (see also Heilman 1995;
Bodenhausen 1992; Macrae, Stangor, and Milne 1994; Oakes and Turner 1990; Tajfel and Turner
1979; Doise 1978; Tajfel 1969; Maass and Schaller 1989). Research has shown that intergroup
dichotomy worsens these eﬀects, and that generating alternative or multiple social classiﬁcations
reduces intergroup bias (Crisp and Hall 2005; Crisp et al. 2001; Crisp et al. 2006; Hewstone,
Turner, and Kenworthy 2007; Monteiro, Guerra, and Rebelo 2009). In particular, two experiments
(Hall and Crisp 2005) found that considering multiple criteria for social categorization can reduce
intergroup bias, whereas focusing on a single, narrow criteria increases the odds of violent conﬂict as
a result of stereotyping (see also Levine and Campbell 1972; Doise 1978). Thus, when a protesting
group can be easily classiﬁed or deﬁned in a narrow sense (for example, a group of “students" or a
group of “workers"), there is a higher chance the perverted dichotomous, relational aspects of the
situation will lead to intergroup bias and violence; the distinct cognitive dichotomization into “us"
and “them" is easier
261.2.1 On Groups in the Crowd
Groups play a central role in my theory. It is important to clarify the scope
conditions and assumptions I make about what I believe constitutes a “group," as well
as how I categorize the protest crowd in a protest event. As I mentioned above, there
is a speciﬁc context within which a representative military is least likely to use force
against protesters. This is when the protest crowd is “broad." This section clariﬁes
what I mean by that, giving some examples from the Iranian cases. I am sticking to
the Iranian cases here because my deﬁnition of groups is contextual. I believe that
there is more causal leverage when a scholar knows the political and historical path
of a country; this is how groups can be categorized in the framework I identify below.
Without knowledge of a country’s social history, it would be necessary to take a more
strict or narrow approach regarding the deﬁnition of groups—i.e., picking something
like ethnicity as the dominant group identiﬁcation. However, I have a broad deﬁnition
of groups, which goes beyond ethnicity.
Groups are the atomic elements of a social (and political) system, and such a
system allocates power over a territory and people that is backed by a corresponding
27security apparatus (Rummel 1976). The salience of these groups, since it is true
that given this broad deﬁnition anything could be classiﬁed as a group, depends on
two forms of capital—economic and symbolic—which I draw on to categorize the
composition of protesters into two groups (broad versus narrow).
I draw on Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of capital to deﬁne these two categories (broad
and narrow), particularly symbolic capital (prestige, attention, ideological signiﬁ-
cance. See Bourdieu 1977). Social groups are those arbitrary sets that comprise a
particular social hierarchy (Tajfel 1970; Bordieu 1984); adopting this broad deﬁnition
means that these groups can be ethnic, religious, sectarian, gender-based, class-based,
or cultural. Bordieu deﬁnes social hierarchy as a space characterized by capital put to
productive use (the more capital one has, the higher up one’s position). For Bordieu,
there are four species of capital: economic, cultural, social, and symbolic (Bordieu
1980, 1979, 1977). This is why social hierarchy, in Bordieu’s work, is not a one di-
mensional pyramid-like structure, but a system of cross-cutting, interrelated groups
enclosed in multi-dimensional space.
To simplify this complex structure, I consider only two forms of capital: economic
and symbolic. Thus, there are two dimensions that deﬁne a group’s placement in
28social space. Economic capital is the most direct form of domination in society.
It can take various forms—money, factories, stockpiles, shares, and so on (Bordieu
1984). Bordieu’s notion of symbolic capital is diﬃcult to measure because it is based
on perception (see Wacquant 2006); but, at its heart, acquiring symbolic capital is
about the imposition of categories on groups in order to perpetuate the structures of
action of the dominant (Bordieu 1977). In other words, a group with a lot of symbolic
capital is critical to the legitimacy of the social and political order (i.e., the right to
rule). Such a group has a high degree of ideological signiﬁcance—ideology as the set
of beliefs that justiﬁes the allocation of power in the political system. For example,
the rural population in Iran has symbolic capital because of its signiﬁcance to the
Islamic Regime’s ideological principles and salience as a religious identity.
The ﬁgure below demonstrates the diﬀerence between a “narrow" protesting group
versus a “broad" one in the Iranian cases. A broad demonstration is any protesting
group that is composed of more than one group in at least two of the four boxes.
It is important to note that there is a numerical and categorical distinction between
two types of “broad" protesting groups. A broad protest characterized by a coalition
between two or more groups with little symbolic capital may have less of an eﬀect
29on military violence than one characterized by a horizontal coalition—two or more
groups in which at least one of the groups has a lot of symbolic capital. Both types
of broad protesting groups lessen the likelihood of military violence, but one with
a horizontal coalition (so, at least one group from each column) is “broader" in a
sense. Since there is more variation—in a way that accounts for a more signiﬁcant
group with high symbolic capital—it is even harder for the military to “other" a broad
protest crowd characterized by a horizontal coalition.
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Figure 1.1: Groups in Social Space: Iran 1979 and 2009
301.2.2 Assumptions, Causal Claim, and Scope Conditions
My theory about the eﬀect of representativeness is causal. I am arguing that
“us versus them" distinctions cause violence in some contexts and not in others.
However, in some respects, my causal leverage is enhanced; whereas, in others, I have
diﬃculty. On the one hand, the central part of the theory—that violence is more
likely against an out-group—has been tested and studied to the point that there is
not much debate left. Years of research have shown that strong group identiﬁcation
causes violence. However, it is the conditions under which this occurs that have led
to debate. Obviously, groups exist everywhere and all the time; yet, violence ebbs
and ﬂows.
The area in which my story has diﬃculty with causal leverage is on this point
of conditions. In an ideal laboratory experiment, I would be able to show that the
conditions for violence during protest events exist in some cases, and not in others.
And, I would be able to hold all other factors constant. So, I would be able to create
two protest events in the same country at the same time. These protest events would
be comprised of the same exact people (at the exact same time2). They would be
2A feat of wizardry.
31demanding the exact same thing, and, let’s say, the crowd was composed of only
students. I would send forces in to repress the crowds. These forces would have
complete information about the composition of the crowds, demands...etc. The only
thing that would be diﬀerent would be the composition of the forces in the two
hypothetical situations. In one case, I would have a representative military force; in
the other, there would be an unrepresentative military force. I would expect violence
in both hypothetical situations. Now, I would run the experiment again. This time,
the only thing I would change would be to make the composition of the crowds
broad—I would include various subgroups (maybe even a random sample from the
distribution of all groups in society). My expectation would be to see violence in one
case, and not in the other.
The above demonstrated both my causal logic and the limits of my claim. I am
limited by many factors: the quality of my data, my smaller sample size, my inability
to access thoughts in order to measure the perception of individual military members.
However, what evidence I do have does point in the right direction. Furthermore, I
use indirect methods to get at the causal mechanism—i.e., the use of another concept
to test whether "us versus them" distinctions may be at work (see earlier). In short,
32despite limitations, this project is about a causal relationship, and I demonstrate the
correlation using empirical methods, backed by qualitative historical and anecdotal
data that support the causal logic.
There are also several assumptions I make in this work. One of the assumptions
relates to the regime’s decision-making process in the context of protest events. I
have to assume that the regime observes a protest event before it decides to send
in troops. In other words, the regime has not already made the decision regarding
which entity to send in before it observes the crowds. This assumption is relevant to
the 2009 Iranian case because my argument rests on the claim that the government
faces a trade-oﬀ, and must decide which military entity to send in to repress crowds
(Basij/IRGC/Artesh). I show, in the chapter that analyzes the 2009 Green Revolu-
tion, that this decision is aﬀected by the composition of the crowd in any particular
protest event. Thus, since cause must precede eﬀect, it cannot be that the regime
has already made the decision before crowds actually form. I have no direct proof
or evidence that this assumption is valid. However, I suspect it is because of the
ﬂexibility of the Iranian security apparatus; the decentralized nature of the Basij per-
mits the government to have a reactive strategy when it comes to mass-based threats
33(see Golkar 2010). This is not to say that part of the decision-making process isn’t
made ahead of time. Even if some decisions are made before crowds materialize, I
would argue that they are made with an expectation about what sort of crowd to
expect. Furthermore, given the ﬂexibility I mentioned earlier, these decisions would
be subject to change in the event of changes if expectations were not met.
Another assumption concerns the decision to inﬂict violence on the part of the
individual. I talk about the military organization as a whole in this work; however,
I have an aggregation problem when it comes to the question of who exactly is in-
ﬂicting the violence and who is perceiving these group-based diﬀerences, which are
at the heart of my theory’s mechanism. How psychological mechanisms aggregate up
and lead to group behavior is an aspect of psychological research that is not well un-
derstood (Warneryd 1999), so I am in good company when it comes to this problem,
which appears to be widespread. In my work, I do make an eﬀort to disaggregate at
the level of the security entity. Whereas most other works consider the military as a
unitary actor, I break it up and look at the role of the elements (Basij/IRGC/Artesh)
within the organization. Thus, the assumption I make is that group behavior (which is
what I observe) does reﬂect any given individual’s thought process within that group.
34Though this may not be true for every individual, it is safe to say that, on average,
we can talk about individual motivations and group ones in the same vein; otherwise,
at some critical point, the group’s behavior changes, and this can be observed.
The ﬁnal assumption I make is that the regime’s decision to order troops to repress
crowds either does not matter or reﬂects the level of violence. Ideally, it would be
necessary to control for the government’s order to inﬂict violence being given to troops
since the cause of what I am trying to explain is about “us versus them" distinctions
in the context of a protest situation—the only two actors that should matter are the
protesters and the forces sent in to repress them. The fact that the regime plays a
role in ordering the violence should be measured because, in some cases, an order is
not observed and there is violence (or not). Otherwise put, a lack of an observed
order is sometimes followed by violence or lack thereof. In some cases, this can mean
that, even if an order was given, there would be disobedience (so, the order was never
given). In other cases, it might mean that an order was not necessary—for example,
when the Basij is sent in to repress crowds, an order is implicit, but it is never made
explicit by the regime. On top of this, measuring whether an explicit order was
given is mired in diﬃculty. Even cases in which there was a formal trial to determine
35whether an explicit order was given by the Head of State (for example, in the case
of former President Mubarak), there is huge controversy regarding the validity of
the sentence—much of it being due to politics. Thus, the diﬃculties of measuring
whether an explicit order was given require that I think about the outcome of interest
in this study in a particular way. Hence, the focus on military violence, as opposed
to military disobedience. The distinction, ultimately, is not signiﬁcant—though it
might end up being so in a cross-national study.
By focusing on military violence as opposed to military disobedience in these two
Iran cases, I have to assume that the regime’s decision to order troops to repress
crowds doesn’t matter or that it reﬂects the level of violence. This assumption is not
problematic for the two Iran cases based on historical evidence and the structure of
the security apparatus. In 1979, it was clear that the Shah’s order would have been
irrelevant. His generals informed him that, even if an order was given, the troops
would not ﬁre on crowds (Zabir 2011). The breakdown of the Iranian military in
1979 had everything to do with the dynamics between the protesters and the military
and very little to do with any kind of order (or lack thereof) from above. In 2009, on
the other hand, I assume that the underlying will of the regime was reﬂected in the
36patterns of violence. Otherwise put, measuring an explicit regime order before each
protest event is unnecessary because the need for an explicit order was negated by
the design of the security apparatus, which was constructed in a way that ensured
explicitness was not required (see earlier point about Basij).
Regarding scope conditions, my work is most applicable in certain types of polities:
those “in the middle." Anocracies, or those countries that are neither autocratic nor
democratic, are particularly prone to government repression according to the “murder
in the middle" hypothesis. This theory asserts that in any kind of intermediate regime,
given the young and untested institutional channels for voice, there is a tendency
toward cycles of protest and violence (Regan and Henderson 2002) because opposition
forces have no legitimate channels for dissent and incumbents feel threatened. In
strong autocracies, elites have a secure grip on power and, generally, do not fear
popular protest. This means that opposition remains silent, reluctant to challenge
power in the ﬁrst place (Fein 1995). Stable democracies, on the other hand, refrain
from repression because of institutional channels that allow for dissent in a way that
does not challenge the power and authority of the state (part of this is the regulated
and consistent transitions in power based on voting. See Henderson 1991).
37The low likelihood of repression based on these institutional and political factors
means that the question of how representativeness aﬀects the likelihood of violence
against protesters is more relevant in certain contexts—i.e., “in the middle"—over
others. The relative lack of dissent in strong autocracies and the institutionalized
acceptance of it in stable democracies mean that the military is less likely to have a
protest policing role. However, in the event that the military is called upon in these
cases, the same argument about how representativeness aﬀects violence should apply.
This should be an area of further research, particularly with respect to whether there
are diﬀerences across polities in the design and structure of state security systems.
1.3 An Implication of this Argument: Paramilitary
Units in the Armed Forces
Here, I will make the case that, to the extent that the Basij is the most unrep-
resentative force in the Iranian Armed Forces, it is also the most homogenous and
cohesive. There are two parts to this argument. First, by virtue of it being the most
unrepresentative, it is the most homogenous, compositionally. Homogenous entities
38tend to be more cohesive than heterogeneous ones. On top of this, there are charac-
teristics that enhance cohesiveness, which are particular to paramilitaries (identiﬁed
in the scholarship on these entities). These characteristics are the more ideological
and informal nature of paramilitaries. This heightened group cohesiveness, which is
the result of unrepresentativeness and characteristics particular to paramilitaries, has
been shown to lead to perverse or violent outcomes in certain contexts. In Chapter
5, I focus on how these dynamics led to a style of Basiji protest policing that was the
most severe and perverse.
The Basij, as the most unrepresentative unit in the Iranian Armed Forces, is
the most homogenous one. It draws mostly from the rural and semi-rural areas of
Iran, cashing in on the major social cleavage that divides the country. In this sense,
it is unrepresentative, although it may actually be representative in terms of its
representation of ethnic groups.3 From a unit perspective, this is also the case. The
Basij is the most decentralized security force actor in Iran’s security system—each
village has at least one Basij center, and these centers recruit from the areas around
them. Thus, many Basij units are dominated by kinship ties as well as informal ones,
3I do not have data for this. The point is more to emphasize the importance of identifying the
correct divisions in any given society, as opposed to focusing on ethnicity alone.
39like being from the same village.
In some ways, it is puzzling that the Basij would be responsible for the highest
levels of abuse against protesters. In the civil war literature, high levels of abuse are
exhibited by warring factions that are unable to police the behavior of their members
because they are not homogenous (for example, they might be ethnically fragmented.
See Humphreys and Weinstein 2006). However, the assumption of this argument
is that elites would want to police the behavior of lower-level members. In certain
contexts, like the Iranian one, policing of behavior is purposely avoided, which tends
to be one of the beneﬁts of less formal militia-like bodies to the state—the state can
remain aloof (but more on this point a little later).
The case of the Basij problematizes this ﬁnding that links heterogeneity with the
worst forms of violence. However, there is a debate on this point in the civil war
literature, and so the ﬁndings of this project fall more in line with those who argue
the opposite, which is that homogeneity and violence may be linked in a positive
direction (Schneider 2009; Wood 2009). Indeed, this line of research argues that
homogeneity can lead to greater cohesiveness, which is necessary for the types of
severe violence that would otherwise be too brutal. According to this literature,
40there are two conditions under which cohesiveness would have this impact on the
likelihood of violence, and both conditions are present in the case of the Basij—and,
perhaps in other cases involving paramilitary units because these conditions tend to
be characteristics of such entities. These conditions are ideological fervor (norms
and beliefs) and a unique hierarchical structure with clear authority, yet informality
vis-a-vis the relation to the state.
Scholars have made the case that ideology plays a heightened role in paramilitary
units (Feldman 1979; Levitsky et al. 2012; Jeﬀerson 1990; Ugarriza and Craig 2012).
Paramilitaries tend to be more ideologically motivated. This can be due to a selection
issue, which results in ideologues or “true" believers joining (Kraska and Kappeler
1997; Lysaght 2002), or because of historical processes (Levitsky et al. 2012; Ugarriza
and Craig 2012). Historically, paramilitaries have formed during early periods of crisis
or contestation, especially because they are easier to form and, oftentimes, they can
be less institutionalized. This is particularly the case in armies with revolutionary
origins like the Iranian one today, the FLSN of Nicaragua, and the specialized and
paramilitary forces of the Soviet Union. The cohesion of these kinds of units is
enhanced by a shared ideology/identity (Huntington 1968; Walt 1996) that comes
41out of a genuine sense of mission because actors become more willing to confront
risk and undertake personal sacriﬁce (Walt 1996). Furthermore, revolutions and
periods of crisis tend to divide societies, sharpening “us versus them" distinctions and
strengthening in-group ties. Ideological fervor in such settings leads to concentrated
rewards and costs (i.e., choices are framed morally, as are the costs and rewards)—
internal opposition is seen as disloyalty and even treason and, thus, the costs of
speaking out or refusing to carry out highly violent or perverse actions are extremely
high (Lebas 2011; Levitsky et al. 2012). Furthermore, individual accountability in
highly ideological settings is diminished as the responsibility for actions is diﬀused
through strong group identiﬁcation—this “loss of self" to the group is characteristic
of settings dominated by extreme belief systems (Kelly and Kamermann 1998).
Paramilitaries also tend to be structured in a way that allows for an informal
culture within a highly hierarchical setting. Secondary group cohesion, or identiﬁ-
cation with the armed group as a whole, is critical for a strong military hierarchy.
Paramilitaries, especially to the extent that members have a strong belief system,
which clearly justiﬁes the position and strength of authority in the system, are se-
curity bodies that, like most military organizations, have a clear chain of command
42and high levels of secondary group cohesion. When military superiors are seen as
legitimate authorities, the likelihood of obedience even in the wielding of perverse
violence is greatly increased (Wood 2009; Milgram 1974; Grossman 1996). However,
what sets apart paramilitaries from regular military units? What explains the more
extreme violence inﬂicted by the Basij on protesters during the Green Revolution
compared to that by the IRGC?
Military hierarchy, especially a clear chain of command, is associated with a high
degree of professionalization, which is not conducive to the development of strategies
and tactics that are indiscriminate or particularly perverse (though they may be
violent). In fact, for the types of strategies and tactics (especially when it comes to
sexual violence) that are indiscriminate, perverse, and lead to the most terror—i.e.,
what is deﬁned as high intensity coercion against one’s own citizens—there is a level of
professionalization or closeness to the civilian government that would not be conducive
mostly because it threatens the legitimacy of the state (Bellin 2004; 2012). Yet, at
the same time, secondary group cohesion is critical because members must feel like
they have to obey orders. Paramilitaries are unique in that they maintain an informal
or semi-professional culture within a strict military hierarchy. Though paramilitaries
43can be institutionalized as formal elements within a state’s security apparatus (the
Basij, for example), they fall short of having to embody all of the professional elements
of a full military force. In fact, they permit a sense of agency for members, who can
work toward a cause without feeling that they are fully constrained by “big brother"
(i.e., the state) telling them what to do (Gibson 1994). Many scholars have studied
the informal culture of paramilitaries, noting this unique dual tendency toward both
hierarchy and unprofessionalism (Archer 1999; Gibson 1994; Knox 2002).
To summarize this section, I have made the case that, to the extent that paramil-
itaries are the most unrepresentative entities in a state’s security apparatus, we can
expect there to be particularly perverse and extreme forms of violence used by them
against citizens during protest movements. This is because more unrepresentative
bodies tend to be more homogenous, which can be a source of cohesion among mem-
bers. However, cohesion, in and of itself, does not lead to this extreme violence.
There are conditions that facilitate the role of cohesion in the worst kinds of violence.
These conditions happen to be characteristics of paramilitaries, which themselves not
only enhance cohesiveness, but do so in a perverse way by creating the right kind
of environment for the birth and development of extreme violence. Though there is
44no comprehensive research on whether paramilitaries tend to be unrepresentative in
general, there is evidence that suggests this might be the case (see Levitsky et al.
2012). This is a future area of research, which I discuss in the conclusion.
1.4 Representativeness in the Armed Forces: The
Main Explanatory Variable
The standard understanding of representativeness in the civil-military literature
discusses it as structural with two main components: composition and recruitment
policy. In dealing with composition, proportionality is the key issue. Are certain
ethnic groups underrepresented or excluded? As Petersen and Staniland (2008) point
out, the military is not a unitary actor. There are divisions within the military, par-
ticularly between elites and lower-level members—for example, among the services
(army, air force, and navy) or between the ranks and the oﬃcer corps. Thus, another
dimension of compositional variation in representativeness is across these kinds of
divisions. The Syrian Armed Forces are a perfect example of this kind of unrepre-
sentativeness. Though Syria’s recruitment policy is imposed by the state from above
45(universal conscription), there are diﬀerences in composition between the ranks and
the oﬃcer corps because recruitment originates from sectarian circles within the of-
ﬁcer corps.4 When it comes to recruitment policy, which is the second component,
Petersen and Staniland (2008) are concerned with the type and amount of organi-
zational eﬀort involved in recruitment. They create a scale that is more generally
focused on how recruitment happens—is it state-led or dominated by market forces?
However, in Iran’s case, the military’s structure is more complex than their com-
posite scale (composition plus recruitment strategy) would allow. This is because
representativeness varies across three diﬀerent actors that are all part of the Armed
Forces: the Basij, the IRGC, and the regular military (Artesh). All three entities do
fall under the umbrella of the Armed Forces. Though Petersen and Staniland (2008)
do consider variation in representativeness as a result of diﬀerent recruitment policies
at diﬀerent levels of the military, this variation is limited to certain kinds of divisions,
namely divisions among services (air, army, navy) and ranks (oﬃcer corps versus rank
and ﬁle). Their conceptualization of representativeness does not consider how it might
vary across separate bodies—parallel military institutions or paramilitaries—within
4Over 80 percent of all career oﬃcers in the Syrian Army are Alawites, who dominate the country’s
political order.
46the Armed Forces in cases like the Iranian one today.
Furthermore, their conceptualization focuses on the role of ethnicity, which is not a
key shaper of politics and security in Iran. This is true across other contexts, in which
the salient cleavages in society are not ethnic, but are based on other group divisions.
What is a salient division? This is a topic of huge debate in comparative politics,
and it is very diﬃcult to measure. In fact, not all scholars even agree on a single
deﬁnition, let alone a precise way of measuring it (see Cederman and Girardin 2006;
Wedeen 2002). In my work, I consider salient divisions from a historical and cultural
perspective as those cleavages in society that have been most critical over time. In
political science, the relative inﬂuence of diﬀerent cleavages has been the topic of
much research, particularly when it comes to the literature on voting. Lijpart (1975),
Converse (1974), and Sartori (1969) have all discussed the multiplicity of cleavages,
arguing that there is a hierarchy of cleavages in which certain cleavages may dominate
others (and that this varies across societies). Though their conceptualization of what
constitutes a dominant social cleavage (whether it is language, ethnicity, religion, or
social class) depends on a particular cleavage’s eﬀect on voting patterns, the broader
idea in all these works is that a salient social division does not necessarily have to be
47ethnically deﬁned—what matters is the political and historical context. My approach
follows this contextual understanding of a salient division. In Chapter 4, I trace
the development of a critical social alliance—the rural-clergy partnership—through
Iran’s modern history starting in the late 19th century, arguing that this alliance led
to signiﬁcant social and political changes in the country. In fact, this partnership
solidiﬁed the key salient division in Iran, which is urban/rural, by leading to the
formation of security institutions in Iran today that exploit the urban/rural cleavage.
Returning to military representativeness, there are two things to highlight coming
out of this discussion. First, that the salient divisions in society matter when it comes
to representativeness because that is how we can understand what representative
means in any given context. In many cases, it will be ethnic divisions that matter.
The Sri Lankan Armed Forces are a perfect example of this. In Sri Lanka, the salient
cleavages in society are ethnic, among the Tamils, Burghers, Moors, and the majority
Sinhalese. However, the military is highly unrepresentative of the minority groups in
society—by 1985, almost all enlisted personnel in the armed forces were Sinhalese. In
other cases, like Iran, representativeness can only be assessed in the context of social
class divisions—i.e., between the urban and rural populations. If we were to have a
48strict understanding of representativeness as related to only ethnic groups, we would
miss the variation present across the diﬀerent security bodies in Iran’s Armed Forces.
Second, representativeness can vary within the Armed Forces in a third way that is
not addressed in the literature. Depending on the nature of the entities that comprise
a state’s armed forces, it is possible that recruitment strategies are diﬀerent across
these bodies. Thus, the functions of the three security force actors within the Iranian
Armed Forces today determine respectively tailored recruitment strategies, which lead
to diﬀerent compositions in each actor. Whereas the function of the Artesh (regular
military) is to protect the Iranian state from external threats, the function of the Basij
is to protect the revolutionary regime from internal threats. The IRGC’s function is
both; it operates as an externally oriented military, and a protector of the regime?s
revolutionary ideals.
491.5 Military Violence During Protest Events: The
Dependent Variable
There are three things to clarify in this section regarding the dependent variable.
First, I will deﬁne what I mean by coercion as a form of protest policing by the
state, giving background on how scholars have traditionally considered the role of
violence during protests. Second, I will delineate the boundaries of “military" violence
and explain why it is important to independently assess this separately from other
forms of protest policing, which involve police or riot police. Third, I will overview
how I am going to measure military violence. Measuring this concept involves some
complications because of incomplete information since I rely on reports, which are
subject to biases and don’t always have direct access to the events (particularly in
countries like Iran where there is intense government censorship5).
Traditionally, scholars have viewed protests as a key element of social movements,
threatening the state’s authority over public order and, thus, eliciting a direct state
5In 2009, the Iranian regime forced all international reporters to leave the country by June 20th,
arguably right before the peak of the Green Revolution.
50response on the street. A very important aspect of the state response to movements is
the policing of protest—i.e., the handling of protest events, which can also be known
as “repression" or “law and order" depending on the perspective (della Porta and
Fillieule 2003; della Porta 1995). As della Porta and Fillieule (2003) note, researchers
often consider the agents of the state (usually police) involved in protest policing as
mere “arms of the state," obediently following the orders of the government. Only
recently has research begun to consider the discretion in behavior on the part of
these state agents, justifying the study of these agents as speciﬁc actors with causal
properties. It is with this background in mind that we can think about a typology
of protest policing styles, thinking about explanations for variation in these styles by
considering variables internal to the agent itself like organization and culture.
Della Porta and Fillieule (2003) develop this typology by combining the dimen-
sions of the main classiﬁcations and typologies out there on protest policing tactics,
strategies, and styles of control. Their meta-analysis yields 7 dimensions, which are
singled out as most relevant: the degree of force used, the number of prohibited be-
haviors, the number of repressed groups, the agent’s respect of the law, the timing
of the intervention, the degree of communication with the demonstrators, and the
51degree of adaptability. The combination of these dimensions describes the protest
policing style employed by the state’s security force actors at protest events. This
can be boiled down to two main styles—one more opportunist, tolerant, selective,
ﬂexible, and “soft," and the other repressive, diﬀuse, dissuasive, and “hard."
It is the “hard" or “tough" style that I am concerned with in this project. The
dependent variable is about the “tough" style, which usually implies the repression of
a large number of protest groups and a wide range of protest activities via a massive
use of force and/or illegal tactics (for example, the use of an agent provocateur or
an undercover agent who instigates mob-like violence so that a tough style of protest
policing appears justiﬁed). Scholars of comparative politics also look at this tough
style of protest policing, putting it under the umbrella of high intensity coercion, “or
highly visible acts of repression that target large numbers of people"—meant to cause
fear and crush social movements (Levitsky and Way 2010: 57-9).
Traditionally, protest policing has been studied from a police-centric perspective.
In other words, the police (or riot police) has been considered the principle enactor
of the state’s protest policing strategies. However, in many cases, particularly in
quasi-democracies, the military plays a greater (or equal) role within the country
52suppressing internal threat than it does managing external threat. One aspect of the
hybrid function of many militaries then is protest policing. In this project, military
violence is the use of a “tough" style of protest policing by entities that fall under a
country’s armed forces. These entities can be regular military units, parallel military
institutions (like the IRGC in Iran), or paramilitary bodies.
Why the focus on militaries? The involvement of militaries in the suppression
of protest events has been a topic that has not received much attention. However,
more recently, as a result of the Arab Spring, there has been a ﬂurry of research
that looks at the nature of this involvement. The contribution of my work to this
literature has been twofold. First, I consider intra-state variation in military violence,
whereas most of the existing research focuses solely on inter-state variation. Second,
this theoretical framework goes beyond an understanding of civil-military relations
as deﬁned by only the relationship between the government and the armed forces;
it brings society back in by examining the eﬀect of groups and cleavages on the
military’s behavior. Furthermore, military violence (or lack thereof) during protests
is the prerequisite for other outcomes of interest: civil war, revolutions, severe internal
violence, or massive government concessions. In fact, when protests are the most
53threatening, governments are faced with a need for the most intense forms of protest
policing.6 These intense forms of protest policing (or high intensity coercion) usually
involve an enhanced capacity for violence or terror (the promotion of fear through
illegal tactics), which is less likely in most police forces. Such a capacity is most likely
to be found in the military or military-like entities like militias or paramilitary units.
I discuss the measurement of this concept of military violence in each of the case
studies in greater detail. A few points are worth mentioning here. As opposed to
ﬁxating on a speciﬁc indicator (like the precise number of deaths during a protest
event), I measure speciﬁc tactics and strategies, which capture protest policing style.
Though fatalities are usually the result of such high intensity tactics and strategies,
and fatalities would be the easiest and most concrete way of measuring a “tough"
protest policing style, focusing on just this would lead to massive under-measurement
because of media censorship and issues of access. Thus, though I look for evidence
of fatalities, operationalizing the dependent variable is more centered around iden-
tifying high intensity tactics employed by the military that would lead to fatalities.
For example, during the Green Revolution, though it was unclear how many people
6This is true, of course, only in certain types of political contexts. In fully developed democracies,
protests, no matter how large they become, never pose as much of a “threat" to the government
and/or the capacity for full-scale violence against citizens is not there.
54may have been killed or seriously injured by the Basij in any given protest event,
what usually became clear in reports were the tactics Basijis used, such as wearing
plainclothes and stabbing protesters in order to create an environment of terror, thus
dissuading others from coming out to join the protests.
552 | Alternative Explanations
The purpose of this chapter is to consider the rationalist and realist alternatives
to my question about the diﬀerences in outcome between 1979 and 2009. By consid-
ering these alternatives, I hope to clarify the value-added of my socio-psychological
approach. At the danger of giving the punchline away, the main beneﬁt of my ap-
proach is that it does a better job explaining not just the variation that occurs within
a state over time, but also the variation that occurs within a state during the same
protest movement (i.e., from protest event to protest event). The alternatives I go
through in this chapter all fail in this regard.
My approach does not necessarily mean that I am trying to bring down ratio-
nalism. As many scholars have noted, rationalism is inherently diﬃcult to disprove.
Some have claimed that it is not technically a theory because it is unfalsiﬁable (Boland
1981; Radnitzsky 1992 on economic imperialism; Winter 1964; Hodgson 2003) or in-
56determinate (Elster 1989a)—anything can be presented as “rational." Thus, in this
chapter, I lay out some diﬀerences between my approach and a classically rational-
ist one, acknowledging the universality of rationalism and the losing battle that any
scholar faces when trying to “disprove" the rational alternative. It is possible to set
up a countless number of rationalist alternatives. What is going on between the ears
is impossible to measure—not only for those forwarding a psychological approach,
but also for those forwarding a rationalist one.
Given this, the value added of a psychological approach is that it does a better
job explaining the subtle kinds of variation that occur when the researcher takes a
magnifying glass and peers closely into a country. This variation occurs despite the
constancy of variables traditionally regarded as rationalist ones. For example, in
Iran, the same military organization that rapidly fell apart during the 1979 Iranian
revolution was willing to ﬁre on protesters during a wave of protests that occurred
in 1963. There is no evidence to suggest that the state became weaker or that the
military was less able to conduct a coercive strategic operation against protesters in
1979. In fact, the opposite is true in Iran; by 1979, at least on the surface, the military
appeared stronger than ever. And, as I will discuss later, a traditional rationalist
57take on the situation would struggle explaining why a military organization that was
professionalized would choose to side against crowds in 1963.
This chapter looks at three alternative explanations. All three are rationalist,
but the third is also realist to the extent that it traces the source of variation in
the levels of international pressure between 1979 and 2009 to realpolitik concerns (or
lack thereof). The ﬁrst alternative assesses the role of professionalization through a
rationalist framework. This version of a rationalist argument focuses on the costs of
engaging in high intensity coercion by the military. The main factor in the “utility
function" is the concern for survival. The alternative (i.e., what the cost of engaging
in high intensity coercion is compared against) is what life would look like for the
military as an institution after the potential fall of the current regime. Is the military
institutionalized enough to survive beyond the collapse of any given regime? The
second alternative is also rationalist, but the focus is on incentives at an elite level.
The alternative “strategy" depends on the possibility of material gain under a diﬀerent
regime. In this scenario, a military elite is comparing his access to resources under two
diﬀerent conditions—one that may extend the length of his time horizon (assuming
no change in the discount factor), thereby fostering “loyalty" to the current regime.
58Finally, the third alternative explanation discusses the role of international pressure on
domestic politics. Is is possible that the pull (or lack thereof) of material and security
ties with a powerful nation—the U.S.—is driving the military’s use of violence against
protesters?
Alternative Explanation 1: Professionalization
The ﬁrst rationalist alternative explanation focuses on the (material) costs to
the military of either obeying orders and inﬂicting violence on crowds or disobey-
ing and facing the prospects of a regime transition. I put this alternative under the
“professionalization" umbrella; however, I recognize that this umbrella is potentially
wider than the rationalist frame would allow. Thus, before I specify how I am inter-
preting professionalization as a rationalist alternative explanation, I will give some
background and problematize the concept in order to justify my decision with it.
Civil-military relations describe the relationship between society as a whole and
the military organization established to protect it. It tends to focus on the relationship
between the civil authority of a given society and its military authority. The crucial
debate within the early (and current) literature on civil-military relations centered
59on the paradox of military power and the motivation for its restraint: society creates
an institution that specializes in violence, but then fears this very institution for that
reason (Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960; Finer 1976; Perlmutter 1977; Dassel 1998 to
name just a few). Scholars approached the question of how to ensure civilian control
of the military (and, thus, avoid military intervention) from diﬀerent, inter-related
perspectives (Desch 1999; Taylor 2003; Katzenstein 1996; Mendeloﬀ 1994), yet the
concept of “professionalization" emerged as a signiﬁcant variable, eventually carrying
with it a normative value—professionalization was something to which all militaries
should aspire.
For Huntington (1957), professionalization implies that the military subordinates
itself to civilian control voluntarily because members believe they have a “higher
calling" in the service of society. Professionalism is characterized by expertise, re-
sponsibility, and corporateness. All three characteristics, in particular the last two,
rely heavily on a sense of belonging to the group (Huntington 1957). Yet, for Hunt-
ington, a fully professionalized military is one that is politically sterile. This tension
between a strong sense of group identiﬁcation and a lack of political interest led
some to critique Huntington’s conceptualization of professionalization. They argued
60that there are elements of professionalization that actually encourage the military
to get involved in civilian politics, thereby undermining the power and authority of
the civilian government. Recognizing the role of politicization as an important, in-
tervening variable, these scholars have emphasized how military organizations that
look professional by most standards have still conducted coups, disobeyed civilian or-
ders, and/or intervened in domestic politics (Feaver 1996; Finer 1976; Janowitz 1960;
Abrahamsson 1972; Welch 1987; Rouquie 1982; Stepan 1971; Kooning 2003; Pickard
1988; Remmer 1989).
Given this problematization in the literature, a prediction for how professional-
ization should aﬀect the likelihood of high intensity coercion by the military against
protesters is diﬃcult. On the one hand, if we take a strict interpretation of profes-
sionalization as the complete subordination of military will to civilian control, then
we might expect that the more professionalized a military organization, the less likely
we are to observe disobedience in the face of government orders to ﬁre on crowds.
On the other hand, a more commonly accepted expectation of professionalization
(Levitsky et al. 2012; Bellin 2004) is that, in the context of mass-based threats, the
military will abandon civilian leaders and choose not to suppress crowds because of
61this overarching sense of “duty" or service to the national interest—highlighted by
the scholars who emphasize the role of politicization as an intervening variable.
Part of the reason for this uncertainty regarding prediction is that there is a lack of
clarity when it comes to how scholars measure the concept of professionalization. This
is evident in the scholarship. Bellin (2012) argues that the relative professionalization
of the Egyptian military explains why the military refused to inﬂict wide-scale violence
against protesters in 2011. Other scholars argue that the Egyptian military was
not professionalized, citing similar information that Bellin acknowledges, namely the
considerable corruption that characterized the Egyptian military (Springbord 1989;
Kassem 2004; Levitsky et al. 2012). Thus, despite a similar understanding of the
Egyptian military, scholars disagree about the level of professionalization in a well
studied case. In short, based on the literature, it is clear that there are diﬀerent takes
on the concept of professionalization.
For the sake of clarity, I will focus on Bellin’s (2004; 2012) take on professional-
ization because it is the most clearly rationalist.1 For Bellin, the concepts of profes-
1In some ways, it could be argued that the concept of professionalization is not entirely rationalist,
given its focus on non-material and ideological motivations, especially in its original and earliest
formulation. However, more recent work has highlighted a more rationalist understanding of the
concept.
62sionalization and institutionalization are tightly linked. Bellin (2004, 2012) analyzes
the sources of regime stability and breakdown in the Middle East, ﬁnding that the
army’s will to repress is a function of its institutionalization.
She argues that highly institutionalized military organizations in which “recruit-
ment and promotion are based on performance rather than politics" are more likely
to side with opposition movements and “jettison" an autocrat because they perceive
the costs of engaging in high intensity coercion as too great (Bellin 2012: 133). In
this case, military elites are able to “see life beyond the regime" because the military
is conceived of as a separate institution, removed from the political processes signif-
icant to the fate of the government—i.e., there is a sense of belonging to a broader,
national group. On the other hand, militaries that are organized along patrimonial
lines are likely to remain loyal and carry out high intensity coercion—they are less
“professionalized." Where military oﬃcials are linked to “regime elites through bonds
of blood or sect or ethnicity, where career advancement is governed by cronyism and
political loyalty rather than merit...then the fate of the military’s leadership becomes
intrinsically linked to the longevity of the regime" (Bellin 2012: 133). Otherwise put,
the costs of engaging in high intensity coercion are lower than the costs associated
63with a potential fallout from a change in leadership as a result of opposition success.
Her explanation is rationalist to the extent that it focuses on material costs and
incentives for behavior. In this calculation, the assumption is that military members
care about survival and resources over other non-material or ideological factors. In
fact, it is on this point that Levitsky et al. (2012) criticize Bellin’s approach, making
the case that ideology plays a role in solidifying us-them distinctions, which are critical
when it comes to maintaining a will and capacity to repress. In some ways, this implies
that Bellin has underestimated the real “costs" of repression—something more than
concern for survival and resources may have to drive the kind of violence that is
necessary during periods of intense repression.
How does professionalization fall short when it comes to explaining why the mil-
itary did not repress crowds in 1979 but did so very successfully in 2009? In 1979,
based on Bellin’s version of professionalization, Iran’s highly institutionalized military
organization sided with the opposition movement, leading to the fall of the Shah. Her
theory seems to explain the military’s behavior adequately, though the level of profes-
sionalization remains somewhat unclear—career advancement in the military under
the Shah was partially driven by cronyism and political loyalty rather than merit.
64On the other hand, the level of professionalization does not adequately explain the
2009 case. Iran’s current military organization is not any less professionalized than
the Iranian military under the Shah, according to Bellin’s deﬁnition of institution-
alization; yet, the outcome was very diﬀerent in 2009—the military did successfully
repress crowds in a campaign that lasted approximately eight months.
Even if we take a broader understanding of professionalization as it is understood
(albeit nebulously) in the literature, professionalization does not do a very good job
explaining intra-state variation. Cases of military violence vary even when the level of
professionalization is held constant. For example, most would agree that Sri Lanka’s
armed forces exhibit a high degree of civilian control (see Senaratne 2003). However,
in 1983, the military was deployed to suppress anti-Tamil riots and failed to act; yet,
in 1961 and throughout the late 1980s, it willingly suppressed Tamil civil-disobedience
and insurrections. Alternatively, though the Egyptian military refused to inﬂict wide-
scale violence on protesters during the 2011 protests in Cairo, it (or portions of
the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces) has not failed to act violently against
demonstrations by Egypt’s minority groups (particularly, the Coptic population).
Similarly, in the Iranian cases, there is variation that occurs despite a constant
65level of professionalization. An excellent example of this is the military’s harsh crack-
down on large protest waves in 1963 versus the military breakdown in 1979. In the
next section, I look at 1963 in greater detail, focusing on Bellin’s version of profes-
sionalization because it is the most clearly delineated, particularly with respect to its
rationalist framework.
1963
In this section, I will compare the Shah’s harsh crackdown on protesters in 1963 to
the lack of one in 1979. These two cases provide a useful comparison, especially as a
test of the rationalist alternative explanation. As I mentioned earlier, there can be a
countless number of rationalist alternatives. Therefore, I am being very speciﬁc about
the ones I am considering. The next section, on the party centered approach, discusses
a second type of rationalist alternative—one that is more focused on incentives at an
elite level. Bellin’s rationalist alternative centers on costs, speciﬁcally costs that are
tied to threats. The critical question for Bellin really is: how threatened does the
military feel? Given a similar level of threat, a highly institutionalized military versus
a less institutionalized military should act diﬀerently. Otherwise put, given a similar
66level of threat across time between two social movements (in the same country),
the same military should take similar actions because the costs of engaging in high
intensity coercion against protesters are comparable. This set-up is precisely why
comparing 1963 to 1979 is informative for the rationalist case (or, more precisely, this
rationalist case).
As a summary, I will argue here that it is puzzling that the Iranian military
launched a wide-scale campaign of violent repression against the 1963 social move-
ment, given that it failed to do so in 1979. Both social movements were equally
threatening based on “rationalist" factors like the likelihood of success and the size
of the movements. The calculation of “costs" to repressing crowds, given the same
military organization, should have been similar; yet, despite this, the Iranian military
behaved diﬀerently in the two cases. The diﬀerence cannot be understood without the
consideration of another factor: the composition of crowds. The non-material factors
linked to group identiﬁcation—namely, whether a crowd was part of the in-group or
the “other" group—mattered in 1963 and 1979.
The 1963 movement is known as the Qom Protests, even though the movement
spread to Tehran, Shiraz, Mashhad, and Varamin. The movement lasted from the
67beginning of 1963 to the end of the summer, so it was roughly a few months shorter in
duration than the Iranian Revolution. The reason for its name is due to what sparked
the movement. The “White Revolution" of the Shah led to massive changes in Iranian
society throughout the 1940s and 1950s. These polices included land reform, extended
rights for both non-Muslims and women, and attempts to modernize the bureaucracy
and the educational system. Within a short period of time, a very strong opposition
to these programs formed in the clerical establishment in Qom, headed by Ayatollah
Khomeini. In early 1963, the Shah’s security forces entered Qom in retribution, killing
a young seminarian student, which launched a social movement that was, in many
ways, a precursor to the Iranian Revolution ﬁfteen years later.
There are two protest events during 1963 that are particularly informative for
comparative purposes; however, it is important to note that, on a broader level, the
resilience with which the military clamped down on protests in 1963 stands in stark
contrast to the rapid breakdown of the military’s will to crush similarly sized crowds
in 1979. The ﬁrst protest event is the one in Tehran on June 3, 1963, the day of
Ashura, which is a Shi’a holiday. This protest drew a crowd of more than 100,000
people, who were there to support a speech given by Khomeini (who was actually in
68Qom, though the protest in Tehran drew a signiﬁcantly larger crowd). The crowd
was so large and broad, composed of multiple groups, including merchants, Khomeini
supporters, and villagers, that the military was eﬀectively “neutralized" (Poulson
2005). Though the military was mobilized on the streets in Tehran on that day, there
were no deaths reported at this protest event—it seems that the military did not
open ﬁre on the protesters (Poulson 2005; Baqer 2000). This protest event turned
out to be the exception rather than the rule during the Qom Protests. Most of the
other protests were violently crushed by the military; most of these other protests also
happened to be very narrowly composed of one group: the ultra-religious Khomeini
supporters.
Just three days later, a very diﬀerent story unraveled on the streets of Tehran.
Shortly after his speech on the third, Khomeini was arrested and taken to Qasr Prison
in Tehran. As news of this broke on the morning of the 5th, masses of protesters took
to the streets in the capital city (and in some of the other major urban centers like
Shiraz and Mashhad) for six consecutive days. The protest event on the 6th in Tehran
was composed of “thousands," and the protest group was described as composed of
mainly Khomeini supporters—given the political context, this mostly likely meant
69members of the religious class (though there is evidence that ultra-religious villagers
were also involved in other protest events during this time). The Chicago Tribune
called the opposition a “Moslem Sect" (Chicago Tribune 6/6/1963). The crowds were
confronted by soldiers in combat gear who had been given shoot-to-kill orders (Baqer
2000; corroborated in The Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, and The Sun). It is
unclear how many were injured or killed during this period of time, which was the
most intense of the 1963 movement. At the (Tehran) June 6 event, it was reported
that 86 were killed and 150 were injured (The Washington Post 6/7/1963), though I
doubt the accuracy of this number because most secondary sources have claimed that
a deﬁnitive number is not known (Poulson 2005; Baqer 2000). The point, however,
is that the military did ﬁre on protesters at this event (as well as others during the
protest period).
November 5, 1978 is a good comparison to June 6, 1963. On November 5th, thou-
sands of people also took to the streets of Tehran, protesting the Shah’s undemocratic
regime. Like June 6, the protests on November 5th began peacefully and then turned
violent in some parts of Tehran. Unlike June 6th, these protests were broad, com-
posed of multiple groups in society, including the middle class, the merchants, and
70the religious class (though the rioters toward the end of the day tended to be young
teenage boys, see Kurzman 2005). The outcome of November 5th was also very dif-
ferent from June 6, 1963. The army did little to stop the riots, and did not open ﬁre
on protesters earlier in the day (Zabir 2011).
I have brought up three cases: 6/3/1963, 6/6/1963, and 11/5/1978. A comparison
of these cases problematizes the rationalist perspective oﬀered by Bellin. There are
two broad factors to consider within her framework. The ﬁrst is the issue of threat. All
three crowds were similarly sized—in the thousands (on the large end). This implies
that the military perceived the same level of threat in all three cases. However, this is
only one measure for “threat," which may not be comprehensive. Threat is also driven
by a perception of the likelihood of success (i.e., did the military think the crowds
might actually be able to threaten the regime and topple it), as well as protester
violence. In this case, the ﬁrst case on June 3, 1963 falls short. Protesters were
not violent; demonstrators were described as peaceful, though chants called for the
removal of the Shah (Poulson 2005). However, it is clear that, in both cases in 1963,
the military took the threats very seriously. The Shah and his family were removed
from Tehran and taken to a safe location (Chicago Tribune 6/6/1963). Based on
71this and the fact that martial law was also declared in 1963, the perception that
crowds may be successful in toppling the regime was comparable to November 5,
1978. By early December 1978, the threat level increased as it became clear to the
military that the crowds were not going to be suppressed and the Shah’s concessions
were not working; however, it is fair to say that threat perception based on the
protesters’ likelihood of success in November 1978 was comparable to that in both
cases during June 1963. Furthermore, at least in two of the cases (June 6, 1963 and
November 5, 1978), the levels of protester violence were comparable. Both events
started peacefully, and became violent in certain parts of Tehran as the day went on.
How about the state of the military organization between the protest movements?
It is safe to assume that the military did not change much between June 3, 1963
and June 5, 1963. However, is it possible that the Iranian military became more
institutionalized by 1978? If that was the case, then this rationalist alternative may
explain the diﬀerence in outcome. Despite a similar level of threat in 1963 and 1978,
was the Iranian military institutionalized enough by 1978 to view the costs of high
intensity coercion as greater than the alternative, which was a new regime? Was it
the case that the Iranian military in 1978 was professionalized to the point that it
72sided with the opposition movement because it saw “life after the regime?" In some
respects, the opposite is true. By 1978, the corruption and favoritism that determined
career advancement were higher than ever before—the Shah had become increasingly
paranoid about threats to his rule and had many safeguards in place to prevent a
potential coup (Zabir 2011). But, overall, there were no signiﬁcant changes to the
structure of the military2 between these periods of time that suggested the Iranian
military became somehow more professionalized or institutionalized, especially to the
point at which it would matter in such a signiﬁcant way.
Before ending this section, it is important to bring up an additional point that
is related to military professionalization. Professionalization can also be about the
levels of training in appropriate tactics (see Kamrava 2000 for good review). A profes-
sionalized military knows how to do its job. Unfortunately, this job does not involve
protest policing. Thus, when a military is ordered to suppress protests, there may be
a higher likelihood of violence simply because the military has not been trained to
handle protesters without shooting. In fact, this lack of training in riot control tactics
is often used to explain why poorly trained soldiers ﬁre on crowds. Thus, perhaps
2Bellin’s argument about institutionalization is ultimately one about the structure of the military
organization, which did not change signiﬁcantly between 1963 and 1978.
73variations in levels of riot control training and/or access to riot control equipment
actually explain the outbreak of military violence during protests?
There is some merit to this argument. The lack of appropriate training and
a shortage of riot control equipment (rubber bullets, helmets, batons...etc) were a
contribution to the violence in 1979. Black Friday ended up the way it did, with
massive violence against protesters that resulted in the deaths of dozens, partially
because the military did not know how to manage protesters without ﬁring into
crowds. Many have noted that the Iranian military at the time was not trained to
suppress protests using riot control methods (that are coercive, but usually not fatal).
Furthermore, the Carter administration refused to sell riot control equipment to the
regime—there was a shortage of batons, protective gear, and rubber bullets (Chehabi
2013). The question is: would eﬀective training and equipment have made much of a
diﬀerence, especially in the long-run? If the military had been trained and equipped
appropriately, would we not observe an outbreak of violence?
In 1979, the answer is maybe. The counterfactual is hard to assess. It is possible
that there may not have been fatalities on Black Friday had the military received
riot control training and possessed the necessary equipment. On the other hand, the
74Shah wanted a show of force on that day. Black Friday occurred immediately after the
Shah declared a state of emergency. He had raised the stakes, putting his authority
on the line by forbidding further protests. When people ignored his orders, it would
have seemed weak not to respond forcefully. The Shah believed that a show of force
would deter future protests. He had ordered the military to clamp down harshly on
protesters knowing that deaths would result—he had full information regarding the
lack of riot control training and equipment. The point of Black Friday was violence.
In fact, this is a general problem with the argument that a lack of riot control
training/equipment is responsible for military violence; the assumption of this argu-
ment is that the regime would prefer no casualties. Militaries, in general, are not
supposed to operate like police forces.3 Most countries have riot control police that
serve that function. When the military is called upon to handle protesters, the ex-
pectation and intention is violence. In some cases, a regime might be interested in
high intensity coercion with the real risk of fatalities. Why might there be a prefer-
ence for fatal tactics and strategies? State terror includes harassment, spying, bans,
arrests, torture, and mass (visible) killing by the government for the explicit purpose
3There is not much variation across militaries when it comes to riot control training. So, this
explanation is inherently hard to test.
75of deterring future opposition (see Davenport 2007). In 2009, the Iranian regime was
not interested in “safe" tactics of crowd control. There is no evidence that rubber
bullets and helmets were in short supply. There is also no evidence that training in
riot control policing was in short supply. Iran’s police is large and well-trained, and
the IRGC engaged in riot control policing on many occasions, proving that elements
within the IRGC had some familiarity with crowd control methods short of killing. In
fact, there was an intentionality present in the regime’s strategy against protesters—
what might be called state terror. The perversity of some of the tactics—particularly
those that involved sexual violence and torture by the Basij—also proves that the
regime would not have preferred other, less fatal methods of crowd control.
Finally, in a rationalist framework, the ratio of troops to rioters may matter,
so it is important to brieﬂy assess this. If military units are sent to suppress a
crowd, and they are outnumbered and attacked, it is possible that they may use
their weapons to avoid being overrun. I am unable to systematically test this in
the empirical chapters because there is incomplete information regarding the number
of troops that are sent in. However, in very large protests, we can assume that
state forces are outnumbered by protesters (though the extent may vary). The ratio
76between protesters and state forces alone does not predict the outbreak of violence,4
but perhaps protester violence is the missing link? When protests are large and state
forces (we assume) are outnumbered, is it more likely that the military will respond
with violence if protesters become violent? This sequencing of events—protesters in a
large demonstration becoming violent ﬁrst, followed by military violence—does seem
to have some leverage, particularly in 1979 on Black Friday. Though accounts vary,
there is some consensus that armed members hiding among the crowd began ﬁring
weapons ﬁrst, killing several soldiers (though both sides have claimed that the other
ﬁred ﬁrst. See Afkhami 2009.). The soldiers then began to ﬁre wildly into the crowd
because they felt threatened.
However, despite this partial support, the argument about the ratio of troops falls
apart in 2009. It is widely accepted that the regime’s troops usually initiated ﬁrst,
and, in general, aside from barricades and rock throwing, protesters were peaceful,
particularly in the beginning of the movement (Makhmalbaf 2009). At the peak of
the movement, rioting did break out, but this occurred after sustained attacks by the
Basij and other military forces (Majd 2010). In short, there was not a sense, based
4There is variation in military violence, holding the size of the protesting crowd constant.
77on everything I have read, that troops may have felt outnumbered or threatened
by violent protesters who were attacking them. Iranian protesters during the Green
Revolution were armed mostly with slogans and, at times, rocks, which they used
defensively against (mostly) Basijis, who were out in incredibly large numbers with
the explicit intention of harming and terrorizing people.
Alternative Explanation 2: The Party Centered Ap-
proach
A second rationalist alternative explanation emphasizes the role of parties and
political institutions. Comparative scholars argue that single parties matter when
it comes to explaining regime cohesion, which is a signiﬁcant part of the authori-
tarian durability literature. Iran has been problematic for this literature, and the
Arab Spring, particularly Egypt and Tunisia, has led to new work that has further
problematized the scholarship on authoritarian durability (see Gause 2011 for a good
review). Why is regime cohesion relevant to the discussion of why militaries inﬂict
violence on protesters? According to Levitsky et al. (2012), inﬂicting violence on
protesters—or high intensity coercion—requires an extraordinary level of regime co-
78hesion5 because the ability to crush protests depends on the regime’s will or capacity
to do so.
Barbara Geddes (1999) found that single party regimes were more cohesive and
stable than military or personalistic dictatorships. Others went on to deﬁne fur-
ther how single parties enhanced elite cohesion and led to coercive structures that
were better able to manage mass-based threats (Brownlee 2007; Gandhi 2008; Svo-
lik 2012; Reuter and Remington 2009). In general, the party centered approach has
been rationalist, focusing on how single parties create incentives for long-term loyalty.
Otherwise put, in single party regimes, the military is more loyal because the beneﬁt
of crushing dissent is greater than the cost of failing, given some risk of failure, which
is endogenous (the risk of failure decreases as loyalty to the regime increases). Why
is the beneﬁt of crushing dissent so much greater in single party regimes? Single
party regimes pay oﬀ for members of the military in the long-run because they set
up mechanisms that reward loyalty—“sticking" with the regime ensures that, in the
end, members have access to the spoils of oﬃce. These spoils include future opportu-
nities for career advancement and government resources (often for personal use). By
5This is deﬁned as the extent to which the regime elite has the stomach and capacity to defend
the regime against threats, in this case mass-based ones.
79lengthening actors’ time horizons and channeling elite ambitions, single party regimes
create an environment that encourages actors to care about the regime’s future be-
cause doing so ensures their own future gain.
Brownlee (2007) identiﬁed Egypt’s ruling National Democratic Party as a key
source of regime cohesion and the absence of a ruling party as a key source of vulner-
ability for Iran. So, is it possible that a party centered approach actually explains the
diﬀerence in outcome between 1979 and 2009 for Iran? Are militaries in single party
regimes more likely to ﬁre on protesters? It turns out that Brownlee’s predictions
could not have been more wrong. A single party in the Egyptian case was not a key
source of cohesion in 2011, and the absence of one in the Iranian case did not play a
key role in the regime’s survival in 2009. Furthermore, the presence of a ruling party
under the Shah did nothing to prevent or overcome the social movement that led to
the 1979 Revolution.6
It is important to note that the problem with the party centered approach is that
it focuses too much on the elites and not enough on the coercive apparatus of the state
6In 1975, the Shah announced a single party system throughout the country. Prior to this point,
there were two main parties, but he ordered these parties to dissolve and created a single party called
Rastakhiz. Years later the Shah confessed in his memories that the abolishment of all political parties
was a mistake that backﬁred.
80(Levitsky et al. 2012). It is, at its heart, a theory about elite cohesion. It assumes
that this high-level cohesion transfers down to the individuals agents—i.e., the bulk
of the coercive apparatus—who actually inﬂict the violence. In fact, based on the
1979 Iran case, one factor this theory overlooks is the eﬀect the coercive apparatus
has on elite cohesion. Prior to 1978, the Shah’s regime, which operated with a single
party, was cohesive—the mechanisms that regulated access to the spoils of public
oﬃce and extended actors’ time horizons did provide incentives for long-term loyalty.
Regime cohesion began to dissolve once it became clear to the Shah and his generals
that the army rank and ﬁle would most probably fall apart if ordered to inﬂict wide
scale violence upon protesters (Zabir 2012). On the other hand, in 2009, the election
revealed a lack of regime cohesion, and this was, in part, due to the fact that the
Islamic Regime does not have a single party system. However, despite this lack of
elite cohesion, the coercive apparatus demonstrated a will and capacity to crush the
opposition.
A further problem with the party-centered approach is that it does not account for
the intra-state variation that occurs both within a protest movement (from protest
event to protest event) and between protest movements in the same country. Even
81though the party centered argument may not be meant to explain variation at the
intra-state level, an argument that encompasses all levels of variation is superior to
one that only applies to a broader level. Going small and trying to explain the intra-
state variation is key to understanding the mechanisms that drive the outcome—in
this case, violence by the military against protesters. An answer that holds up at
the level of intra-state variation is probably more robust at the inter-state level as
well—as we saw with the party-centered approach, it falls short at the inter-state
level as well.
Levitsky et al. (2012) also critique the party-centered approach, arguing that it
does not focus adequately on the state’s coercive apparatus, which is the main factor
when it comes to explaining the likelihood of high intensity coercion. Their state-
centered approach underscores a non-material basis for regime cohesion: revolution-
ary origins. They argue that “origins in a sustained, violent, and ideologically-driven
struggle for power are a critical source of elite cohesion—and regime durability" (Lev-
itsky et al. 2012: 9). Revolutionary origins enhance a regime’s repressive capacity by
giving rise to large and highly disciplined coercive structures, creating a shared revo-
lutionary ideology and identity, and polarizing societies (thus, sharpening “us-them"
82distinctions and strengthening within-group ties). Though this approach comes the
closest to providing a satisfying explanation for the inter-state variation in military
violence, there are important gaps that need to be ﬁlled, namely at the intra-state
level, which is overlooked by Levitsky et al. (2012). Their approach emphasizes
several non-material mechanisms that are not adequately explored because they re-
quire further theorization. How do the dynamics of “us-them" distinctions matter
in the context of a state’s security apparatus? By looking within a protest event,
my approach contributes to the state-centered approach by clarifying how us-them
distinctions matter in the context of the military organization and the protest event.
Alternative Explanation 3: International Concerns
Variations in levels of international pressure may have an impact on the willingness
on the part of the state and the military to use force against protesters. Perhaps
changes in the type and level of international pressure not to engage in violence
against protesters were driving the diﬀerence between 1979 and 2009? Though it is
true that the source of international pressure was diﬀerent, perhaps more inﬂuential,
in 1979 (due to realpolitik concerns), the marginal impact this had on the Shah’s
83motivations seems to be limited. Furthermore, given the rise of social media in 2009,
which increased the level of transparency, international pressure may not have been
signiﬁcantly less during the Green Revolution, though the source of it was diﬀerent.
Some argue that the United States’ inﬂuence, as one of two major superpowers,
loomed large under the Shah, even when it came to matters of internal security.
With the end of WW2, the Soviet Union and the U.S. emerged as the two hegemonic
powers, each eager to halt the other’s sway in key regions around the world. In fact,
the Cold War was dominated by a balance of power, both globally and regionally,
as great power politics and conﬂict played out in regions like the Middle East, Latin
America, and Africa (Halliday 2005). The U.S. saw the Middle East as a key factor
of national security, and believed that the USSR wanted more inﬂuence in the region
for the same reasons. The Middle East held the key to the world’s most massive oil
reserves, and it became increasingly clear that whoever controlled this region also
controlled the global oil supply.
The decision by Great Britain in the late 1960s to withdraw its military forces
from the Persian Gulf and to grant independence to its ten protectorates on the
Arabian Peninsula confronted the United States with a strategic dilemma. Since
84U.S. troops were focused on Vietnam, the U.S. decided to build up the capabilities
of its two closest allies in the region (not counting Israel): Iran and Saudi Arabia.
As the “twin pillars" of U.S. policy, these two countries, with support from the U.S.,
would be able to protect the region from the spread of Soviet inﬂuence, and the U.S.
would not be over-extended during the Cold War (Hooglund 1992). As a result of
this close relationship, Iran received billions of dollars of military aid in the form of
advanced arms, resources, and capital, becoming extremely dependent on not only
U.S. money, but also U.S. expertise when it came to managing/operating the new
technology (Hooglund 1992; Zabir 2011).
Within this context of a critical Cold War alliance and Iran’s dependence on the
United States, some have argued that the Carter administration was responsible for
the Shah’s unwillingness or inability to clamp down harshly on protesters, which
led to the fall of the regime (see Milani 2008; Sabeti 2012; Evans 2014; Graham
1980). When Jimmy Carter became President in 1976, America was at the peak of
a liberal wave of anti-Vietnam War emotion. Carter’s presidency was marked by a
liberal foreign policy agenda; in fact, he said he would bring pressure on the Shah
to make Iran more democratic (Milani 2008; Evans 2014). Carter created a special
85Oﬃce of Human Rights after he was inaugurated in an eﬀort to make American
foreign policy seem more benevolent. Portraying this image of the United States as
a benevolent superpower meant not being in alliances with authoritarian dictators
who had shoddy human rights records like the Shah. In fact, when Carter sent the
Shah “a polite reminder" of the importance of political rights and freedom, the Shah
felt pressured, and responded by granting amnesty to almost 400 political prisoners
and permitting the Red Cross to visit prisons (Abrahamian 1982). As this highlights,
there was no question that the United States’ opinions on Iranian domestic politics
mattered to the Shah.
By the time the Iranian Revolution was in full swing in the fall of 1978, it became
clear that the Shah’s soft policy toward the protesters was not working, and some
blamed the Carter administration’s inﬂuence for these policies (Pahlavi 2004; Sa-
beti in Milani 2008; Afkhami 2008; Amuzegar 1991). The Shah, on many occasions
throughout 1978, attempted to reason with protesters, appearing conciliatory and
even admitting faults. He also promised concessions and ordered the police not to
use deadly force, which was diﬃcult because the Carter Administration had refused
to sell Iran protest policing gear, like tear gas and rubber bullets, for humanitarian
86reasons. When Parviz Sabeti, a senior SAVAK oﬃcial, gave him the names of 2000
protest leaders to arrest, the Shah ignored the advice, arresting only a small handful
(Milani 2008). He also ordered arrested protesters to be tried in civilian rather than
military courts (which would have been a much stronger deterrent), and ﬁred high-
ranking members of SAVAK for inappropriate behavior—probably because they were
being too harsh (Amuzegar 1991).
On the ﬂip side, in 2009, there was, arguably, less international pressure on Iran
for its human rights. This may explain why the Islamic Regime was able to crush
protests so harshly. Though it is true that there may have been some form of interna-
tional pressure through various international organizations and international media
(including social media), a realist perspective would discount the value of this type of
pressure, arguing that it does not compare to actual material and security inﬂuence
in the form of a major alliance with a superpower, especially during the Cold War.
So, is it true that the Shah’s hands were tied because of Iran’s close relationship
with the United States and its liberal foreign policy agenda at the time? There are a
number of issues with this claim, though I don’t doubt that the international context
did have some eﬀect. First, the negative view of the Shah as a dictator who would
87have ordered troops to slaughter thousands of protesters has come into question with
the release of new information about SAVAK and the actual estimates of political
prisoners and torture victims. During the Iranian Revolution, the opposition claimed
that Iran had “hundreds of thousands of political prisoners," and that countless thou-
sands had been killed and tortured to death. The actual number of political prisoners
(in total) was 4000, and the actual number of people executed for political crimes was
1,500 (Milani 2012). Indeed, the release of this new information has been part of a
revival of the Shah’s reputation, with new biographical work that has painted the
Shah and his regime in a diﬀerent light—a less oppressive one.
These new works tend to suggest that he was a troubled leader who was, nonethe-
less, a true believer in the message he sold to the Iranian people, which was one of
greatness with him at the helm as a “father ﬁgure" to the nation—something his own
writings center on as well (Milani 2012; Pahlavi 1980, 1977; Sciolino 2000). Indeed,
after his exile, the Shah conceded that he had made mistakes during his reign, but
he was also very clear about his refusal to engage in full-scale violence against the
people he was charged to protect above all (see his last interview with Robert Frost
in 1979).
88Ultimately, the problem with trying to ﬁgure out whether the Shah would have
actually ordered a full-scale crackdown on protesters is that it is impossible to get into
his head and identify his real motivations. Who is to say what actually motivated
him? And, multiple motivations are possible in a complicated world. Nonetheless,
there are some more objective reasons to believe that the Shah’s liberalization (or
forced liberalization) as a result of U.S. inﬂuence was subject to re-assessment when
his power was threatened. As Kurzman (2004) brings up, even at the height of the
Shah’s relationship with Carter and the United States—when the Shah arrived in
Washington DC in 1977 for a state visit—the liberals were in full retreat back in
Iran. The regime’s partial tolerance of oppositional activity, called the “liberalization
wave" (see Chehabi 2013), began in 1976, but had basically disappeared by the time
the Shah walked into the White House in late 1977 (Kurzman 2004).
Furthermore, another challenge to the argument that the Carter Administration
was responsible for the Shah’s unwillingness to use force against protesters is the
problem of intra-state variation. This was present in 1979 and 2009, which problema-
tizes the realist approach more generally as well. Arguably, international concerns
and the structure of power in the international system do not shift between very
89short periods of time, yet violence against crowds between protest events (in the
same movement) does. A good example of this is the period of time around Black
Friday, which ended in the deaths of 64 protesters after soldiers ﬁred indiscriminately
into crowds on September 9, 1978. Before he declared martial law on midnight of
September 8, the Shah had adopted a soft line approach to protests (for the most
part). For example, on September 7th, 500,000 protesters were allowed to take to
the streets unharmed. Yet, two days later, Black Friday occurred, resulting in ca-
sualties on both sides. Just a few days after Black Friday, crowds were back on the
streets, and the Shah was trying to appeal to protesters through negotiation and ap-
peasement. The events of Black Friday prove that the Shah was not unwilling to use
harsh force against protesters—he certainly did not give much thought to the Carter
Administration’s human rights policies when he ordered the show of force on that
day.
Lastly, though the nature of any kind of international pressure was diﬀerent in
1979, it is hard to argue that there was no international concern or pressure in 2009.
It is true that pressure from the Carter Administration may have been more “real" in
the sense that it was tied to an alliance; however, we cannot discount the inﬂuence
90of international media attention during 2009. While this inﬂuence may have been
“softer," there is evidence that international media attention matters to state leaders.
The heightened level of transparency as a result of faster methods of information
transmission over huge distances meant that mass killings were immediately visible
and easier to conﬁrm. During the Arab Spring, the role of the international media
(particularly Al Jazeera) and newer forms of social media was well documented, as
was the eﬀect this media attention had on Arab leaders, even the ones who did decide
to use harsh force against protesters (Lindsey 2013).
Others have argued that Iran’s harsh crackdown on protesters did have signiﬁ-
cant international costs for Iran’s leaders by aﬀecting Iran’s inﬂuence in the region
(Dabashi 2013). The Iranian Regime lost credibility in the eyes of many in the region.
The 1979 Revolution had once been considered the paragon of non-violent success for
Islamists in the region, but after the government’s violent response in 2009, Iran’s
eﬀorts to inﬂuence the Arab Spring and gain support in the region failed—even its
branding of the Arab revolutions as an “Islamic Awakening" was outrightly rejected
(Dabashi 2013).
In conclusion, it is important to clarify what a psychological approach does not
91mean. It does not mean that I think governments are behaving without a strategy. It
is true that the early work on political violence against civilians portrayed this kind of
violence as irrational, random, or the result of ancient hatreds between ethnic groups.
Most scholars today would agree that violence against citizens is instrumental, driven
by speciﬁc motives, interests, and preferences (Valentino 2014). Though I agree with
this in general, I also argue that these interests and preferences are constrained by
non-material beliefs in some cases, maybe not all. This constraint becomes evident if
we look at the design of state security systems. If political violence is to be understood
as solely orchestrated by powerful actors seeking to achieve tangible objectives, then
there should not be as much variation in the design of security systems across the
world. However, what we see is a vast plethora of diﬀerent structures and designs in
many diﬀerent types of situations. In fact, this is a gap in the literature on political
violence, according to Valentino (2014). Scholars continue to disagree about the exact
motives that drive violence against civilians, and the conditions under which extreme
violence against civilians is likely.
The key to understanding these motives and the conditions is to go one step back,
and consider how elites design security institutions. In the choices that are made are
92the clues that may lead the researcher to a better understanding of both the motives
and the conditions that facilitate the violence. My theory points to the signiﬁcance
of non-material interests—speciﬁcally, us versus them distinctions—as the basis for
how the individual agents of the violence act.
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ness in the Iranian Armed Forces and
Violence against Protesters in 1979
3.1 Introduction
The Iranian Revolution in 1979 transformed the landscape of politics in the Middle
East and the balance of power internationally. Over the course of a year, the Shah of
Iran struggled to contain the forces that sought to topple his regime, as neighboring
states peered into the crisis overtaking the country. After the outcome was ﬁnalized,
and Ruhollah Khomeini stepped onto Iranian soil just two weeks after the Shah had
ﬂed the country, it became clear that the United States had lost its most signiﬁcant
ally in the region. The Islamic Republic "under the guidance of an extraordinary
religious scholar from Qom" is the ﬁrst and only of its kind (Benard and Zalmay
1984). Designed and produced to parallel the will of God on earth, the Iranian
94regime today reﬂects the complexity of an intellectual process. Such a system, as I
will show in the next chapter, possesses a great capacity for state terror against its
own citizens.
This chapter, however, focuses on the Shah’s security institutions in order to show
why the military fell apart during the 1979 Revolution and did not crack down on
demonstrators during the wave of mass protests that swept the country from January
1978 to February 1979. This chapter begins by setting up the historical context for
both 1979 and 2009. This context is relevant to both cases because of the groups
involved in the political changes, particularly with respect to the critical social al-
liance between the clergy and the rural population, which forms the foundation of
the Islamic Regime’s security apparatus. It is only through this context that, I ar-
gue, representativeness can be assessed—i.e., through a country’s social and political
history. This historical section also describes the ideology through which the Shah
legitimized his claim to rule and structured the security apparatus. The universality
of a new “Persian" identity seeped into all aspects of the security apparatus, including
the military organization. This is important because it gives a sense of how military
members viewed their membership, which was tied to a nation (as opposed to a nar-
95row group). This chapter then assesses protest events within the Iranian Revolution,
ﬁnding that there was variation in the levels of violence dependent on the composi-
tion of crowds. Protest events with broadly deﬁned crowds composed of more than
one subgroup were less likely to turn violent. I end by assessing the possibility that
SAVAK may have operated like a paramilitary organization. I conclude that SAVAK
was not unrepresentative in composition, and did not possess the right kinds of char-
acteristics that would lead to mass violence against protesters; these characteristics
include a lack of ideological fervor and capacity.
3.1.1 Historical Context: Social Alliances, Ideology, and Ira-
nian Universalism under the Shah
Security institutions under the Shah, in contrast to those of the Islamic Republic
of Iran, lacked the capacity of a system designed to combat mass internal threat by
failing to exploit a signiﬁcant social cleavage. In fact, the opposite occurred. The
Shah and his policies reinforced a social alliance that led to his demise and the rise
of a new regime.
The Shah continued the work of his father, reinforcing the Iranian national iden-
96tity. Through the process, he attempted to forge an identity that was inclusive and
universal. However, he ended up alienating powerful social groups and imposing an
alien culture—one tainted by its lack of originality. For many, this identity was simply
not salient; it was a western identity, and one with no foundation. The Shah wanted
to destroy cleavages; but, instead, he reinforced the one that would form the back-
bone of the current regime’s security apparatus: the rural/urban divide. Moreover,
the system of beliefs intended to legitimize the Shah’s rule never resonated within the
political system, particularly within the security apparatus. This was because these
beliefs lacked a salient cultural dimension for a large portion of the population—
unsurprisingly, those in rural areas, the lower class, and the religious elite. The
Shah’s right to rule became increasingly linked to the West, and Westernization as
an ideology was bound to fail in Iran.
By alienating important social groups and reinforcing alliances with deep historical
signiﬁcance, the Shah’s policies were increasingly contextualized as un-Islamic and
un-Iranian; the term “Westernoxiﬁcation" came to deﬁne the underlying ideology
justifying his power (Keddie 2003). In addition, because the goal was to fashion
a united, secular identity, a viable frame for legitimizing violence in the coercive
97apparatus never emerged. The result was a security apparatus not structured to deal
with mass internal threat.
First, the military organization was representative of Iranian society. In fact, one
of the military’s most critical functions was to aid in the nationalizing of the Iranian
state by turning man into citizen (Katzman 1993). To that end, it reﬂected the Shah’s
vision of how national identity would map onto the national ideology in the security
system very clearly. Second, military units were specialized and professionalized along
Western lines not in terms of interest, but function. This reﬂected a set of beliefs
intrinsic to the purpose of the Iranian state between 1926-1979—much of the right
to rule on the part of the Pahlavi dynasty resided in the extent to which the Shah
and his father before him “built" a nation by modernizing it. As it turned out,
modernization, by the end of the 1970s, became synonymous with Westernization, as
each policy designed to modernize aspects of Iranian politics, military, and society
was viewed by those opposed to the Shah as an encroachment on a true, Islamic
identity (Abrahamian 2008). Third, the security apparatus under the Shah, as a less
fervent ideological setting, did not have the sorts of informal or militia-like coercive
institutions that might have been more amenable to the use of severe violence against
98crowds. SAVAK came closest to this kind of paramilitary style organization; however,
as I show later, it did not possess the capacity for such violence.
The 1979 Revolution was characterized by a very broad alliance of social groups:
intelligentsia, middle class, religious elite, workers, and rural/lower class members
were all represented. Moreover, the protests were widespread and large, covering all
regions of the country—major urban centers, small towns, and villages were aﬀected.
The nationalizing rationale of the Shah’s modernization program created a theoret-
ical problem for security enforcers and the system: how to deﬁne those against the
regime. It was easy when the “them" were foreigners, governments in neighboring
states, or separatists in the border regions. Some of these people were not “Iranian,"
and others were not “Iranian" yet—suppressing them, in the case of separatists, was
part of the “nationalizing" agenda. Thus, forcing the Iranian national identity upon
them was legitimate. However, when the threat came from a broad range of people,
representative of each layer of Iranian society, identifying these people as the "them"
became impossible within the security apparatus, especially given that members of
the military viewed themselves as belonging to a broad, national group (the purpose
of the Shah’s nationalizing agenda).
993.2 The Shah’s Security Apparatus in Context
The security system under the Shah, despite its capacity and breadth, did not have
the right kind of muscle for dealing with mass internal threats. The Shah’s eﬀorts
to fortify the Iranian national identity ended up alienating important social groups
and reinforcing cleavages, instead of uniting. Furthermore, the Shah was unable to
construct a set of beliefs salient enough to justify his rule; secularism in Iran could
not bear the pressures of a deep religiosity within most of the population, particularly
in the rural areas. In short, there were fundamental problems in the political system
when it came to legitimacy and national identity. These problems diminished the
capacity of security institutions to deal with threats to the regime from below.
By all measures, the Shah’s security apparatus was extensive and highly capable.
SAVAK—the Shah’s secret police—was established with the help of the CIA in 1957.
SAVAK interrogators were sent abroad to receive scientiﬁc training in clean torture
techniques (Rejali 2009). These were implemented eﬀectively on thousands of dissi-
dents. According to scholars, SAVAK was one of the best ﬁnanced, most eﬀective
security and intelligence agencies in the region (Kurzman 2004; GlobalSecurity.org).
100Legally, SAVAK operated its own prisons and had the authority to arrest and detain
suspected persons indeﬁnitely. There were few, if any, institutional checks. Formally
a civilian institution, the agency had close ties to the military, but it was not really
a paramilitary organization, though there was a unit in the third division that was
highly weaponized. The military organization under the Shah was considered well-
trained and well-equipped. Designed along American lines, the Iranian army was
prepared to deal with external threats, emerging successful from a 1946 campaign in
Azerbaijan to put down a Soviet-inspired separatist rebellion (Cordesman and Kleiber
2007). What was most surprising to scholars about the Iranian Revolution was pre-
cisely the strength of Iran’s security system under the Shah (Skocpol 1982). How
could such a strong state fall apart in the face of mass protests?
The answer is that the Shah’s security system was representative—i.e., not struc-
tured in a way that would facilitate violence against a broad group of people rising up
against the state in protest. Despite its access to resources, the authoritarian nature
of the Shah’s rule, and the lack of institutional checks on its actions, the security ap-
paratus did not engender the group-based factors that would enhance the potential for
severe violence against citizens. Two of the biggest issues within the system were the
101nationalizing, secular mission of the military, which inculcated a broad group identity
(composed of cross-cutting ties—one could be a Kurd and “Iranian" at the same time)
within the military organization, and the secular basis of the Shah’s claim to power,
which reinforced a signiﬁcant social alliance with a powerful historical foundation.
Mohammad Reza Shah continued the state-building enterprise of his father, Reza
Shah. Both assumed a paternalistic role in relation to the state. During the period
1921-1941, Reza Shah embarked on a mission to centralize the power of the state.
At the heart of this mission was an eﬀort to forge a national identity heretofore non-
existent (Cronin 1997). In 1935, the Iranian government requested those countries
with which it had diplomatic relations to call Persia “Iran." The oﬃcial name change
signaled two things. First, Reza Shah was eager to signify the Aryan race of his people
(“Iran" is a cognate of “Aryan"), bringing the country closer to its European allies and
aligning himself with the West. Second, changing the name of the country indicated
the importance of the nationalizing mission. Iran has always been a country consisting
of many diverse groups: Kurds, Turks, Lurs, Baluchi, and Persians. The new state
identity in the early twentieth century deviated from the norm by emphasizing Iran’s
pre-Islamic history and its ancient Persian culture. Farsi became the oﬃcial language,
102whereas, in the past, Turkic and Azerbaijani languages (among other dialects) were
spoken in court. For the ﬁrst time, a national anthem was created and it focused on
the role of the Pahlavi king in restoring Iran’s ancient greatness (Price 2005). Reza
Shah’s nationalizing mission, however, was not accepted by all. It was accompanied by
an awakening of ethnic identities in diﬀerent parts of the country, and these identities
clashed with the new state identity imposed from above, particularly in Azerbaijan
and Kurdistan.
Under Mohammad Reza Shah (1941-1979), this nationalizing mission continued.
The new secular Iranian national identity was reinforced in three main ways, all of
them focused on assimilating “others." First, military service became mandatory for
all young adult males. In the past, the military recruited from only certain parts of
the country, leaving the southern regions and nomadic/tribal areas of Iran untouched.
This meant major groups (Baluchis, for example) were left out of the military, while
other groups, like the Azerbaijanis, were oversampled (Hickman 1982). Consequently,
the armed forces, prior to the Pahlavi dynasty’s reign beginning in 1925, were not
representative of society. Beginning in the 1920s, the military organization came
to be seen by the monarchy as the main engine of state-building (Zabih 1988). The
103government enforced conscription in every part of the country and, generally, at every
social level. Lower civil servants, farmers, and ethnic tribal people constituted the
draft’s pool, and better educated middle class members served at the upper echelons
of the military organization, especially at the oﬃcer and command levels (Zabir 2012;
Lenczowski 1978). The socialization of each adult male would begin at primary
school and end at military school. To this end, one of the principle functions of the
military under the Pahlavi regime was to disseminate and impose on the masses the
regime’s ideology. Every male adult, particularly those whose claims for autonomy
had been crushed under the ﬁrst Shah (farmers, religious, and ethnic tribal people),
was schooled to understand the greatness of the Persian people, the role of the Shah
in bringing that grandeur back, and the secularism of the Iranian state.
The military also contributed to the regime’s program of national integration—the
second way in which the Pahlavi regime forged the national identity by bringing in
nomadic tribes and separatists. Reza Shah began this process in the 1920s and 30s,
imposing mandatory military service on border tribes, which led to countless clashes
between the new army and tribal forces throughout the two decades (Cronin 1997).
This intensiﬁed after WW2 with the rise of the second Shah to power, particularly
104in Kurdistan and Azerbaijan. Separatists in these regions wanted independence from
Iran, and they saw an opening in the vacuum of power following the end of WW2.
With American and British help, the Iranian army crushed separatist movements
in these border regions during the 1940s, with the peak of ﬁghting between 1944-46
(Elphinston 1946; Cronin 1997; Hassanpour 1994). For the Shah, national integration
was critical to the formation and solidiﬁcation of the national identity, since it meant
“others"—those previously unmanaged and unaccountable to the state—were brought
in. By extending a strong arm to sweep and transform all into citizens of the state, the
Shah was putting ideology into practice; like his father before him, he was legitimizing
his right to rule as a nation-builder—“the father of the state." Of course, this ideology
was intrinsically and, at times, indistinguishably tied to a very speciﬁc notion of
Iranian identity as inclusive, broad, and universal: everyone living in the territorial
space of the country could be, and would be, an Iranian.
Third, despite the underlying theoretical belief that the imposition of the national
identity was supposed to destroy cleavages and unite all Iranians, the Shah’s policies
involved “othering" a very important and inﬂuential sector of Iranian society: the
religious elite. The religious elite or ulama in Iran opposed the Shah’s modernization
105policies because, to them, these policies were largely un-Islamic. They reﬂected a
Western way of life, intended for the secular and modern. These policies included
forbidding headscarves for women, requiring men and women to wear Western clothes
in all public settings, and drastically lessening the role of religion in politics. In fact,
much of the Shah’s new ideology reﬂected a return to an ancient pre-Islamic greatness
that these religious elites viewed as blasphemous (Cronin 2010; Parsa 1994). From
the Shah’s point of view, the ulama favored an inherently diﬀerent (highly ideological)
identity from the one deﬁning his rule. Their attachment to an Islamic identity was in
direct opposition to the national, secular identity. His suppression of this important
group through various coercive strategies ranging from the extra-judicial to outright
brute force (for example, in the infamous 1963 Qom massacre, which led to the
Shah’s security forces killing seminarians in one of the holiest Shi’ite cities in the
region; see Poulson 2005) led directly to his demise in 1979. It also set the stage for
an important alliance between the ulama and the rural class—the two groups most
adversely aﬀected by the Shah’s economic and social policies.
The ideological component, which is inherently linked to this notion of Iranian
identity under the Shah as universal and broad, was also problematic. It is ideology
106that legitimizes the system and its power structure. In the Shah’s case, the set of
beliefs justifying his rule was mainly personalistic. The Shah struggled with legiti-
macy as a result of his rise to power. His father, Reza Shah, was born in a village
and rose through the ranks of the army. His claim to rule had been mythologically
sullied: he was seen as a puppet King placed in the position by the British, and after
he was removed from power by foreign forces, his son was placed on the throne by the
Americans (see Afkhami 2009). Though the historical facts make this simple story
of succession more complicated, for most Iranians, the myth of an illiterate King fol-
lowed by an illegitimate heir persisted (to this day). Regardless of the objective truth
of the matter, there is no doubt the Shah sought to build a system of beliefs legit-
imizing his rule that delved deep into Iran’s ancient history. By making a connection
from the Pahlavi dynasty directly to the great kings of Persia’s pre-Islamic past, the
Shah was deepening his right to the crown.
This connection, for the Shah, lay in Iran’s grandeur: in ancient times, Iran had
been the greatest empire in the world, and the Shah saw himself as the man who would
restore that greatness, “Being king over a mostly poor, ill, and insecure people was
no honor...We must begin to prepare ourselves for that time [to become the greatest
107civilization]" (Shah at coronation in 1967, see Afkhami p. 248). Thus, restoring
grandeur involved a massive program of modernization, which would become the
Shah’s life work and legacy. Modernization implied centralization and strengthening
of the state. To that end, tax revenues were increased and oil money expanded the
state’s budget drastically. GDP doubled in six years from 1964-1970 (Firoozi 1974).
The Shah bought billions of dollars worth of the latest weapons, often while they were
still on the drawing board. Sophisticated foreign equipment drastically transformed
the labor industry, as thousands of Western technicians and workers streamed in.
The rate of Iran’s industrial growth from the 1960s until the mid-1970s was one of
the highest in the world (Keddie 2003).
However, the Shah’s modernization plan—the mainstay of his plan to restore Iran’s
grandeur—was ﬂawed in the manner that it became conﬂated with Westernization.
The Shah’s economic policies were preferential toward Western-style industries. Many
foreign ﬁrms were involved in payoﬀs to individuals within the government and the
monarchy. Foreign capital played a huge role in the development of the Iranian
economy during the 60s and 70s because foreigners could legally own shares in Iranian
industries. They were subject to few restrictions and could repatriate proﬁts freely.
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of large-scale and high tech productions that required a Western presence (Keddie
2003; Ansari 2007).
It is not surprising that income gaps widened in the 1960s and 1970s as a result of
the Shah’s economic modernization policies (Keddie 2003). The Shah’s land reform
measures, intended to abolish feudalism in the countryside, ended up worsening the
plight of urban workers and the peasantry (Najmabadi 1987). By buying the land
from wealthy landlords at what was considered a fair price and selling it to peasants
at below the market rate, the Shah hoped to win over the rural poor. In fact, he
alienated them further because the program was unrealistic and poorly designed.
Less than half of the rural population received any land, and many of the people who
did receive land did not receive enough to sustain themselves. These people ended
up trading their land for a small value or opting into cooperatives with a low rate
of return (Abrahamian 2008). Though land reform did have some positive eﬀects,
the heightened expectations and subsequent loss for many added to the sense of
dissatisfaction with the Shah, particularly for the rural population. Furthermore, the
program did not beneﬁt village laborers—a large portion of the rural population, who
109tended to be young males between the ages of 15-25. Some were forced to migrate to
urban centers in order to look for work, and most became very resentful of the land
reform program (Abrahamian 2008).
Public criticism of the program came primarily from landlords and the clergy. The
clergy came predominantly from well established landowning families—the same ones
most negatively eﬀected by the government’s land buying program. Furthermore, the
program undercut the inﬂuence of the clergy by inserting the power of the state into
the rural areas of the country, especially in the realm of family law and custom. The
clergy had traditionally enjoyed a powerful inﬂuence in the rural regions, and the land
reform policies, along with other ones designed to modernize Iranian society (women’s
rights, family planning, and education), diminished its strength. One of the ways the
state was able to do this was by ﬁnancially weakening the clerics: the rents from
a large portion of villages—ones which helped ﬁnance the clerical establishment—
became eligible for redistribution (Mackey 1996).
The Shah’s social policies, which grew out of his modernization program, served
to further alienate the rural population and the clergy. The nature of these social
policies solidiﬁed the frame through which these two important elements in Iranian
110society related to each other. In short, restoring Iran’s grandeur—the central point
of the Shah’s political ideology—and reinforcing the Iranian national identity were
re-framed as “Westernoxiﬁcation." For example, didactic reforms in schools ensured
that the nationalized curriculum prepared students for the modern world (Lenczowski
1999). Clerics argued that these reforms imposed Western ideas on students because
the new curriculum was very similar to a European model. Part of this criticism was
motivated by fears that the state’s interjection into a realm previously monopolized by
the religious elite (education) would diminish the power of the clerical establishment.
Similarly, eﬀorts by the Shah to modernize Iran culturally—for example, through the
passage of laws that forbade religious dress in public spaces—ended up targeting the
rural population because people in the countryside were more traditional and oﬀend-
ing the clerics, who happened to have the most inﬂuence over the rural population
(Bill 1970). Thus, even though the Shah did not intend to isolate the rural popula-
tion (in fact, his land reform plans were meant to empower farmers and peasants),
the implications of modernization in the system meant that a sub-section of Iranian
society (the religious institution) was marginalized, suﬀering directly from policies
intended to weaken it, and another integral layer of the population (the rural) was
111estranged, though not on purpose.
All this brought together a perfect storm of dissatisﬁed rural people—crushed by
the social and political modernization policies of the Shah, which aﬀected their purses
and their traditional, religious sensibilities—and “othered" religious classes (from local
mullahs to grand ayatollahs). The Shah deepened a powerful social alliance between
the religious and the rural population, which presented the state with serious chal-
lenges; these challenges led directly to the Shah’s fall in 1979. Furthermore, the
rural/religious alliance formed the basis of a new political and security system under
Khomeini. As the next chapter will show, this relationship, by taking advantage of
a major social cleavage, has strengthened Iran’s coercive institutions by facilitating
the use of violence against citizens, particularly in the context of protest policing.
What is special about the alliance is its deep roots, which is why “othering" the
religious—because they preferred an Islamic identity and resented modernization—
and alienating the rural population were such costly mistakes for the Shah. Their
history of collaboration dated back to the late part of the 19th century under the
Qajars (1795-1925). Moreover, under Reza Shah, the nationalization of opium, which
hurt farmers and peasants, led to protests in rural areas organized by local and elite
112religious leaders (Cronin 2010; Cronin 1997; Poulson 2005). There were many similar
episodes throughout this earlier period, and, by the 1970s, it became clear that the
alliance had re-emerged and was stronger than ever.
3.3 1979 Revolution and the Security System
3.3.1 The Iranian Revolution and Social Movement Theory
My argument about the 1979 Revolution in Iran must ﬁrst be situated in the
landscape of the leading approaches to revolution in the social science literature. To
be clear, I am not proposing an argument for why social movements emerge or even
why they are successful. I have a far more narrow focus, and that is explaining the
actions of the military during mass protests. Nonetheless, these actions are signiﬁcant
to the extent that they lead to other outcomes—one of them being successful regime
transition. In the Iranian Revolution, the fact that the military fell apart and was,
for the most part, unwilling to take violent action against protesters was one of the
most signiﬁcant causes of the movement’s success. In light of this, a brief overview
of the theories of revolution and how my argument ﬁts in with them is relevant.
113It is, of course, impossible in a short space to do justice to the rich literature on
revolutions. However, as an injustice, I divide this literature into two camps: those
who emphasize structural factors (Moore 1966; Wolf 1969; Paige 1975; Tilly 1978;
Skocpol 1979) and those who emphasize cultural factors (Arjomand 1988; Skocpol
1982). Structural factors are those key elements such as the strength of the state
(Skocpol), the commercialization of agriculture (Moore and Wolf), economic orga-
nization (Paige), and the mobilization of resources by challengers (Tilly). Cultural
factors highlight the role of ideology in social revolutions. One of the best summaries
of this approach comes from one of the principle actors himself: Ayatollah Khomeini,
"They [the left] were not decisive for the victory...[The people who were killed by
the thousands died] For Islam. The people fought for Islam" (in Foran 1994). The
“value-relevance" or ideological signiﬁcance of the revolution pushes back against the
claim that ideational elements have only a small role deﬁning the success of a social
movement. Otherwise put, the structural versus cultural/constructivist debate places
the agency of mobilization at diﬀerent levels. For structuralists, the causes of move-
ments and the reasons for their success lie in the slow-moving frameworks built by
political, social, and economic systems. For culturalists, the real agency rests at a
114much lower level; it is self-deﬁned by the actors who comprise the system.
My theory, which is social-psychological at its core, is both structural and con-
structivist. I emphasize the importance of structure when it comes to designing
institutions capable of dealing with threats from below. In this sense, the security
apparatus or system ﬁgures prominently as a key element leading to a particular
outcome, and the concept of state strength is highly relevant to the discussion. How-
ever, I also emphasize the role of identity in deﬁning that strength, problematizing
“strength" when it comes to using violence publicly during mass protests. In my
theory, state strength is not solely a function of the quality or breadth of the system
and its structure; it is also determined by the design choices of its actors, and these
are based on ideological principles and social identiﬁcation.
3.3.2 Patterns of Military Violence Over Time: 1979 in Con-
text
The table below highlights the key protest events in Iran during the period from
1890-1979. The outcomes of these events reinforce my argument about the roles
of representativeness in the military and crowd composition when it comes to the
115outbreak of violence. I deﬁne violence, for the purposes of this table, as the use of
coercive protest policing strategies by the military organization that resulted in at
least one death. Data for this table was compiled from four main sources: three
secondary sources 1 and one primary source.2
The table identiﬁes ﬁve key social/political movements in Iran’s history, beginning
with the Qajars (see Poulson 2005; Cronin 1020; Foran 1994). The Qajar dynasty,
a royal family of Turkic origin, ruled Iran from 1785 to 1925. Their rise to power
involved a bloody eﬀort to consolidate power across the country using the Qajar
armies to eliminate rivals and massacre entire populations (Katouzian 2003). The
Qajar military changed minimally throughout the Qajar reign, initially composed
of a small number of Turkoman bodyguards and Georgian slaves with the informal
backing of Turkic tribal forces. These informal ties with the Turkic tribes became
more formalized, as the ruling elite pursued a policy of ﬁlling the military with fellow
members of Turkic origin (Lapidus 2002). As a result, by the 1890s, the Qajar military
was highly unrepresentative of the general population, composed predominantly of
1Poulson (2005), Kurzman (2004), and Abrahamian (1982)
2I searched through archives of the New York Times in ProQuest, using search options (“Iran,"
“Protest,*" “Demonstrat,*" “Rally") that limited the number of articles returned
116Turkic groups and some mercenary units.
The ﬁrst signiﬁcant protest movement of the twentieth century in Iran occurred
right before the turn of the century. The Tobacco Movement began in the rural
parts of the country, and spread into the urban centers. It started when the Qa-
jar shah granted a signiﬁcant concession to a British company, resulting in losses to
merchants and farmers. In this movement, religion played a major role in mobiliz-
ing people, marking a historically signiﬁcant precedent for intervention by the Shi’i
establishment in politics. Initially, small protests sprung up regionally; these tended
to be composed of narrow-based ethnic groups. After the ﬁrst year, protests became
urbanized, larger and broad: workers, merchants, and the religious elite joined in
(Moaddel 1994; Poulson 2005). However, the structure and composition of the Qajar
army was such that, despite the broad nature of the protesting groups, violence was
legitimized.
Though the Qajar shah was able to crush the movement, the state was left weak-
ened, both morally and economically, by its concessions to the opposition. This led
directly to the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11, in which the shah was forced to
establish a parliament and adopt a democratic constitution in the country for the ﬁrst
117time. For the most part, the protests that accompanied the constitutional movement
were quite broad, involving merchants, intellectuals, and urban elite. Nonetheless,
and for the same reasons stated above, the state’s response to these protests involved
military violence (Bayat 1991).
The next three movements took place under Mohammad Reza Shah and a rep-
resentative military. The 1940s and 50s saw a massive mobilization of the state and
its security engine against its political enemies. Foremost among them was the leftist
movement, which began with the communist Tudeh Party and culminated in the Na-
tional Front, headed by Mohammad Mosaddegh. By the early 1960s, the Shah had
virtually obliterated any formal, political opposition to the monarchy (Azimi 2004;
Behrooz 2004). Most of this work was done extra-judicially through the state’s in-
telligence bureau, SAVAK, and was directed against mid- to upper level opposition
leaders; however, when necessary, the military was called upon to repress crowds
during protests. Generally, the protests were comprised of a narrow group—the po-
litically marginalized, leftist opposition (Poulson 2005). In these cases, the military
did not fail to act, and fatalities resulted. However, in line with my theory, when
these protests were broad-based, there was no military violence against demonstra-
118tors (there are two instances of this in the table below).
The Qom protests were a signiﬁcant lead up to the 1979 Revolution, involving
a profoundly respected religious institution of higher learning in the ancient city
of Qom (Keddie 2003). The protests marked the beginnings of a critical mass of
support around the ﬁgure of Ruhollah Khomeini. The protesters at Qom, who were
Qom seminarians (ultra-religious elite), were calling for the removal of the Shah and
the establishment of a new government that respected Islam. The dissent was a
direct reaction against the secular, modernizing policies of the Shah, and the bloody,
militarized government response only solidiﬁed Khomeini’s support among those with
traditional, religious preferences, particularly in the rural areas (Moin 2000).
Finally, the 1979 Revolution, which is the focus of the next section, was successful,
in large part, as a result of the breakdown of the state’s military apparatus. By
late 1978, as national momentum gathered and crowds became larger and broad,
the military organization was unable to control and deter protesters—in some cases,
blatantly refusing to ﬁre.
119Name of Event/
Movement
City or 
Location
Date Military 
Violence
Description Composition of Crowd  Description
Tobacco 
Movement
Constitutional 
Revolution
Tudeh Party and 
National Front
Qom Protests
1979 Revolution
1890 - 1892 YES UNREPRESENTATIVE Narrow --> Broad Started locally, and then spread
Regional 1890 YES Regional governor uses troops 
to forcefully end merchant basts
Narrow Regional and small ; started in 
Turkic regions
Esfahan 1891 YES Troops fire on crowds Broad Merchants, workers, and religious 
elite
Tehran 1892 YES Qajar Shah’s personal troops fire 
on crowd
Broad Merchants, workers, religious elite, 
and intellectuals
1905 - 1906 YES UNREPRESENTATIVE Broad Concession to masses ; urban-
based unrest
Tehran 1906 YES Imperial army attempts to 
disperse large crowd by firing ; 
killing 22, injuring 100+
Broad Religious elite, merchants, and 
intellectuals
1940s, 1950s YES REPRESENTATIVE Narrow Leftist movement, which is 
crushed by Shah. National Front’s 
Mossadegh is elected Prime 
Minister and overthrown in a coup 
(1953)
Tehran 1943 NO Troops mobilized, but do not fire Broad Thousands mobilized ; Tudeh 
party members, merchants, and 
peasantry
Azerbaijan 
Province
1944 YES Massacre of peasant activists 
and Tudeh party members at 
demonstration
Narrow Azeris (Turkic minority group)
Azerbaijan 
Province
1946 YES Army crushes unrest, and loots 
cities in the province
Narrow Azeris (Turkic minority group)
Tehran 1951 YES Security forces open fire on 
crowd
Narrow Tudeh Party members (communist 
party)
Tehran 1952 YES Bloody clashes between army 
and demonstrators 
Narrow Leftists (minority political 
opposition) : National Front 
supporters
Tehran 1953 YES Bloody clashes between Tudeh 
communist supporters, National 
Front ``thugs,” and military
Narrow Tudeh Party members (communist 
party)
Tehran 1953 YES Bloody clashes between army 
and student demonstrators on 
university campus. Became 
known as “Student Day.”
Narrow Students supporting National 
Front
Tehran 1961 NO Unclear army presence, but no 
military violence
Broad National Front supporters and 
merchants
Tehran 1961 YES Armed forces open fire, killing 
one
Narrow Teachers union
Tehran 1962 YES Paratroopers attack 
demonstrators
Narrow Tehran University students
1962 - 1963 YES REPRESENTATIVE Narrow Protests established the 
importance and power of the  
Shi’a religious opposition, and 
Khomeini as a major political and 
religious leader
Qom 1962 YES Army attacks seminarians  Narrow Religious elite
Qom  1963 YES Armed forces enter Qom and kill 
one seyyed 
Narrow Religious elite
Qom 1963 YES Martial law imposed ; army 
enters and fires on crowd, killing 
unknown number of seminarians
Narrow Religious elite
Tehran (area) 1963 YES Protest group confronted by 
tanks and soldiers in combat 
gear. Whether tens or hundreds 
killed remains unclear, but 
machine guns were fired on 
crowds. 
Narrow Rural villagers march on Tehran, 
stopped at major bridge to city
Tehran 1963 YES Protest groups fired on by army 
in city
Narrow Smaller groups of Khomeini 
supporters
1977 - 1979 NO REPRESENTATIVE Broad Military falls apart in face of broad, 
mass protests
Tehran 1977 YES Armed forces open fire on 
students
Narrow Tehran University students
Qom 1978 YES Army fires on Qom seminarians Narrow Religious elite
Tabriz 1978 YES Tanks and infantry repress 
crowds and restore order
Narrow Azeris (Turkic minority group)
Tehran 1978 NO First signs that military is 
collapsing
Broad Middle class, workers, and 
students
Tehran 1978 NO Riot police presence ; no military 
violence
Broad Coalition ; 500,000 march
Tehran 1978 YES Security forces shoot and kill 
dozens of protesters ; martial 
law had just been imposed
Broad Coalition ; hundreds of thousands 
in Jaleh Square on “Black Friday”
Tehran 1978 YES Military raids Tehran University Narrow Students
Tehran 1978 NO Top general informs Shah that 
there is high probability troops 
will refuse to fire on crowds
Broad Coalition (workers, merchants, 
students, intellectuals, religious 
elite)
Tehran 1978 YES Muharram rallies turn bloody Narrow Ultra-religious (on a very sacred 
Shi'a holiday)
Tehran 1978 NO Ashura march, over 10 million 
people. Resolution declaring 
Khomeini is the leader of the 
revolution is presented
Broad Unclear, but very diverse group 
Figure 3.1: Intra-State Variation in Military Behavior: Signiﬁcant Protest Events in
Iran 1890-1979
1203.3.3 The Puzzle in 1979
It is puzzling that, just ﬁfteen years before the start of the Iranian Revolution,
the military had been used against demonstrators during a signiﬁcant protest move-
ment that lasted for more than a year in the religious city of Qom. Why would the
military be willing to inﬂict violence on the protesters in Qom in the early 1960s,
but not on protesters in Tehran (and elsewhere) in 1979? Arguably, the military was
stronger than ever in 1978-79. Military spending had steadily increased throughout
the decade, and the most signiﬁcant combat operation involving Iranian troops took
place between 1972-77 in Oman’s Dhofar province. In 1976, Iranian forces, relying
on helicopter support, were deployed in Pakistan’s Baluchistan Province to combat
a separatist rebellion. By involving the Iranian military in regional battles of geo-
strategic importance to the state, the Shah established Iran as the dominant regional
military power (Country Studies 2013). With respect to spending, between 1953 and
1970, defense expenditures rose from $67 million to $844 million—a twelvefold in-
crease. Between 1970 and 1977, they rose by almost the same proportion to $9,400
million (Looney 1988). Yet, despite its strength, the military fell apart in the face of
121mass protests, unable to deter protesters from toppling the Shah’s regime.
The Crowds
When crowds are broad, composed of more than one subgroup of society, it is less
likely that we will observe military violence. By 1979 in Iran, the revolutionary crowds
were large, broad, and widespread. However, through 1977 and 1978, challenges to the
Shah came from separate segments of the population that had not consolidated yet.
This explains the early cases of military violence and brutality—protesting groups
tended to be narrowly deﬁned.
Low High
Low Workers,*Rural*Population Soldiers*(rank*and*file)
High
Students,*Intellectuals,*
Qom*Seminarians,*Clerics,*
NF*Political*Activists
UpperFMiddle*Class*and*
Professionals,*Technocrats
         Symbolic Capital
Economic Capital
Figure 3.2: Groups and Social Space in Iran 1979
122For example, the ﬁrst round of anti-Shah demonstrations between October 1977-
January 1978 occurred after the death of Khomeini’s son, Mostafa. Crowds during
this period were composed mainly of Islamist students and religious leaders. As a
result, this group was clearly demarcated as an "out-group," singularly deﬁnable and
narrowly based (with low political representation and ideological signiﬁcance to the
Shah’s political and security system). This meant that violence against protesters
during this time would be more likely because the group-based factors facilitating
it existed. Unsurprisingly, the army was sent to disperse crowds on more than two
occasions (at least two times in Qom), resulting in the death of several protesters
(Kurzman 2004; Abrahamian 1982). By the summer of 1978, protests had sprouted
in each major city (an average of 10,000 participants per protest event). By this time,
a small minority of protesters included merchants and workers; however, for the most
part, crowds were not broad, and the level of repression remained high (Kurzman
2004).
On September 7th (1978), the Shah declared martial law, and the next day is
known as “Black Friday" because of the number of people killed by government secu-
rity forces. This incident runs counter to my theory because, by this point, the middle
123class (merchants, students, and workers) and the more aﬄuent upper-middle bour-
geois in Tehran had joined the opposition (Kurzman 2004). The protesting group in
Tehran on September 8th (“Black Friday") was very broad, composed of both mem-
bers with low and high symbolic capital (upper-middle class Tehran crowd: lawyers,
doctors, intellectuals. See Kurzman 2004). Nonetheless, the military used force to
crush crowds, including tanks and helicopters; one European correspondent claimed
that the helicopters left a “carnage of destruction" (J. Gueyras in Abrahamian 1982;
p. 515). According to oﬃcial estimates, 88 demonstrators were killed in Tehran
(Baghi 2003): 64 in Jaleh Square, and 24 in other parts of the capital.
Though this is problematic for my theory, part of the reason why military violence
occurred in this context was that the Shah had just declared martial law the day
before. Consequently, these protests were seen as a very obvious and direct challenge
to the regime (Regime/Military Insider, Interview 4/7/20143). Furthermore, there
was a belief that if the regime responded harshly this one time, there would be
3This was based on a phone interview I conducted with a high ranking oﬃcial in SAVAK at
the time. He now resides in the United States, and has retired from making public statements or
appearances, which is why I believe he wanted me not to identify him. He could credibly speak to this
matter because he had access to the types of resources, information, and personnel that would allow
him to make a valid judgment about the Shah’s perception of threat. His opinion is probably biased
by his elite position in the Shah’s regime—so, we might expect him to have a stake in presenting
the Shah in a favorable manner. However, based on his other opinions about the Shah, which were
not entirely favorable, I would argue that he is able to speak objectively and informatively about
the events that occurred during the Revolution
124eﬀective deterrence—i.e., the military would not have to use force again (see Ansari
2007). Thus, in some sense, this incident was an outlier. Moreover, there is evidence
that the actual military violence took place in situations that reinforce my argument.
Protesting crowds on the day were localized in diﬀerent areas of Tehran. The worst
clashes between the military and the people occurred in southern and eastern Tehran.
In southern Tehran, crowds were comprised of working-class residents who engaged
in violent, deﬁant acts against government security forces. In Jaleh Square (eastern
Tehran), the protesting group was mainly composed of students who were staging a
sit-in demonstration (Abrahamian 1982).
After “Black Friday," the government’s response to protesters vacillated between
the use of force and conciliatory measures. On the one hand, massive nationwide
strikes involving blue- and white-collar workers had shut down most of Iran’s indus-
tries, aﬀecting oil reﬁneries, copper mines, industrial plants, the National Bank, high
schools, customs, government ministries, post oﬃces, and the bazaars. In an eﬀort to
end these strikes, the Shah promised higher wages and oﬀered greater beneﬁts. By
November, it was clear that a coalition of diﬀerent interests was represented in the
protests that spread through all the major cities in Iran: Tehran, Mashhad, Tabriz,
125Qazvin, Shiraz, and Isfahan. It also became obvious by this point that the army
rank and ﬁle was unwilling to shoot down fellow citizens. Massive demonstrations
were mostly peaceful. The military was sent in to crush only certain types of crowds
(narrow ones): students at Tehran University on November 4th, ultra-religious fun-
damentalists between December 2nd and 4th during Muharram, high school students
in Mashhad on December 4th (Abrahamian 1982). The events of November 4th are
particularly interesting because of the military’s refusal, on the one hand, to shoot
down demonstrators in Tehran proper—demonstrations that eventually turned into
riots—and their willingness, on the same day, to raid Tehran University, killing dozens
of students participating in peaceful demonstrations (Taheri 1983). The main diﬀer-
ence between these two cases is the nature of the crowd in the ﬁrst (broad) versus
the second (narrow).
By the middle of December, all willingness on the part of Iran’s representative
military to shoot down protesters had dissipated. Hundreds of soldiers had deserted,
and other conscripts threatened to follow the orders of religious leaders instead of
their commanding oﬃcers (Apple 1978). There were reports that troops in Qom had
refused to ﬁre on demonstrators, and that ﬁve hundred soldiers and twelve tanks in
126Tabriz had joined the opposition (Branigin 1978). Marches were attracting millions
of people in Isfahan, Hamadan, Mashhad, Arak, Tehran, and Tabriz. The Ashura
march on December 11th attracted over two million people (Abrahamian 1982). The
fact that there was no military violence signaled the government’s powerlessness in
the face of broad protests—the security system was simply not structured to handle
the situation. Protesters could not be seen as a threat—dangerous enough to ﬁre
on—because they were representative of society.
Figure 3 is a closer look at protest events during 1978. 4 The Shah ﬂed the
country on January 16th, 1979, which functionally ended his rule. The table demon-
strates intra-state variation within a protest wave: of the eleven events, there are
six examples of military violence against protesters. Though this is not a random
sample of all the protest events during the Iranian Revolution, it is representative of
the most signiﬁcant ones, and all (but one, “Black Friday") ﬁt the theory. There are
two particular examples from this table that highlight the argument about the eﬀect
of protest group composition. I mentioned the events of November 4th earlier; how-
4Data for this was from three major sources, used in conjunction with each other: two secondary
sources—Kurzman (2004) and Abrahamian (1982)—and one primary source, the New York Times.
I searched for “Iran" during the period from 1/1/1978-12/31/1978, and was able to screen out
irrelevant stories using the subject search option.
127ever, in the same vein, on December 2nd, the military failed to act against a broad
protesting group in Tehran’s Shahyad Square, but did ﬁre on religious students out-
side a mosque. Obviously, there may have been diﬀerences that might have aﬀected
the decision to use violence; however, the most glaring distinction between the two
events on the same day is the composition of the crowds.
Protest'Event Crowd'Composition:'Groups Type Military'Violence
1/9/78 Qom)Seminarians Narrow YES
2/18/78 Azeris Narrow YES
6/20/78 Middle)Class,)workers,)students Broad) NO
9/4/78 Coalition)(unclear) Broad NO
9/8/78
CoalitionHHwomen,)students,)merchants,)
middle)class Broad YES
10/16/78 Khomeini)supporters Narrow YES
11/4/78 Students Narrow YES
11/4/78 Political)activitists,)workers,)women Broad NO
12/2/78 Coalition)(unclear) Broad NO
12/2/78 Religious)students Narrow YES
12/11/78 Coalition)(unclear) Broad NO
Figure 3.3: A Closer Look at 1979 and the Signiﬁcant Protest Events
The army rank and ﬁle had been trained to defend the country against foreign
enemies and protect the state against separatists who sought to tear Iran apart. At
the same time, the ideological component of their training emphasized the greatness
of Persian culture and the unity necessary to achieve a “great civilization." Sectarian
interests were considered evil—the purpose of the state and its security system was
128to fortify an inclusive national identity. Given this ideology, which was rigorously
disseminated through the military, it was impossible for the military organization to
look out at the large, broad crowds, and, in some way, justify killing people who were
very much representative of the Iranian national community.
The Representativeness of the Military Organization
By all accounts, the Iranian military organization was compositionally represen-
tative of the various groups in society by 1979 (Zabih 1988). Reza Shah inherited
an unrepresentative military from the Qajar Shah in 1926, and embarked on a mis-
sion to transform it into a professional force. One of the ﬁrst controversial policies
he enacted was universal conscription, which set oﬀ peasant protests throughout the
country during the 30s and 40s (Cronin 1997). Universal conscription was a criti-
cal element in the Shah’s modernization and nationalization strategies, which began
with consolidating power within Iranian territory. To this end, the military was the
main engine of assimilation, bringing together Iran’s diverse groups under a common
umbrella of national unity. There was no doubt that this process was painful; most
groups resisted the imposition of a national identity via conscription in the military.
129However, by the mid 1960s, the composition of the Iranian military mirrored that of
society’s because conscripts were drawn representatively from throughout the country
(Keddie 2003; Zabih 1988; Ward 2009; Sazegara, Interview 3/11/2014).
Measuring only the composition of the military organization does not give a com-
plete sense of representativeness (Petersen and Staniland 2008). Some states in the
Middle East have militaries that are compositionally representative or, at the least,
not egregious in this respect; however, scholars would argue that these militaries are
still unrepresentative. For example, Syria has a universal conscription policy, yet its
military is hardly representative of the general population (Holliday 2013). Thus,
assessing the structure of a military organization is also critical to determining rep-
resentativeness. Military structure encompasses both the organization and ordering
of a state’s armed forces as well as the ideological outlook that legitimizes this orga-
nization.
The military under the Shah was structurally balanced. No units within the
army were favored either ﬁnancially or politically because of their composition, and
none were specialized in terms of group interest. The structure of Iran’s army at
the time was functional—the Shah chose to focus on modernizing the military. To
130this end, the armed forces were increasingly specialized at the level of their military
branches: the navy, army, and air force were developed independently as functional
units (Ward 2009; Cordesman 2005). The Shah did funnel more funding into the
air force, enhancing capabilities (for example, supplementing F-5s with bigger F-4s)
there; however, the diﬀerentiation and consequent (quasi-)asymmetric distribution of
resources reﬂected strategic, functional concerns not group-based ones (Zabih 1988).
The decision to focus on the air force was driven by the Shah’s geo-strategic vision:
he wished to make Iranian territory impenetrable to Soviet forces (Zabih 1988).
Thus, unlike other militaries in the region that drew uniformly from the popula-
tion but were still unrepresentative, the Iranian military under the Shah was truly
representative, both compositionally and structurally. Its organization did not reﬂect
group identities or interests. This representativeness was for two reasons. Firstly, as
a driver of state socialization, the military was designed to promote and diﬀuse the
Iranian national identity. As a result, group loyalties were discouraged and actively
destroyed. Secondly, the Shah’s ideological beliefs—the principle basis of his claim to
power—stressed modernization as the only way Iran could re-achieve greatness. To
this end, the Shah focused on modernizing the military, which was one of the most
131important elements leading to the end goal (for the Shah, military superiority in
the region was the most signiﬁcant component of “greatness." See Lenczowski 1978).
Modernization eventually became synonymous with westernization, especially in the
military realm (Ward 2009). Western inﬂuence on the structure of the military in
Iran can be seen in three ways.
First, the Iranian military organization was basically designed along American
lines (Cordesman 2005). In terms of structure, both organizations were strikingly
similar, and this was purposeful. Iran was critical to America’s national security
policy in the region, particularly as an ally against Soviet interests in the north
(Halliday 2005). As a result, the United States played a huge role in enhancing the
capability of Iran’s armed forces: the Americanization of Iran’s military resulted in an
organization that depended on US technical assistance because it grew to look more
and more like the American military. Furthermore, the massive inﬂow of US arms and
the great shortage of skilled personnel in the Iranian economy meant that there was
high demand for US military advisers and trainers. By 1979, there were approximately
50,000 American personnel and their families involved in defense-related contracts
living in Iran (Zabih 1988).
132Second, since Iran’s education institutions were not advanced or large enough to
train suﬃciently large numbers of Iranians in a short period of time, many students
were sent abroad to train at military academies in the West, notably the United
States (Cottrell 1978) . This was a risk even the Shah acknowledged; exposure to
Western democracies might lead to subversive actions once these men returned home
(Chegnizadehn 1997). However, there were also beneﬁts with regard to skills gained
and socialization. These men came back with beliefs that reﬂected a Western-oriented
ideology concerning the role of the military in politics. The internalization of such
norms—namely, that a fully professionalized military is subservient to the demands
of the state—pleased the Shah who was deeply concerned about the threat of military
coups (Zabih 1988). More importantly, these eﬀects (as well as the ones identiﬁed
earlier on direct US assistance/military ties to Iran) enhance the third way in which
Western inﬂuence was evident in the structure of the military under the Shah: Iran’s
military was ideologically motivated by and focused on external threat.
The Iranian military under the Shah was not designed or organized as a provider
of internal security and regime stability. The reason for this was no doubt connected
to beliefs about what a modern, professionalized military was “supposed" to do: pro-
133tect the state against foreign threat (see Shah’s speech in 1976 on Now Rouz)—for
the Shah, this was a Western model he wanted Iran to copy (Sazegara, Interview
3/11/20145). The focus on external threats meant that Iran was predominantly con-
cerned with projecting the state’s military power outward. One justiﬁcation for the
massive build up of the Iranian military was the protection of the Persian Gulf in
view of the rising signiﬁcance of oil exports and the threat of instability coming from
countries like Iraq. Moreover, Soviet ambitions in the north also became the source
of further concern as the Shah’s perception of Iran’s strategic position shifted to in-
clude Iran among the great players in the Cold War. This shift was encouraged by
the United States: a Congressional study noted that, “The military threats to Iran’s
security seem to be suﬃciently real and diverse to enable the Shah to justify major
investments in military forces" (in Hickman 1982). As a result of this outward focus,
Iran’s military was simply unprepared to deal with internal security disturbances.
The weapons, training, strategy, and manpower for crowd control were unavailable,
5This was a phone interview I conducted with a former high-ranking member of the Islamic
Regime, Mohsen Sazegara. He is a visiting fellow at the George W. Bush Institute in Dallas. He
used to be deputy prime minister under the Mir-Hossein Mousavi government between 1981-1989 in
Iran. He can speak credibly about the Revolution, SAVAK, and Khomeini because he was part of
Khomeini’s inner circle prior to the ousting of the Shah in 1979. Furthermore, he was involved in
protests as a student during the early part of the Revolution. His opinion might be biased by his
experience with the regime after he clashed with the second Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei.
His reformist policies landed him in the notorious Evin Prison for a period of time before he was
able to escape the country in 2003.
134“Police clubs, twenty-ﬁve thousand canisters of tear gas, and other riot equipment
were ﬁnally purchased from the United States in November [1978], but the delivery
came too late to help" (Ward 2009; p.215).
In the lead up to the ﬁnal collapse, advisors recommended that Khomeini avoid
calling for a “jihad of protesters." As a grand ayatollah, this was within his purview—
he could call upon the people to martyr themselves in the name of protecting what
was divine. However, he was opposed to the bloodshed for multiple reasons—the
most obvious being the loss of lives. However, his advisors also convinced him that
it was unnecessary for more instrumental reasons. It turned out they were very
right. Their belief was precisely that the military, which ended up being the only
security force actor actually capable of repressing crowds, would fall apart because
of its representativeness (Sazegara, Interview 3/11/2014). In a signiﬁcant speech on
the eve of the revolution, Khomeini advised his millions of followers not to be afraid
of the military. He told them to “notice that the soldiers of the army are from the
nation" (Khomeini 1979). He asked that protesters invite soldiers to join them. The
protesters seemed to pick up on that message very quickly. Soon, pictures of protesters
handing ﬂowers to soldiers (and soldiers accepting, placing the ﬂowers in the barrels
135of their guns) ﬂooded the media, internationally and domestically (see Gheytanchi
2009; Sazegara, Interview 3/11/2014; NYT 1/15/1979). Signs that addressed the
soldiers as brothers became commonplace (Sazegara, Interview 3/11/2014).
Eventually, there was a rift within the military. There was a common opinion
among soldiers within all the branches of the Armed Forces that, if ordered, they
wouldn’t obey, “Amongst us [mid-level oﬃcers], we talked to each other. If the chief
commander orders us to go with a helicopter and kill people on the streets, then we
promised we wouldn’t do it. We don’t kill our brothers and sisters" (Air Force pilot,
Sazegara, Interview 3/11/2014). Because the military did not have protest policing
gear—the type of defense equipment that does not kill–it was very clear that such
an order would lead to many fatalities (Sazegara, Interview 3/11/2014). In the end,
the real collapse did start within the military organization. On the eve of February
1979, the technical side of the military within the Air Force turned on other members
within a garrison located east of Tehran. Civilian protesters surrounded the base in
order to protect these men from the guards of the Shah (a very small unit responsible
for protecting the monarchy) who were sent to disarm the soldiers responsible for
the crisis. By the time they got there, the base was fully under the control of the
136protesters. It all happened so quickly because “the sentiment was shared by many"
(Sazegara, Interview 3/11/2014).
SAVAK
Informal and/or formal paramilitary institutions are better suited to carry out
acts of asymmetric violence against groups because they tend to be very cohesive
and more ideological (White 2007; Mueller 2000; Valentino 2004). Paramilitary or-
ganizations, to the extent that they are the most unrepresentative entities within the
armed forces, also have characteristics—a highly ideological setting and an informal
culture—that enhance their cohesiveness in particularly pernicious ways, leading to
a greater capacity for mass violence (in the most perverse form—including sexual
violence). The security apparatus in Iran under the Shah lacked a formal and/or in-
formal paramilitary or coercive institution capable of crushing mass internal unrest.
This was yet another way in which the security system was not designed or structured
inwardly—the Shah was focused on projecting might outward.
The Shah’s strategy for maintaining power within the country essentially rested
on a theory of deterrence, with minimal use of the military when necessary. SAVAK—
137the Shah’s secret police—was a very eﬀective intelligency agency, which navigated the
world of information, honing in on individuals capable of politically organizing mass
protests (Kurzman 2004). This method deterred and even anticipated unrest before it
could actually materialize. For example, the Shah’s political opponents (represented
by the National Front) were functionally destroyed by the end of the 1950s—SAVAK
identiﬁed and either killed or imprisoned each important member of the organiza-
tion at the individual level, thereby neutralizing the threat of mass domestic unrest
(Siavoshi 1990). The few instances of mass political protest that did occur in the
1950s tended to be deﬁned by narrow, leftist crowds; in these situations, the military
was able to legitimize violence against the protesters, and did ﬁre on crowds (Saze-
gara, Interview 3/11/2014). What the security apparatus was not prepared for and
did not anticipate was the bottom-up nature of the 1979 movement. This was evident
in the lack of the system’s readiness to manage the crowds.
It is perhaps a useful exercise to examine the counterfactual in this case: what
would have happened had there been a formal and/or informal paramilitary insti-
tution intended to deal speciﬁcally with internal unrest? 6 This is a problematic
6The two possible candidates for a potential paramilitary institution were the Government Gen-
darmerie and the Persian Cossack Division. The Gendarmerie was established by the Second Majles
in 1912 as an internal military force intended to impose order, collect taxes, and safeguard internal
138counterfactual precisely because the justiﬁcation for the existence of such an insti-
tution would not be possible in the state system under the Shah. However, we can
imagine the outcome in any case. Because the set of beliefs justifying the power
structure of the state emphasized unity over division and the salient identity within
this system was inclusive, the basic function of such a force would be thwarted by
its composition. In such a situation, despite dynamics that might encourage violent
actions against the out-group, a basic distinction between in-group versus out-group
would still need to be made. In the Shah’s system, such a distinction was ideologi-
cally problematic: the members of a hypothetical paramilitary institution would be
representative of society.
SAVAK’s purpose and culture grew out of its experience with urban guerrilla
warfare during the 1960s and 1970s. As Mohsen Sazegara, an Iranian pro-democracy
activist who helped create the IRGC (and then ﬂed the country because he was impris-
oned for his reformist ideas), told me in an interview, “SAVAK destroyed both of the
main urban guerrilla groups [Fedayan-e Khalq and the Mojahedin-e Khalq] by 1978,
trade. The Persian Cossack Division emerged under the Qajar Shah in 1878 after he visited Russia
and signed a contract for the dispatch of Cossack oﬃcers and non-commissioned oﬃcers to form a
regiment in Iran to serve as a royal guard. Reza Shah eventually merged both units into the Iranian
National Army, and created a police force to deal with domestic crimes (though domestic policing
institutions were not equipped or trained to respond to mass protests. Cronin 1997).
139so they thought there was no other opposition" (Sazegara, Interview 3/11/2014).
Thus, SAVAK was more professionalized and institutionalized than its counterpart
in Iran today, the Basij. In fact, it is perhaps fairer to compare SAVAK to the
IRGC—there was no organization like the Basij in Iran under the Shah. Though
SAVAK did manage internal security, it was weaponized and institutionalized like a
conventional army because the threat with which it was concerned possessed weapons
and could be clearly distinguished from a civilian (i.e., an urban guerrilla soldier).
In short, SAVAK’s function was not managing mass protest; there was no division
within SAVAK that had been trained or equipped with the kinds of weapons, tactics,
and strategies that could suppress large crowds (Sazegara, Interview 3/11/2014).
Moreover, SAVAK was small; it only had approximately 5000 members (Sazegara,
Interview 3/11/2014; Regime/Military Insider, Interview 4/7/2014) compared to the
one million members of the Basij (see Aryan 2008, though estimates are rough be-
cause intelligence is limited). SAVAK was also representative (Sazegara, Interview
3/11/2014); it was not composed in a way that reinforced any of the major divisions
in Iranian society, particularly the most salient one: the urban/rural divide. SAVAK
members were recruited from the (representative) army based on merit and loyalty
140to the Shah (Amuzegar 1991).
Second, SAVAK could hardly be described as highly ideological. SAVAK was a
centralized state institution concerned with intelligence gathering, for the most part.
In this sense, it was concerned with maintaining the power of the regime against
threat, but this was deﬁned without a strict set of beliefs relating to the legitimacy
of the throne. The organization had six divisions—divisions one, two, four, and
ﬁve were focused on espionage, counter-intelligence, technical support (for example,
bugging), and monitoring SAVAK members, respectively. The sixth division was in
charge of administration and ﬁnancial aﬀairs. It was the third division that handled
internal security; for the most part, this was a weaponized unit that fought the ur-
ban guerrilla groups (Regime/Military Insider, Interview 4/7/2014). However, it was
also responsible for targeting individuals and elite groups 7, and arresting/torturing
political activists (Sazegara, Interview 3/11/2014). According to Sazegara, SAVAK
suﬀered, “a diﬃculty of understanding....[SAVAK] lacked good analysts to understand
the trends in society" (Sazegara, Interview 3/11/2014). With respect to the events
7For example, on the birthday of Mossadeq in the summer of 1978, SAVAK organized a band of
members dressed like rural folk to attack a high level group of political activists who were travelling to
a village in Karaj where Mossadeq was born. This was an attempt to protest the Shah’s dictatorship,
since Mossadeq was considered a symbol of democracy; however, the SAVAK attack left many high
proﬁle activists battered (Sazegara, Interview 3/11/2014).
141leading up to the 1979 Revolution, SAVAK lacked the structural capacity and ideo-
logical fervor needed for it to play a major role in stopping the tide of dissent that
eventually swept the nation. In short, SAVAK was not unrepresentative in a way that
exploited a major divide in society. Furthermore, because it was not really a paramil-
itary institution, the conditions that would facilitate perverse violence—namely, an
informal culture with a lower degree of professionalization and a highly ideological
outlook—did not exist.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter addresses the events of 1979 in Iran from a diﬀerent perspective.
Though many have studied this revolution, they have missed the relevance of group-
based factors to the breakdown of the state. Common explanations for the uprising’s
success include economic factors (Kurzman 2004; Keddie 2003), international factors
(Del Gludice 2008), and domestic political ones (Abrahamian 1982). Though I do
not discount any of these ideas—in fact, I think they are all relevant—none study
the revolution within a system of ideas, power, and relationships among agents of the
state and the people. My work considers the structure of the security apparatus not
142in isolation but within the ideological framework through which power is legitimized
for the state and its people. I ﬁnd that the Shah’s particular set of beliefs upon which
his power was legitimized led to a security apparatus devoid of the kinds of factors
that would facilitate and justify violence against protesters.
The next chapter discusses the Green Revolution in 2009, making the case that
it is possible to compare 2009 to 1979. Many relevant factors are consistent across
both cases: economic, domestic, and international ones. However, the outcomes were
very diﬀerent. The Green Revolution started in the summer of 2009; by February
2010, it had run its course, and not much had changed politically for Iran. In fact,
the government clamped down harder. In the next chapter, I look at the political
and security system in Iran post-1979, which created a diﬀerent set of factors that
was far more conducive to violence.
1434 | The Green Revolution: Representative-
ness in the Iranian Armed Forces and
Violence against Protesters in 2009
4.1 Introduction
“You deﬁne yourself by your enemies, and those were the superpowers back then.
... But now [the Basij] are ﬁghting young people who put gel in their hair. That’s the
enemy. So it’s demeaning, and not at all elevating for their self-image." - Anonymous
(in Peterson 2003)
The 2009 Iranian election protests began on the night of June 12, following the
announcement that incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had won nearly
sixty percent of the electorate. Protesters rallied in the streets, calling on the Supreme
Leader to issue a recount. There were irregularities in several districts, in which
144Ahmadinejad had won 100% of the vote. What followed was the biggest and most
threatening display of civil dissatisfaction in Iran since the 1979 Revolution, which led
to the overthrow of the Shah and the establishment of the Islamic Republic. There was
no question why the regime felt threatened. Iran’s politics since the 18th century has
centered on social movements in a way that is unique in the region. There has always
been a sense in Iranian politics that change comes forcefully from below (Tobacco
Protests 1890-92; The Constitutional Revolution 1905-05; Iranian Revolution 1978-
79), and the Islamic Regime felt this threat—the possibility of change—more than
they ever had before during this time.
The wave of protest events carried on for approximately seven months, albeit
discontinuously. There were peaks of activity that occurred in September (Quds
Day), November (religious holidays), and December (Student’s Day). By the end of
June 2009, however, it became clear that the protests were about more than just a
recount. Protesters viewed their activities as contributing to a larger social movement,
which was about changing politics in Iran at a fundamental level. For the ﬁrst time
in the history of the Islamic Regime, people chanted, “Death to the Supreme Leader."
In one broad vocal stroke, these people signaled to the government that they were no
145longer afraid to voice publicly their disillusionment with the ideological underpinnings
of the system. What was so threatening about this particular chant? The Supreme
Leader was supposed to be infallible. The legitimacy of Iran’s entire political system
rested on the belief that this man represented God’s will on earth.
This chapter works in tandem with the previous chapter on the 1979 Revolution.
In both cases, the Iranian state (under the Shah in 1979 and the Islamic Republic in
2009) perceived an equal level of existential threat from below. In the 1979 case, the
regime crumbled in the face of broad protests. In this case, despite broad crowds,
the Islamic Regime was able to eﬀectively suppress the movement by February 2010.
Many factors—like the most important economic and social ones (an ailing economy
and high levels of social/political dissatisfaction)—are constant across the two cases,
but there is one clear diﬀerence, which is, arguably, the most critical element of
movement success (see Katz 2004): the state’s response. Iran in 1979 was, by most
measures, a strong state with strong security institutions. However, as I argued in
the previous chapter, Iran’s security system was designed in a way that emphasized
unity and nationalism. There was no informal or formal security body within this
system that was structured unrepresentatively—i.e., took advantage of a major social
146cleavage. On the other hand, the Islamic Republic’s security institutions are designed
along a major fault line: the urban/rural divide. This divide in Iranian society is
fundamental, long-standing, and bolstered by the religious ideology legitimizing the
entire political and security system—the rural population tends to be more religious
and traditional.
The 2009 Iran case is relevant to my theory because it presents a hard case for
my thesis. Iran’s regular military units are representative, and the election protests
that began in June 2009 were largely broad-based with support from diﬀerent social
groups. However, the government was still able to violently clamp down on protesters.
Nonetheless, upon closer inspection, this case provides an interesting context within
which to test other implications of my theory. First, the 2009 case problematizes
my claims by highlighting the role of an intervening variable: the state. If the argu-
ment about the eﬀectiveness of unrepresentatively structured security institutions is
true, then states may anticipate problems, and design bodies intended to deal with
speciﬁc types of opposition groups (i.e., broad-based) should the need arise. Thus,
state agency in the design of a security system can aﬀect the ultimate outcome.1
1Perhaps these states were predisposed (for other, unobserved reasons) to use coercive methods
of protest policing.
147However, it is still possible to test mechanisms because state agency in this regard
leads to the creation of multiple agents, which can vary along the dimension of rep-
resentativeness. This is true in the 2009 Iran case; there are three diﬀerent security
actors (Basij, Revolutionary Guard, Military), and each agent has a diﬀerent level of
representativeness.
The main argument of this chapter exploits the variation across Iran’s three diﬀer-
ent security actors to show that representativeness aﬀects the state’s decisions when
it comes to choosing which agent to send in to control crowds on any particular day.
The ﬁrst section outlines the theory and hypotheses as they pertain to Iran in 2009.
As a result of dynamics particular to the Basij—both in terms of its unrepresentative-
ness and paramilitary features—I expect a positive correlation between Basij violence
and broad-based protesting groups. Otherwise put, the state is more likely to send
in Basij forces when the opposition is broad. The opposite is true for the Revolu-
tionary Guard (IRGC), which is relatively more representative. I expect a negative
correlation between IRGC violence and broad-based protesting groups—the IRGC is
more likely to be sent in to handle narrowly composed protest events. The military is
the most representative body in the state’s security apparatus. As a result, I expect
148there to be a low likelihood of violence; if any does occur, it should only be in the
context of narrow-based protesting groups.
Section 2 describes the data collection process and methods, presenting descriptive
statistics for many of the key variables. In this section, I highlight the main contribu-
tion of my work, which is to analyze variation in the state’s response to protests at the
micro-level. In this way, I am able to pick up variation that occurs within a country
during a short period of time, and hold constant other relevant political and social
factors. The focus on diﬀerences in outcome at such a ﬁne grained level allows me to
make a case for the importance of group-based factors when it comes to explaining
violence—in short, that violence is group-based and relational. Section 3 presents my
main ﬁndings, which prove my hypotheses, albeit partially. I have limited support
for the ﬁrst hypothesis on the likelihood of Basij violence against protesters. Finally,
I discuss mechanisms in the fourth section by drawing on interviews and secondary
literature to show that the perceptions of individuals within the Basij, IRGC, and
military varied.
1494.2 Basij, Revolutionary Guard, and Military; Three
Actors, Three Predictions
My theory about military violence draws on social psychology literature to make
an argument about the actions of the military when it comes to repressing protest
movements. However, for this particular chapter on Iran, the measurable outcome
is not simply military violence per se; my argument extends to paramilitary groups
as well: the Basij. The Basij is a paramilitary volunteer militia established in 1979
by order of the Islamic Revolution’s leader Ayatollah Khomeini. The force consists
of young Iranians who have volunteered, often in exchange for oﬃcial beneﬁts. The
function of the Basij is to maintain internal security—they are charged with the
task of protecting the ideals of the Revolution from domestic political and social
threat. Structurally, the Basij is quasi-decentralized, and forms the ﬁfth branch of
the Revolutionary Guard. As a result, it operates like a network of small groups with
a hierarchical leadership structure (Alfoneh 2008).
Given its ideological basis, it is not surprising the Basij is selective in its recruiting.
The Basij uses informal and formal means to attract voluntary recruits to ﬁll its ranks.
150One of the main incentives for joining the Basij is material motivation (Ali, Interview
12/27/2013; Mohsen, Interview 06/24/20132). The government chooses to focus on
rural areas for recruitment because people in these areas are poor and tend to be
more religious than those in Iran’s urban centers (Golkar 2011). Thus, the regime’s
security apparatus exploits a major historical cleavage in Iranian society in order to
ﬁll the ranks of the organization. The Basij has roots in Iran’s countryside from both
a structural and economic perspective. The Construction Basij Organization (CBO)
is one of the main economic arms of the organization. Its purpose is to build popular
rural support for the Basij and the government both with respect to recruitment and
political support. Under the Hejrat Plan of the CBO, Basijis in the provinces are sent
to nearby villages to help with small projects such as building mosques, harvesting,
2These are pseudonyms to protect the identity of two former members of the Basij. Both lived
in Tehran during the time that the election protests broke out in 2009. I met them through the
Iranian refugee community, which is based in the L.A. area. We were connected to this community
through my aunt, who was also forced to ﬂee Iran in 2010 for political reasons. My family has also
been working with UNHCR in Ankara on some cases for friends, so both interviewees in this chapter
occurred as a direct result of that and my aunt’s situation. I have guaranteed their anonymity for
obvious reasons relating to their personal security, but also because their involvement in the Basij
is not public knowledge to most people even in that community. “Ali" was a low ranking active
member of the Basij in Tehran, whereas “Mohsen" claimed to be a higher-ranking active member
(also in Tehran). Mohsen was originally from a small village in Golestan province, so he was able to
speak to the dynamics of the Basij in the countryside as well. Ali and Mohsen did not know each
other in Iran, but met in Ankara in 2010. Obviously, these two interviews may not be representative
because I was only able to speak to two people, and these former members are biased in their
opinions because they left Iran for political reasons. However, anecdotally, they are able to reinforce
beliefs about the IRGC and the Basij that are held by scholars who study current events in Iran (for
example, Ali Alfoneh). This leads me to think that, in general, they are valid sources.
151renovating schools, and planting trees (Basij Quarterly 1994). The Basij Cooperative
Foundation, established in 1992 to provide welfare support to Basijis, is the other
economic arm of the organization. Through the BCF, the Basij has virtual control
over Iran’s agro-industry (Golkar 2011; Basij Quarterly 1994; Sobeh-e Sadegh Weekly
3/15/2004), which bolsters its strong presence in the countryside. Furthermore, the
Basij Housing Institution hands out free or exceedingly cheap land to Basijis in rural
areas for residential and commercial purposes (Golkar 2011).
Structurally, the Basij’s primary apparatus for recruitment is through the various
Basij branches. As of 2011, there are seventeen diﬀerent Basij suborganizations and
40,000 Basij bases (Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013). As a point of comparison, the
IRGC is much more centralized with only 31 command bases; as I will discuss below,
this means it has a mixed recruitment strategy. The large number of bases allows
the Basij to focus on recruiting members from rural areas throughout the country
(Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013; Sepah News 12/25/2009). Motivations for member-
ship are ﬁnancial, ideological, and educational (Basijis are given preferred enrollment
at universities 3); however, by far, the most important motivation for poor people
3Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013
152living in rural areas is a combination of economic and ideological ones (Golkar 2011).
Figure 4.1: Basij ride motorcycles while policing demonstrations on July 9, 2009 in
Tehran. Credit to World News
The Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) is a branch of Iran’s military distinct from Iran’s
main military units. It was founded after the Iranian Revolution with the purpose of
protecting the country’s Islamic system (Payam-e Enqelab 7/25/1981). Some consider
the IRGC to be a military within a military (or a parallel military institution), since
part of the impetus for its creation was to create a force that would act as a buﬀer
against the Army. The IRGC is a combined arms force meaning it includes ground,
aerospace, and naval forces. Its expanded social, political, and economic role under
153Figure 4.2: An image from a Basij militia parade. Credit to Iranian Students’ News
Agency (ISNA)
154President Ahmadinejad between 2005-2013 has led many analysts to argue that this
branch of the Armed Forces is the most critical and inﬂuential actor in Iran’s security
apparatus (Safshekan and Sabet 2010; Samuel 2012).
In 2007, the IRGC underwent a massive reorganization. First, it was restruc-
tured to become less centralized and more focused on the provinces (Mardomsalari
7/27/2008). Second, the Basij was merged into the IRGC as a specialized, distinct
unit. The reason for this readjustment, according to the IRGC leadership, was to
promote harmony; since the Basij and the IRGC share the same organizational goals,
merging the two makes sense because the regime can increase eﬃciency (Hamshari
9/25/2007). In fact, since 2007, the IRGC’s structure has borrowed heavily from
the Basij’s, particularly to the extent that compositional strategies have exploited re-
gional diﬀerences. In 2008, Ali Jafari, the seventh Commander in Chief of the IRGC,
introduced the “Mosaic Doctrine," which altered the command structure of the orga-
nization, though it still remains a centralized entity. The doctrine divided the IRGC
into thirty one commands—one for each province, and two for Tehran (Alfoneh 2013).
The new provincial basis of IRGC units is meant to focus recruitment at the local
level, so that IRGC members can be recruited more easily from the ranks of the
155Basij (Payam-e Enqelab 1/27/2008). Since the massive student protests in 1999 and
2001, the IRGC has increasingly drawn a signiﬁcant segment of its recruits from the
Basij (Alfoneh 2013; Ali, Interview 12/27/2013). Basijis are seen by IRGC comman-
ders as generally more committed to the regime (Mohammadi 2009; Ali, Interview
12/27/2013).
Nonetheless, there are compositional diﬀerences between the IRGC and the Basij.
The Basij draws predominantly from the rural population, whereas the Revolutionary
Guard also selects from the regular army units. According to a former Basiji, though
the IRGC is becoming increasingly more like the Basij in its recruitment strategy,
its more conventional role as a deterrent force against external threat in the region
means that it still draws on the resources and personnel of Iran’s main military units,
which are representative (Ali, Interview 12/27/2013). Unlike the Basij, the IRGC has
substantial inﬂuence over Iran’s military doctrine, and how the state deﬁnes its re-
gional security and national interests (Wehrey et al. 2009). Thus, the IRGC is a mix,
in terms of function and composition—it selects from members of the regular armed
forces 4 and the Basij (Ali, Interview 12/27/2013; Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013;
4The IRGC selects from conscripts in the regular armed forces based on merit and ideological
fervor (Ali, Interview 12/27/2013; Alfoneh 2011). As a result of superior pay and brighter career
prospects in the IRGC compared to the Army, the Army tends to get the “second-best recruits"
156Alfoneh 2013). The precise ratio is unclear, so it is diﬃcult to say what IRGC rep-
resentativeness is like in exact terms. However, given the IRGC’s mixed recruitment
strategy and restructuring, it is fair to say that its composition falls somewhere in
the middle between the representative Army and the unrepresentative Basij.
Figure 4.3: IRGC sergeants armed with KLS (AKM) assault riﬂes. Credit to Iranian
Students’ News Agency (ISNA)
The Iranian Army (or the regular military) has been called the Middle East’s most
powerful military (not including Israel’s Defense Forces). It is strictly an outwardly
(Alfoneh 2011)
157oriented military in the sense that the main focus is on defense against external
threat (Cordesman 2010). Iran has mandatory military service for men (or universal
conscription), which starts at the age of 18. Consequently, Iran’s regular military
is representative of society (Schahgaldian 1987; Ali, Interview 12/27/2013; Mohsen,
Interview 06/24/2013). Through an analysis of each actor’s recruitment strategy
and organizational structure,5 I ﬁnd that Iran’s three security force actors within the
Armed Forces vary in their representativeness: the Army is the most representative
entity, followed by the IRGC, and then the Basij, which is highly unrepresentative.
Within the Iranian context, representativeness is deﬁned along a cultural cleavage: the
urban/rural divide. This cultural divide is the most signiﬁcant one in Iranian society
for historical, economic, political, and religious reasons. Chapter three discusses these
reasons in great depth; however, for the purposes of this chapter, it is important
to note that religiosity shifts at this dividing line in Iran—the rural population is
signiﬁcantly more Islamic than the secular urbanites are.
To explain and predict variation in the state’s response to the election protests in
2009, it is necessary to understand the group-based factors that legitimize violence
5I also consider evidence from interviews and the secondary literature.
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Figure 4.4: Representativeness and Security Force Actors
and, therefore, enhance the likelihood that it will occur. First, the plots below show
the patterns of violence from an actor-based perspective. In the ﬁrst ﬁgure, we can see
that between 2009-2012, the Basij and Revolutionary Guard were employed roughly
the same number of times by the state: the Basij used violence against protesters in
32 protest events, and the Revolutionary Guard did so in 34. The military, unlike in
1979, was not the principle player; it mobilized only 8 times between 2009-2012, and
did not inﬂict violence in any of these cases. The second ﬁgure below represents the
use of security force actors over time. This plot shows clearly the variation between
2009-2012 with peaks of activity during the period from June 2009 to March 2010.
159The state tended to rely more on Basij forces in the beginning, though this switched
in the summer of 2010; from this point on, the state favored Revolutionary Guard
forces. This plot is evidence that the government’s strong show of force in the ten
month period between June 2009-March 2010 did deter future protest waves—the
frequency of protest events decreased after March 2010.
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Figure 4.5: State’s Use of Security Force Actor, 2009-2012
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Figure 4.6: Variation Over Time, 2009-2012
A closer look at protests during the critical period between June 2009-March 2010
further delineates the variation in the state’s use of force (see Figure 7). Not only does
the frequency with which the state responds with violence toward protesters change,
so does the state’s choice of whom to send in; though the Basij is favored for the most
part, there are times during which the Revolutionary Guard is used just as much, if
not more: August 2009, November 2009, January-March 2010. This variation is again
supported in Figure 8. The second and third bars, which also represent this critical
period, show the shift in the government’s preferences with regard to its choice of
161security actor. The Basij is favored in the aggregate (i.e., used more in total during
this ten month period), but the Revolutionary Guard comprises a greater relative
proportion in the latter half. Interestingly, protests during the latter half of this ten
month period tended to be less broad on average—there were more protests that
were narrowly deﬁned. As I will discuss in depth later, this ﬁts well with the broader
pattern that is evident in the dataset; the regime prefers to call on the Basij when
crowds are broad.
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Figure 4.7: Variation Over Time, June 2009-March 2010
After an examination of the three relevant security actors and the nature of the
variation, it is possible to generate hypotheses based on the theory outlined in Chapter
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Figure 4.8: Variation Over Time, All Protests 2009-2012
1. The dependent variable for this case study is the use of violence against protesters
between 2009-2012, with a special focus on the election protests (or the Green Move-
ment) during June 2009-February 2010. The contribution of this work, however, is
to distinguish among security actors when it comes to the use of force. Thus, I am
interested in the use of force by three agents: the Basij, the IRGC, and the regular
military. All three actors are part of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of
Iran. The key independent variable is the composition of the protesting group at the
level of the protest event. I categorize each protest event as “narrow" or “broad," de-
pending on the groups involved. A narrow protest group is one that falls into one box
163of the 2X2 ﬁgure below. A broad protest group is comprised of at least two groups
that fall into at least two of the boxes. Though there are many more groups that
could be added to the ﬁgure, this particular set of groups was determined inductively
from the data. If a particular social group was mentioned in the news sources, then
I included it as a relevant group.
Some groups, like “women," were put into more than one box. This is because
“women" as a group cover the entire economic distribution (although an argument
can be made that they only belong in one box since property rights favor men and
women earn less on average); however, this group has very little symbolic capital.
Women in Iran do not have the same standing as men in Iranian courts, and they
certainly are not a salient identity in the set of beliefs justifying the allocation of
power in the system (Afshar 1997). On the other hand, Iran’s rural population is the
backbone of the regime’s political support and ideological foundation. It is because
of rural dissatisfaction with the Shah that many argue the revolution in 1979 was
successful. It is not surprising, then, that the government’s political legitimacy has
been built in the countryside, where the source of the clergy’s power rests (Alfoneh
2007). Similarly, Iran’s merchant class is also signiﬁcant to the regime because much
164of the country’s business aﬀairs is dominated by religious and security actors (in
some cases, as a form of patronage). For example, the Revolutionary Guard is widely
considered to be one of Iran’s most inﬂuential economic players (Bruno et al. 2013).
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Figure 4.9: Groups in Social Space, Iran 2009
There are four hypotheses that emerge when the factors—representativeness of the
Armed Forces, composition of the protesting group, and the existence of a paramili-
tary force—highlighted by the theoretical framework are considered.
165There should be no signiﬁcant diﬀerence with respect to the nature of the
state’s response between “narrow" and “broad" protests
Although narrowly deﬁned protesting groups are virtually always violently re-
pressed and broadly deﬁned ones are not, there should be no observable diﬀerence in
the state’s response in this case. This is because the state has options in its choice of
security service provider. It can choose to send in the “right" kind of security actor
given the composition of the protest event; in order not to risk the chance of disobe-
dience in the face of broad protests, the “right" kind of security force is one that is
unrepresentative.
The Basij is more likely to be used by the government when the protesting
group is broadly deﬁned
The Basij is a well-ﬁnanced, cohesive paramilitary unit within the Iranian security
apparatus. To the extent that the Basij is the most unrepresentative entity within
the Iranian armed forces, and given its highly ideological setting and informal culture
(characteristics representative of most paramilitary or militia-like units), we would
expect the highest likelihood of violence (and perverse violence) when the Basij is
166involved as an actor in a protest event. The highly ideological nature and informal
culture (within a strict hierarchical framework) of the Basij produce the conditions
that allow for its cohesiveness to lead to particularly perverse forms of violence against
threats to the state. These pathways are discussed in depth later, but they include
factors like a heightened sense of anonymity, stereotyping, and responsibility diﬀu-
sion/moral disengagement. Since broadly deﬁned protests present the regime with
the most diﬃculty given the more representative nature of the threat, the regime
prefers to send in the Basij to do the dirty work in these cases because of the higher
guarantee that orders will be followed.
The Revolutionary Guard is more likely to be used by the government
when the protesting group is narrowly deﬁned
The Army is least likely to be used by the government; and, if it is, it will
only be sent in to manage narrow protest groups
The ﬁnal two hypotheses describe the roles of the IRGC and the regular military
in the context of protest policing. Even though Iran’s military is unrepresentatively
structured, the Army (or Artesh) is representative in its composition because of uni-
167versal conscription; however, the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij (which falls
under the command of the IRGC) are units within the military that are favored by
the government. Thus, because these units are formal structures within the mili-
tary organization that are better ﬁnanced, politically preferred, and better equipped,
the military as a whole is unrepresentative, even if the Army is not. Moreover, the
IRGC and Basij are unrepresentative compositionally—though this is more the case
for the Basij, which is the most highly unrepresentative. As a result, assuming scarce
resources, the government will prefer to use Basij forces when the protest group is
broad to maximize the chance of success, but will opt to use the Revolutionary Guard
when the protest group is narrow in order not to overwork or strain the Basij. I ex-
pect that the regular military (or Army) will be the least utilized security actor in
the context of protest repression. Iran’s regular military is representative of society,
and, as a result, unlikely to be eﬀective against a broadly deﬁned opposition.
4.3 Data Collection and Methods
In order to test these hypotheses, I collected data on protests events in Iran
between Jan 2009 to August 2012. The main component of this data collection eﬀort
168involved putting together and reading through thousands of international and local
newswires. I was able to access these newswires through LexisNexis; they included
Agence France Presse, Associated Press 6, IRIN Middle East Service, and Iran News,
among others. 7 These local newswires range in terms of their independence from
the state—whereas IRIN, which is a service of the UN Oﬃce for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Aﬀairs, is entirely unconnected to the Islamic Republic, Mehr and
Fars (FNA) are well-known semi-oﬃcial news agencies with ties to the government.
According to The Wall Street Journal, FNA is aﬃliated with the Revolutionary Guard
Corps (Farnaz 2010).
A second component of the data collection involved scraping the archives of Pay-
vand News of Iran, which are online. Payvand is an Iranian-American news website,
based in California. It is an outlet that brings together many independent news
sources, including radio show transcripts, blogs, international/local newswires, and
analysis. What is particularly useful about this website is that it aggregates not
only English language sources, but also Persian ones. For example, Ettelaat—one
6Also, Associated Press Online and Associated Press Worldstream
7Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA), Iranian Government News, Mehr News Agency, Voice
of America (Persian), and FARS News Agency
169such source—is a Persian Daily Newspaper published outside Iran. Another is Ra-
dio Zamaneh—an organization that provides a venue for citizen reporting and other
non-traditional journalism. Both are good examples of local level, opposition news
sources (and there are many more: Rooz Online, Radio Farda, Norouz, to name a
few). I also considered the Persian-language press, based in Iran. This included the
archives of the IRGC’s mouthpiece Payam-e Enqelab, Sobh-e Sadeq, and the current
IRGC news outlet, Ansar News.
In all cases, I chose to cast a wide net and gather the data more broadly—pruning
the data to include only relevant information came later. 8 Research assistants used
a coding instrument I developed to record information about the protest events after
the relevant newswires were identiﬁed. This information included duration, number
of participants, the composition of protesters, and state response (the presence of
police/riot police/paramilitary/military and the use of violence 9). The end result
8For Payvand News of Iran, all articles tagged as “Politics" were downloaded. These were then fur-
ther assessed, so that only those articles discussing speciﬁc protest events and government responses
were kept. The search procedure in LexisNexis used the power search interface. The HLEAD option
searched for the country name in the headline and lead paragraphs. After that, I used Boolean
options to select additional terms—terms(protests and demonstrations). Only those which were
ranked as above 75% with respect to relevance were kept. In the “Sources" ﬁeld, I speciﬁed “Wire
Service Stories," and included the aforementioned international and local-level/regional newswires.
9The ﬁnal dataset only included those events with more than 100 participants
170was a database of major protest events in Iran between Jan 2009 - August 201210.
These observations tend to be Tehran focused, but they also include some protest
events in other regions, particularly other major urban centers like Mashhad, Shiraz,
and Isfahan.
Research assistants were instructed to read through newswires carefully, paying
attention to multiples pieces of information.11 The two most critical pieces of infor-
mation were composition (the key explanatory variable) and violence (the dependent
variable). In general, an eﬀort was made to extrapolate, but leaving cells blank was
encouraged if information was missing. Protesters were either classiﬁed as “Broad"
(0) or “Narrow" (1). If a speciﬁc group (see Figure 4.9) comprised a majority of the
protesting group, the protest event received a “1" on the composition variable.
The outcome variable (the use of coercion against protesters resulting in at least
one fatality) was divided into three levels: Basij, Revolutionary Guard, and Military.
These actors would have to be speciﬁcally mentioned in the newswire in order for the
protest event to be given a “1" (i.e., observed violence) for any of the three outcome
variables. Violent tactics include ﬁring on protesters, using armored vehicles, riding
10See Appendix for descriptive statistics of the main variables
11Please see the Appendix for an example of the coding process for one protest event.
171motorcycles into crowds, and utilizing other methods of coercive crowd control.12
4.4 Quality and Coverage of Sources
The nature of my data is observational. Though there is a lot of information
out there, not all of it is reliable or accurate. Because of this, my methods relied
on cross-checking sources against each other. Though the Iran database may seem
relatively small compared to other ones, I believe the quality of the information is
better because the information for each protest event was usually corroborated by
multiple sources, in particular Farsi-based ones.
This brings me to an important point regarding protest event data. With the
advent of Twitter and other forms of social media, it is easier than ever for any-
one to be a reporter of events. This is great because it means more information is
recorded. However, there are also downsides because the legitimacy of sources comes
12In order to ensure the validity and reliability of the coding process, I had two sets of research
assistants. The main group was based in Cambridge, MA, and it was comprised of paid Harvard
undergraduates. The second set was based in Fresno, CA, and it was comprised of unpaid high
school students from my former high school. In exchange for two weeks of work (approximately
20 hours), I wrote my high school students recommendation letters for college, and they were able
to list their experience researching for me on their resume. This second set of researchers were the
robustness checkers of the ﬁrst group, who were also told that their work would be checked. I believe
this was a good method of keeping all research assistants focused and detail-oriented. In the end,
there were some changes that I made based on diﬀerences between the ﬁrst group of researchers
(Cambridge) and the second group (Fresno); however, I found there to be a medium-high degree of
inter-coder reliability based on my method.
172into question—it is simply impossible to validate all pieces of information, and large
gatherers of reports do not always cite where their information comes from. To man-
age this issue, I tried, whenever possible, to err on the side of caution and remove
observations with little information or uncertainty. For example, if an observation
only had information on a particular protest event’s location and number of people,
but was not conﬁrmed and enhanced by another newswire or article, then I deleted
it. This does mean that my sample is biased in two major ways, and perhaps not
representative of the universe of cases.
First, dropping observations with limited or more questionable information means
that data tends to be focused on Tehran. In general, however, most of the activity
during the time was centered on Tehran and other large urban centers (like Mashhad).
Nonetheless, this leads to a second bias in my data: the source of state violence. My
theory hinges on being able to distinguish among state actors when it comes to
identifying the source of protest policing violence. My data underestimates Basiji
violence in two potential ways.
First, by focusing on Tehran and other major urban centers, it misses the violence
inﬂicted on protesters in smaller cities and villages. The Green Revolution was marked
173by its nation-wide scope, and though activity was concentrated in the large cities, my
data does not adequately represent protests outside Tehran, Mashhad, and Isfahan.
It is likely that the bulk of protest policing in the smaller cities was carried out by
the Basij, since the attention of the regime was on Tehran. This meant the IRGC
and the Artesh were mobilized in Tehran and the other large urban centers, less so
in the smaller cities. The Basij is also the largest and most rapid force in the state’s
security apparatus. It is the most decentralized, with bases in every city and village
throughout the country. For this reason, the regime is able to rely on the Basij not
just in places like Tehran, but quite literally anywhere and everywhere.
Second, Basij violence is under-reported in newswires because it is also less de-
tectable than the more standard protest policing methods of the IRGC and the regular
military. For example, many protesters simply disappeared during the Green Rev-
olution. These people were mostly likely beaten, put into the backs of unmarked
cars, and taken to prisons where they were tortured and killed.13 According to the
International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, rape and torture by the Basij was
routinely practiced as a matter of policy to intimidate people from coming out to
13http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world-jan-june11-iranianwomen_06-10/
174protest again. According to The Guardian, thousands went missing after the Green
Revolution, most probably killed in secret or not so secret prisons like Evin.14 This
more informal, yet lethal strategy of protest policing should be part of my opera-
tionalization of military violence against protesters; however, it remains unmeasured
because it is not picked up in newswires (at least systematically).
It is unclear how exactly this bias is aﬀecting my results because I have no way
of knowing what the crowds in these protests were like compositionally. Fortunately,
there is no reason to believe that the reason for the missing information is correlated
with crowd composition. Rather, it is a function of the undetectable nature of these
more perverse strategies. Since I have no reason to think that newswires are sys-
tematically less likely to exclude information on Basij violence in narrowly composed
protests, the best case scenario is that my results are underestimating the true eﬀect
of crowd composition on Basij violence.
It is important to discuss comparisons across diﬀerent kinds of sources because
I incorporated both international and “local" newswires. Given heavy censorship of
the press in Iran, the local news I consider is mainly based in Los Angeles. I consider
14http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2009/jun/29/
iran-election-dead-detained?guni=Article:in
175this to be local in the sense that reports to these outlets (for example, Payvand or
Ettelaat) do come from inside the country. Furthermore, the expatriate community in
Los Angeles is deeply involved in Iranian politics; most of the opposition newspapers
based in Los Angeles are read by Iranians in Iran because they are considered more
accurate than sources within the country. I did make an eﬀort to also collect data
from sources within the country (for example, Mehr and Fars); however, the only
ones that I had access to were government sponsored ones with clear biases against
protesters.
Though these government approved news sources did identify protest events, and
through this I was able to corroborate or conﬁrm information like the number of
protesters, the presence of police, the nature of protesters’ demands...etc., they did
not include much on the state’s response, particularly if there was violence. This is
because, until recently, the government has denied there was any state sanctioned
violence during the election protests. It was only in January 2014 that a Basij Com-
mander admitted there was one instance of the Basij ﬁring on protesters. This un-
named Commander claimed the protesters were targeted because they were armed
and dangerous to those around them. Furthermore, he denied any fatalities, saying
176the Basijis aimed at the “troublemakers" from the waist down. Photographs and
video footage indicate otherwise, as do reports in legitimate international newswires
(see International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran15).
Setting aside the government approved news sources, there were some general dif-
ferences between the international and “local" sources that are worth noting. Some-
times I noticed that the opposition sources lacked information on the outcome of
the protest events—for example, how many people were arrested or how the state
responded to protesters. Nonetheless, these were still useful because I was able to
cross-validate events and even add to them because there was a more detailed de-
scription of the nature of the crowd or the location of the event itself. The lack of a
description of the outcome stemmed from the location of the reporter. If the reporter
was identiﬁed by name and the location was in Iran, there was a tendency to avoid
descriptions of the outcome. Fortunately, this wasn’t a common occurrence.
A second diﬀerence I noticed was the density of reports between peaks of protest
activity. Whereas the international newswires were consistent in reporting events
between peaks of activity, the opposition newswires were more clustered in their
15http://www.payvand.com/news/14/jan/1053.html
177approach. This probably stemmed from diﬀerences in access and reach, not to mention
resources. Sources like the Associated Press have networks of reporters that monitor
countries for newsworthy events in a consistent manner. Smaller mediums do not
have this kind of capacity, and must rely on social media or contacts who are more
informal. Overall, however, I would say that international and local sources were not
too diﬀerent, reﬂecting each other for the most part. This allowed me to cross-validate
as many protest events as possible, adding information in some cases and conﬁrming
information in others.
The density of newswires did reﬂect major periods of protest (see Appendix). The
number of protests during the Green Revolution ebbed and ﬂowed, and this movement
was reﬂected in the amount of news reported by international and local sources. There
were three major peaks of activity during the Green Revolution: the initial outbreak
in June, the Ashura Holiday in December (2009), and then in February (2010). These
are clearly marked in the ﬁgure. This ﬁgure does not represent all newswires collected,
but only the ones that were judged to be relevant. As mentioned earlier, the data
collection method cast a wide net, relying on research assistants to not only code
the relevant information from the newswires, but to also determine which newswires
178contained information on protest events.
4.5 Results
Table 1 displays the results for the model testing the ﬁrst hypothesis. The unit
of analysis is the protest event, and there are 87 events in total during this 30 month
period. There is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence with respect to the nature of the state’s re-
sponse between “narrow" and “broad" protests in this table. The dependent variable,
for this model, is the use of violence against protesters on the part of the state. In
other words, protest policing violence has not been disaggregated at the level of the
security force actor. The lack of an observable diﬀerence in the state’s response is
expected because the state has options in its choice of security service provider. The
main conclusions of this chapter reassess violence by considering not just whether it
happens, but also who inﬂicts it.
Control variables were included to capture the inﬂuence of other relevant factors.
First, I included a measure for the size of the protesting crowd. This variable ranged
from 1 to 6.16 The eﬀect of a large crowd on the likelihood of state violence could
161 (100-1,000), 2 (1,001-10,000), 3 (10,001-100,000), 4 (100,001-1,000,000), 5 (1,000,001-
2,000,000), 6 (over 2,000,000)
179go either way. On the one hand, from a rational perspective, a large crowd should
deter state agents from ﬁring. This is because the costs of doing so are higher if
there are more people who are dissatisﬁed. As an agent of the state, I would ﬁnd
the likelihood of my own safety and the prospects of the state to be less favorable as
the size of the crowd increases. On the other hand, if my more social-psychological
approach is correct, a large crowd should seem more threatening to the regime and
the agents of the regime who have an ideological stake in the regime, not a sense of
belonging to society as a whole. In this case, for the unrepresentative Basij and IRGC,
a larger crowd should be seen as an even bigger out-group threat—the us versus them
distinction should become more salient as a large crowd signals greater threat. This
should manifest as a greater likelihood of violence as the size of the crowd increases,
especially on the part of the Basij.
The results are not conclusive, but they do seem to signal that my approach is
correct. The sign on this variable in Table 1 is positive, though it is not statistically
signiﬁcant. In Table 2, the Basij is more likely to inﬂict violence on protesters as
the size of the crowd increases (this is statistically signiﬁcant). Though this eﬀect
disappears in Model 2 (Table 2), it is probably because some of the eﬀect of the
180variable is actually neutralized by the inclusion of a variable that measures threat
perception. I discuss this variable in greater detail further down, but it is important
to note that the sign on the threat variable is also positive, which reinforces the notion
that it is picking up some of the eﬀect of the protest crowd size variable. Lastly, in
Model 5 (Table 2), the size of the crowd also has a positive eﬀect on the Army’s
presence at the protest event. It is important to make clear that the Army never
actually inﬂicted violence on protesters, given any of the data that I collected. Thus,
this eﬀect on the Army, since the Army is representative, does not counter my claim
about the implications for my theory if my social-psychological approach is correct.
I also included a lagged protest crowd size variable. I did this to take into ac-
count any trend based on the government’s expectation for the direction of the social
movement in terms of its scope. In other words, it is possible the government is just
choosing to send state security force actors in to manage crowds based on its per-
ception of how the social movement is developing over time from prior beliefs. For
example, if the regime looks at a previous protest event, and assumes the next one
will be large and that the social movement is growing in strength, it might choose to
send in the Basij or IRGC without considering the composition of the crowds, which
181is what I am arguing. Thus, to account for this alternate possible consideration by
the government, I am including a lagged protest crowd size variable to map out this
possible trend. The results demonstrate, however, that the size of the previous protest
event has no bearing on the regime’s decision to use force in any particular protest
event.
Another control variable I include is one that measures protester violence on state
agents 17. Violent acts include such actions as throwing rocks at state security force
actors, hitting or storming police/Basij/IRGC, and attacking state agents in a mob-
like manner. Based on newswires and other sources of news that I considered, it is very
hard to determine who engaged in violence ﬁrst. So, this variable is inherently ﬂawed
in that it may be picking up protesters’ responses to violence instead of their initial
actions. Thus, forming expectations for how this protester violence variable might be
aﬀecting the likelihood of violence is problematic. Similarly, deriving an interpretation
for this variable based on the results is similarly problematic. Nonetheless, I believe
it is an important variable to include because, bracketing which actor (the people
or the state) inﬂicted violence ﬁrst, there should be an eﬀect of the use of violent
17This is a binary variable: protesters engaged in violent acts toward government security forces–
“0" NO, “1" YES
182methods by protesters on the use of violence by state actors against the protesters. I
expect that this eﬀect is positive—violence from protesters, whether it is reactive or
active, should lead to a higher likelihood of violence from the state. The results in
both tables bear this out. The Basij is more likely to use violence against crowds that
are violent. In the Army’s case, the results are unclear because of the lack of enough
data. The sign is negative but not statistically signiﬁcant in the case of the IRGC
(see Models 3 and 4 in Table 2). This is most likely the eﬀect of a lack of instances
during which protesters were violent and the IRGC used violence.
A fourth control variable I include is GDP in the previous year to model the ef-
fect of economic downturns. This does vary during the three year period, especially
as a result of economic sanctions. The results are mixed, but in the right direction
generally. As the economy worsens and GDP declines, state violence increases be-
cause, arguably, more people are dissatisﬁed with the state of the economy, leading
to an increase in the number and scope of protest events. However, this result is only
statistically signiﬁcant in the case of the IRGC (Models 3 and 4, Table 2). A ﬁfth
control is state capacity, which is measured with the State Fragility Index (see Polity
IV). This gets at the ability of the state to manage internal threats, and Iran’s SFI
183score varies during this period of time.18 However, the variation is not great, and
the only signiﬁcant result is in Table 2 in the IRGC model. The expectation here is
that a more fragile situation within a country should lead to a more serious response
by the state to threats. It makes sense that there is a strong, positive eﬀect of this
variable on the likelihood of IRGC violence because the IRGC is a more militarized,
more formal entity than the Basij within the Armed Forces—using the IRGC signals
a more serious response by the regime.
A ﬁnal control variable in the model is the use of police/riot police, which is
a binary variable19. I included this variable to model the sequential aspect of the
regime’s protest policing strategy. It makes sense to imagine that the regime responds
to the development of a protest event, ﬁrst observing and then sending in a less costly
non-military agent (the police or riot police) unless the level of threat is perceived to
be high from the outset. The assumption here is that, if possible, the regime would
try to prevent the loss of life; its military options (the Basij or the IRGC) tend to
be more harsh and the likelihood of fatalities is higher. I would expect, given this,
18Iran’s SFI score is 14 in 2009. By 2010, it is 12 and doesn’t change. The higher the SFI score,
the worse is the state’s capacity to handle internal threats.
19“0" no police/riot police reported at protest event, “1" police/riot police reported to be present
at protest event.
184that there is a positive correlation between this variable and the likelihood of violence
since, in most protest events in which the Basij or the IRGC are present, the police or
riot police should also be present. Unfortunately, this relationship is only signiﬁcant
in Table 1, and not in any of the models in Table 2, though the sign is in the right
direction.
Table 2 presents the main ﬁndings of this chapter, particularly with respect to
the three main hypotheses (corresponding to the Basij, IRGC, and Military). The
ﬁrst column presents the results for the model testing the eﬀect of protest group
composition on Basij violence. In this model, only two variables (the size of the
protesting crowd and protester violence) have any signiﬁcant (positive) eﬀect on the
probability of Basij violence. However, including a variable that measures the level of
threat perceived by the central government changes these results, 20 showing that the
hypothesis on the likelihood of Basij violence given broad crowds bears out (second
column).
This proves the main conclusion of the threat perception school, which ﬁnds that
the level of threat matters when it comes to predicting the government’s response
20THREAT is a binary variable that measures the perceived level of threat by the government.
It is based on the demands of the protesters—if there is evidence that protesters were calling for a
revolutionary change in the regime, then the event was given a “1."
185Table 4.1: State Violence on Protesters
Dependent variable:
VIOLENCE
Crowd Composition 0.504
(0.540)
Size of the Crowd 0.413
(0.312)
Protester Violence 1.227
(0.557)
Size of the Crowd (lag) -0.302
(0.289)
GDP -0.0003
(0.001)
State Capacity 0.639
(0.980)
Police Presence 1.451
(0.737)
Constant -7.494
(3.617)
Observations 87
Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
186to citizen mobilization. This is particularly the case in quasi-democratic states (i.e.,
those “in the middle" 21) like Iran—ones in which there are some democratic insti-
tutions that foster citizen participation, but there is little capacity to fully permit
peaceful civil resistance because protesting activities are perceived as threatening.
Thus, the probability of violent outcomes or responses to “threatening" civil acts
(like protests) increases as these acts are perceived to be more threatening to the
central government.
Once the perceived level of threat is taken into account, the model shows that
the Basij is more likely to be used by the government when the protesting group is
broadly deﬁned. Holding everything else ﬁxed, the Basij is 74% more likely to be sent
in and use violence against protesters when the protesting group is broad as opposed
to narrow. Column three in Table 2 presents the results for the third hypothesis
on the Revolutionary Guard. In short, there is strong evidence that suggests the
Revolutionary Guard is more likely to be used by the government when the protesting
group is narrowly deﬁned.22 In fact, when the opposition is broadly deﬁned, the
Revolutionary Guard is ﬁve times less likely to be sent in and use violence against
21For a good summary, see Pierskalla (2010)
22Including the THREAT variable does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the results. See column 4.
187Table 4.2: Regression Results, Protests 2009-2012
Dependent variable:
Basij IRGC Army
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Crowd Composition -0.568 -1.343 1.793 2.222 149.075
(0.604) (0.708) (0.842) (0.948) (21,249.880)
Size of the Crowd 0.551 -0.426 -0.678 -0.200 1.081
(0.331) (0.510) (0.457) (0.603) (0.538)
Protester Violence 1.749 1.474 -0.371 -0.249 0.236
(0.621) (0.659) (0.663) (0.680) (1.036)
Size of the Crowd (lag) -0.144 -0.220 -0.293 -0.339 -0.672
(0.308) (0.331) (0.428) (0.442) (0.659)
GDP -0.001 -0.001 -0.007 -0.008 0.057
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (8.690)
State Capacity 1.466 2.200 8.107 8.470 -54.584
(1.852) (1.796) (3.333) (3.412) (8,255.372)
Police Presence 1.299 1.335 -0.596 -0.347 25.526
(0.833) (0.900) (1.123) (1.200) (50,461.260)
Threat Perception 2.407 -1.222
(0.961) (0.986)
Constant -16.518 -18.288 -19.181 -20.474 -149.524
(5.312) (5.567) (7.626) (7.811) (53,320.670)
Observations 87 87 56 56 87
Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
188protesters (holding all controls at their mean).
Finally, based on interviews and newswires, there is no indication that the military
actually engaged violently with protesters. Moreover, the dataset only contains a
few observations in which the military mobilized on the streets in the capital city.
Therefore, the military is the least likely to be used of the three security actors.
However, because of the limited data, the results of the logit regression do not pan
out, and not much can be concluded statistically.
4.6 Us Versus Them Distinctions
Though I am not able to rigorously test the main mechanisms in this chapter,
there is some evidence that these play a signiﬁcant role when it comes to explain-
ing military (and paramilitary) violence. There are three broad factors, which are
outlined in Chapter 1, that underlie the results of this study. The ﬁrst relates to
the eﬀects of the protesting crowd. Broader crowds present more of a threat because
representative militaries are more likely to perceive them as part of the “us." The less
representative an entity within the armed forces, the easier the distinction between
“us" versus “them," even in the context of broad protests. This is because members
189of unrepresentative military institutions tend to have one strong group identiﬁcation;
as a result, the deﬁnition of what constitutes an out-group is broader.
In the context of 2009, given the unrepresentative nature of the Iranian military,
protesters were easily “othered." Even though crowds tended to be broad in general,
composed of many subgroups, there is evidence that the unrepresentative entities (the
Basij and the IRGC) perceived those protesting as part of an out-group. I discuss
perceptions within the Basij in great depth later; however, this section discusses the
government’s framing of the protesters. I have not discussed the role of framing
as it relates to my theory, but it suﬃces to say that, in this case, opinions coming
from inside the clergy reﬂected the perceptions of those within the IRGC, given the
extremely close relationship. The IRGC was created by the clerical establishment as
a parallel military institution to protect the ideals of the religious revolution.
During the protest events of 2009, the clerical establishment framed protesters
both narrowly and in a manner that highlighted threat—i.e., as an outgroup. Through-
out what became known as the “Green Revolution," clerics and security oﬃcials pub-
licly asserted that the demonstrators were not representative of society, but rather re-
ﬂected a small group of easily identiﬁable people. On June 19th, the Supreme Leader
190spoke during religious services, saying the election was legitimate because turnout
was so high—protesters were part of a small group of “unhappy" people (Khameini,
Speech 6/19/2009). During Friday prayers, which were broadcast on television on
June 26th, Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami called for the execution of demonstrators, la-
beling them “people who wage war against God" (Khatami, Speech 6/26/2009). The
most famous example of government framing comes from President Ahmadinejad
(who was a former Basiji), who characterized protesters as “specks of dirt" during his
victory rally directly following the election (Ahmadinejad, Speech 6/19/2009). More-
over, for months after the election, government oﬃcials continued to deﬁne protesters
very narrowly either as a clearly deﬁned political opposition (for example, as re-
formist politician Mir-Hossein Mousavi’s disgruntled supporters) or as marginalized,
Western-leaning secularists (see Hashemi and Postel 2010). This occurred despite the
fact that demonstrations were broad, and crowds were composed of many groups:
merchants, professionals, students, and the middle class.
Similarly, security oﬃcials made an eﬀort to marginalize the Green Revolution
protesters, presenting them as threatening and their claims as illegitimate. For ex-
ample, the Iranian intelligence chief alleged that “Zionist" forces were responsible for
191the protests. Later, he added that the CIA was funding a small group of domestic
secularists to topple the government (Slackman 2009). The attempt to marginalize
the protesters also contextualizes Ahmadinejad’s characterization of those involved
in the movement as “specks of dirt."
The second factor underlying this study is the eﬀect of security force representa-
tiveness on the willingness of security actors to inﬂict violence on protesters. Repre-
sentative militaries are more likely to view protesters who reﬂect society more broadly
as part of the “us" and not the “them." On the other hand, unrepresentative mili-
taries are able to make “us versus them" distinctions regardless of the nature of the
protesting group because, in this case, the deﬁnition of what comprises the in-group
is far more narrowly deﬁned (i.e., composed of just one group).
These dynamics can be indirectly assessed through the application of a concept
in social psychology: Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE). Because an unrepre-
sentative entity within the armed forces views a protesting crowd, regardless of its
composition, as part of a more easily identiﬁed “other" group, according to FAE,
such an entity should also see protesters’ demands as threatening, illegitimate, and
extreme (including the crowd itself). An FAE occurs when an individual ascribes
192meaning and cause to another person’ĂŹs actions and behavior based on that per-
son’s disposition rather than on his or her situation. An extension of this concept
to group dynamics ﬁnds that individuals are more likely to judge in-group members
favorably; the motivations of an in-group member are more likely to be attributed
to his or her situation by another member. In the context of protests, this leads to
the expectation that security actors may perceive some demands as more or less le-
gitimate. Representative militaries are more likely to sympathize with a broad-based
opposition because such a group may be perceived as part of the “us." Otherwise put,
such demands may not be seen as illegitimate or threatening. On the other hand, if
it is true that unrepresentative militaries view crowds as part of an out-group, then
crowds and their demands should be perceived negatively.
These mechanisms are present in the Basij, IRGC, and military members’ per-
ceptions of protesters during this period of time. The Basij News Agency, which
maintains a website to publicize news about ongoing activities, was very clear about
its characterization of those protesting. According to a former Basiji (Tehran), BNA
reﬂected the opinion that protesters were not “real" Iranians (Mohsen, Interview
06/24/2013). At the same time that protesters were excluded from the in-group in
193oﬃcial online and print Basij publications, rural folk or "Roostahiye" were gloriﬁed
as the most critical part of society, responsible for keeping the foundation “pure" be-
cause of their religious zeal. Thus, what was deﬁned as the “us" depended heavily
on a reaﬃrmation of what constituted the in-group—for the Basij, this was based
on religiosity. Based on anecdotal evidence, those in rural areas perceived protesters
as outsiders as well. This may reﬂect their pre-existing beliefs about the nature of
urbanites, no doubt based on centuries of conﬂict between city dwellers and urban
dwellers; however, it does seem that, during this period of protest, such beliefs were
made more salient (Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013; Sobh-e Sadegh 07/12/2013).
With respect to the perception of demands, the Basij reﬂects the government’s
opinion of the protesters. Basij propaganda has emphasized the threatening nature
of the protesters’ demands throughout 2009-2010, calling them “foreign" and “ex-
treme" (Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013). This was an eﬀort to paint the protests as
illegitimate and dangerous, therefore justifying the severity of the response against
them. In short, the protesters’ grievances were easily downplayed by the Basij be-
cause protesters themselves were conceptualized to be outsiders. Furthermore, though
the IRGC supported the Basij during this time, it was noticeably less vocal about
194the protesters. Though there is little doubt the Revolutionary Guard harbored sim-
ilar sentiments about the demands and nature of the protesters, given its relatively
more representative composition, there is some evidence to suggest that there was
less of a cohesive framing regarding who the protesters were and what they wanted.
Its weekly magazine and website Sobh-e Sadegh condemned the protesting activities
(Sobh-e Sadegh 06/20/2009) and reported the chaotic events taking place in major
cities; however, it did not go as far as the Basij propaganda in its characterization of
the events. 23
It is diﬃcult to assess the mechanisms in the case of the military. This is because
the military mobilized only eight times throughout the protest period, and there were
no reported violent incidents involving (regular) military personnel. Theoretically,
given the military’s representative composition, this should be the case—the lowest
likelihood of violence against protesters. However, the small number of cases in the
sample means that this proposition cannot be rigorously tested. Nonetheless, there
was a widely shared sentiment within the Iranian security apparatus that the burden
of providing internal security would fall mainly on the Basij and the IRGC (Ali,
23This is based on the selections I viewed, which were not comprehensive, and also anecdotal
evidence from interviews (Ali, Interview 12/27/2013; Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013)
195Interview 12/27/2013; Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013). In fact, according to Katzman
(1993), Iran’s security apparatus was structured to include two relatively homogenous
security actors (compared to the military’s regular units)—Basij and IRGC—precisely
because of the representative nature of the Armed Forces; Khomeini anticipated the
need for a separate, less representative security provider. Furthermore, during the
protest period, one trend emerged that highlighted the more inclusive nature of the
relationship between regular military units and protesters; protesters gave troops
that were mobilized ﬂowers symbolizing peace, which were accepted (see for example,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=idvMwLSbdLw). As opposed to the relationship
between the Basij and the protesters (and to a lesser degree, the IRGC/protesters),
the one between the military and the protesters was marked by a sense of comradery
and unity—“yekiboodan" or “oneness" (Ali, Interview 12/27/2013).
The ﬁnal factor underlying the results of this chapter is paramilitary eﬀects. The
Basij militia is an omnipresent feature of life in many Iranian cities. However, de-
spite its reach and size, it operates in a militia-like manner. To the extent that it
is the most unrepresentative element in the Iranian security apparatus, it is also the
most cohesive. However, cohesiveness alone does not lead to perverse violence. The
196conditions that facilitate violence are intrinsic to paramilitaries, and these work to
strengthen the organizations’s cohesiveness in a particularly pernicious way, increas-
ing the likelihood of not just violence, but other forms of more perverse violence.
These conditions are the highly ideological context within which paramilitaries oper-
ate and also their unique mix of unprofessionalism (or a culture of informality with
respect to training and tactics) and hierarchy (i.e., high secondary group cohesion,
which means that commands are followed). The conditions facilitate the pathways
to violence more generally: anonymity (through unprofessionalism), responsibility
diﬀusion (through ideology and hierarchy), de-humanization/stereotyping (through
homogeneity and ideology), and de-individuation (through ideology and unprofes-
sionalism). The cohesiveness of the Basij, based on its unrepresentativeness and
paramilitary characteristics, concentrates the rewards and costs of all actions, par-
ticularly when it comes to following the group through the pathways to violence
aforementioned.
The ideological foundation of the Basij organization is based on a revolution-
ary doctrine that is both normatively and pragmatically motivated. From a nor-
mative perspective, this doctrine is ultra-conservative and religious—Basij members
197view themselves as part of a mission to bring the commandments of God to society,
“[and] create a pious society" (Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013). In fact, their mission
statement is to enforce the principle of Amr be Maruf va Nahy az Monkar (Golkar
2011). This translates to “commanding the right and forbidding the wrong." As it
was explained to me in an interview, members are socially rewarded or “lifted up"
inter-subjectively—it is the extent of their selﬂessness in relation to this doctrine that
matters. In other words, actions are judged by the group, not in accordance with a
normal code of conduct (for example, “killing another human being is wrong"), but by
the degree to which a member puts aside his own will (this is “selﬂess") and submits
to God’s authority, which is manifested—this step is critical—through a hierarchical
divine structure as the will of the Supreme Leader (Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013).
Thus, “killing another human being is wrong" translates into “except when it isn’t
wrong." “Ideologically hot" conditions under which perversions like that become possi-
ble reinforce the cohesiveness of the group, as members become increasingly dependent
on each other and their belief system for justiﬁcation and legitimization.
Furthermore, in highly ideological settings, these social rewards are concentrated,
and it is easier for groups to isolate themselves from external inﬂuences, which might
198otherwise discourage extremist beliefs and actions (for a good summary of Groupthink
mechanisms, see Janis 1972). This is certainly true in the case of the Basij, which
has remained separate from mainstream politics in Iran, insulated against public
criticism and not accountable to public opinion. Geographically, most Basij groups
are located in rural areas, away from urban centers, which further isolates members
and facilitates the perverse eﬀects of group-based dynamics. The groups that do
reside in urban centers are closely monitored; active members spend most of their
time in the classroom learning about Islamic doctrine or at the centers surrounded
by other members (Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013; Ostovar 2013).
Pragmatically, the Basij has operated as if it has been in a “constant state of war"
(Ali, Interview 12/27/2013). The use of threat, historically, has been instrumental
to the formation and cohesiveness of the organization. In the decade following the
revolution and during the Iran-Iraq war, the main role of the Basij was recruiting,
organizing, and deploying volunteers to the warfront. The full muscle of the organi-
zation was exerted against an outside threat, and this strengthened its raison d’etre.
Following this, the regime used members as a morality police in place of the revolu-
tionary committees (Golkar 2011). 1989 became a very important year for the Basij;
199its purpose was redesigned by the Supreme Leader, who identiﬁed a new war that
was to be fought by the organization. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who became Supreme
Leader following Khomeini’s death in 1989, identiﬁed the organization’s most impor-
tant priority:“cultural invasion" by Iran’s enemies in the West was corroding Iran’s
cultural and moral landscape (Iranian News Memo, 07/13/1992). For the Basij, the
war was not over, and it was the organization’s mission to “move society to greater
spirituality" (Ali, Interview 12/27/2013). This purpose reinforced the organization’s
cohesiveness by giving it an enemy; as a result, membership was strengthened by a
sense of threat.
Furthermore, tight familial and ideological connections bonded members, partic-
ularly at the elite level. This is true even today. The most critical criterion for
Basij membership is the religiosity of the member’s family. It is an honor for a Basij
member to claim that he comes from a “household of martyrs," and this is a com-
monly held belief (Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013). In fact, the network of Basij
leadership (and sub-leadership) is primarily composed of prominent religious families
(Ostovar 2013). Though there is more variation at the lower levels, Basij members
are signiﬁcantly more religious than the general population, and this sense of religious
200fervor enhances the organization’s cohesiveness (Ali, Interview 12/27/2013; Mohsen,
Interview 06/24/2013).
The interviews that I conducted in 2013 with two former Basij members gave me
further anecdotal proof that “us versus them" mechanisms, exacerbated by the orga-
nization’s extreme level of unrepresentativeness and paramilitary style, were driving
the Basij’s perverse and violent response to protesters during the Green Revolution.
Compared to the IRGC and the Army, the Basij’s strategies and tactics of policing
were far more perverse and violent. This is not to say that the policing methods
utilized by the IRGC did not result in violent (and even fatal) outcomes; however,
the tactics tended to be more standard—for example, the use of batons, water can-
nons, and shields. Moreover, there was no evidence that regular military units used
any violent methods of protest policing during this period, even though they were re-
portedly mobilized during some of the bigger displays of dissatisfaction in the major
cities.
On the other hand, the Basij had extremely violent, perverse strategies of control
that they inﬂicted on protesters. These included using batons to rape prisoners who
were arrested during the protests, cables that coiled and extended (if they attached
201onto someone’s hand, they could do very serious damage. Ali, Interview 12/27/2013),
and other forms of sexual violence (McDowall 2009). Both interviewees explained to
me that the nature of clashes was unlike anything they had seen before, particularly
with respect to the severity of state-sanctioned Basiji violence. There were orders
from the top to “attack without restraint or mercy" (Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013).
Protesters were considered to be in “disagreement" with the Supreme Leader; as a
result, there was no diﬀerence between men, women, children, and the elderly. In
both interviews, I listened to horror stories—the beating of old men, the striking of
small children, and even a disregard for pregnant women in the crowd.
Exacerbated “us versus them" dynamics aﬀected how Basij members viewed protesters
and how they viewed themselves. It was the nature of these two perspectives that
was responsible for the severity and perverseness of the Basij’s strategies.
4.6.1 To “Other" More Easily
Dynamics within the Basij, as the most unrepresentative element within the se-
curity apparatus, permitted members to “other" protesters more easily. Protesters’
demands were perceived to be extreme, threatening, and illegitimate—and, what is
202critical is that social rewards within the membership encouraged such beliefs. These
rewards were tied to the ideology underpinning the structure of the apparatus. Thus,
members received status and backpatting, the more their actions and words reﬂected
a set of beliefs transmitted from the top down. In this case, protesters were “mean-
ingless" because their demands were “meaningless" (and vice versa. Ali, Interview
12/27/2013). What made their demands illegitimate in this way, and how was this
considered threatening for members? There is evidence that the Supreme Leader
had called the election for Ahmadinejad months before the actual election took place
(Robinson 2009), invoking the Velayat-e Faqih, which gives the Supreme Leader the
power and capacity to interpret the will of God (Alfoneh 2013). Because protesters
were questioning the results of the election, which had been divinely determined and
validated, their demands existed outside the Velayat—i.e., they had no meaning.
These demands, therefore, seemed threatening because they were not about an issue;
they were against the Supreme Leader, the ultimate guide who is never wrong (Ali,
Interview 12/27/2013).
However, the ﬁrst step before a judgment about demands is made requires a
judgment about the individual. Dynamics within the Basij also encouraged the de-
203humanization of protesters. This process reﬂected the same one described earlier for
demands—social rewards, based on ideology, facilitated the perception that protesters
were part of an“other" (a “lesser"). As one interviewee described, “Attacking peo-
ple didn’t mean much" (Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013). Because protecting the
will of the Velayat against threat was the “right" thing to do, protesters became
undiﬀerentiated—men, women, children, and the elderly were all the same. Members
often talked about protesters as “agents" without will (particularly if the foreign plot
frame was raised) or “dirt" in the context of the city’s westernized youth (considered
corrupt, see Khatam 2010). Stereotyping was encouraged by members at all levels.
At the beginning and end of the day, socializing and religious activities (which became
conﬂated) emphasized the diﬀerence between protesters and real Iranians—protesters
were stereotyped and clumped into one group: westernized urbanites (Mohsen, Inter-
view 06/24/2013).
4.6.2 The Reﬂection in the Mirror
“Us versus them" dynamics, bolstered by the homogeneity and paramilitary char-
acteristics of the Basij, also encourage members to feel invincible in the face of threat,
204and to de-individuate themselves, thereby diﬀusing moral responsibility (Janis 1972;
Valentino 2005). This results in actions that are more likely to be violent and dis-
criminatory. Many inside the Basij, particularly those responsible for protest policing,
are often very young, between the ages of 15 to 21 (Ostovar 2013). Since they were
brought into wealthier, urban neighborhoods within which they have very few friends
or connections (Golkar 2011), they would spend time together at the Basij bases, form-
ing even deeper social bonds with their small group of compatriots. Consequently,
the “Basij" group identity became highly salient, leading to feelings of superiority and
power over any individuals not within that membership, “When we came to the city
[Tehran], it was very fun. We liked the power, and being in control over others. We
felt very powerful because we could do what we wanted. We’d do it together and take
care of each other" (Mohsen, 06/24/2013).
There were multiple aspects of deindividuation within the Basij organization. The
ideological component encouraged members to give up their own will and submit to
God’s will, which is represented divinely by the Supreme Leader. The Ayatollah
Khamanei is the incarnation of the 12th Imam (the one who is supposed to return
in the form of the Messiah), “Not far short of God" (Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013).
205When he stated that the advancement and development of Islam depended on Ah-
madinejad maintaining power, “[Basij members] felt like their actions were justiﬁed
by God" (Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013). In fact, for 3-4 months before the elec-
tion, members attended classes on Islamic ideology (Golkar 2011). Furthermore, the
thought of speaking out against this authority seemed “horrifying" (Mohsen, Inter-
view 06/24/2013), particularly in a group as cohesive as the Basij unit. If issues did
come up regarding the violence, superiors responded normatively, attesting how ev-
erything was for a good cause. If that did not work, religious leaders were consulted,
“Everything was Fath Al Moin" or “Aid to Victory" (Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013).
The pragmatic or political component facilitated the diﬀusion of moral responsi-
bility through hierarchical structure. Clear hierarchical structure is not necessarily a
bad thing; however, in the context of a highly homogenous or unrepresentative organi-
zation, it can facilitate pernicious violence by increasing the social costs of questioning
authority. The organization of the Basij is precise and extremely organized, reﬂecting
very clearly the ideological source of its power—all commanders report directly to
the Supreme Leader, who issues commands directly back to them (Alfoneh 2013).
The directness of this chain of command, particularly in its divine nature, magniﬁed
206the costs of going against the group’s will, “This is the belief. We had accepted the
Velayat ... everyone’s actions must follow. Outside of that did not exist. There was
no choice... It was requirement" (Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013). Thus, holding a
contradictory belief not only became “immoral," it also made you an outsider. In a
cohesive, small Basij unit, this was unfathomable—extremely costly, given the years
of ideological training and social bonding, particularly when displaced and brought
to the big city. In fact, there was a very strong group identiﬁcation because mem-
bers felt like they belonged to a “secret society" (Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013).
The secretive nature of the organization—for example, knowing months before the
election who was “supposed" to win—further darkened members’ perspectives on the
protesters, who were all non-members. The privilege of belonging to an “in-group"
delineated and justiﬁed the very clear boundaries around anyone (or groups) on the
outside of that group who was threatening the political (and divine) order.
Thirdly, the organization emphasizes “sameness," facilitating the role of anonymity
as a pathway to extreme violence. This is reinforced ideologically: members are called
“warriors of Islam," with group prayer sessions that call for unity before expected
periods of harsh repression (Ali, Interview 12/27/2013). This is also reinforced by the
207group: members are encouraged to address each other as “brother" or “sister" (there
is a division for women known as the Al-Zahra battalion. Ali, Interview 12/27/2013).
Lastly, structure highlights the interchangeability of Basijis, “Basijis from the areas
around Tehran might be sent to Karaj, while Basijis from the areas around Karaj
might be sent to Tehran" (Ali, Interview 12/27/2013). Though I cannot conﬁrm that
this precise exchange took place during the Green Revolution, exchanges like this
certainly happened, particularly when it came to using Basijis from the rural areas in
the cities. The Basij had a clear function, and individual agency was co-opted within
this process when it became obvious that the local Basij in the urban centers were
not performing well, “Heavy clashes were getting worse in the cities. [Commanders]
couldn’t rely on local Basijis ... So, Basijis from the countryside were brought in"
(Ali, Interview 12/27/2013).
Lastly, the “unprofessional" culture of the Basij, despite its formal, hierarchical
structure, explains the nature of the strategies used against protesters. The Basij
has long operated with near immunity from the state; there are many examples of
judicial leniency and formal acquittals of Basijis implicated in serious crimes (Naji
2008). Sa’id Tajik, a Basij commander from Tehran, suggested in an April 2011
208interview that the beneﬁt of the organization to the state was precisely this capacity
to operate outside the oﬃcial chain of command (this is not to say that the Basij
doesn’t have its own chain of command, which is explicit. See Amiri 2011). Of course,
this distance from the state has also meant that, in some ways, Basijis operate like
“thugs" because the organization is not institutionalized in the traditional sense (see
Bellin 2004 on institutionalization; Interview, Sohayl in Ostovar 2013). The Basij’s
unprofessional culture was responsible for the greater variation in its protest policing
methods—Basijis were unquestionably more brutal, perverse, and extreme in their
tactics.
The decentralized structure of the organization explains the stickiness of this cul-
ture. Though the state decided to integrate Basij forces into the IRGC in 2009, the
basic shape of the organization—a decentralized network of small groups—has not
changed. It is in this type of structure that the unprofessionalized nature of the
organization can be maintained within a very strict, formal understanding of where
authority is derived. One reason is that a decentralized network of small groups
inhibits the kind of formal training that would lead to professionalization (see Hunt-
ington 1957). As one interviewee said, “Nobody had really trained us ... I don’t know
209what we were" (Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013). Second, when it comes to methods,
there is more that is left to the discretion of lower level members in this kind of set-up;
thus, more extreme, informal tactics are used (Mitchell 2004). One example of this is
the tactic of urban camouﬂage—Basijis, dressed up as protesters, joined crowds and
instigated fear through random acts of violence during the Green Revolution (for ex-
ample, stabbing protesters in the back and arms, see Vermaat 2009). It was through
these strategies that the state was able to create an environment of fear, which be-
came very eﬀective in suppressing crowds (see also Duvall and Stoll 1988); however,
this is not a function that a more professionalized unit, like the IRGC, could fulﬁll
by itself. Therefore, the state relied upon the Basij for its organizational capacity to
produce certain kinds of tactics and strategies.
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Representativeness in the military organization aﬀects the likelihood of violence
during protest events. Militaries that are representative are less likely to inﬂict vi-
olence upon protesters when crowds are broad because they are less likely to view
crowds as a threatening other. “Us versus them" distinctions are a critical component
of the decision and capacity to crack down on protesters. When these distinctions are
easier to make, violence is easier to legitimize. In unrepresentative militaries, mem-
bers identify themselves very strongly with one group, and are more likely to view
crowds (even broad crowds) as part of an out-group. An extension of this argument
to paramilitaries leads to the expectation that paramilitaries would be the agents of
the worst kinds of atrocities against protesters—severe violence that includes even
more perverse forms like sexual violence. To the extent that paramilitaries are the
most unrepresentative entities in the armed forces, there are characteristics particular
211to paramilitaries, like a highly ideological setting and a unique hierarchical structure
that leaves room for an informal culture, that further enhance cohesiveness in ways
that facilitate the pathways to extreme violence.
I established this conclusion through a comparison of two signiﬁcant social move-
ments in Iran: the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the Green Revolution in 2009.
In one case, the military fell apart and was unable to inﬂict violence on protesters.
In the other case, in 2009, the military waged a sustained campaign of repression
against protesters, ending with the collapse of the movement. Given the background
variables, it is puzzling that the outcomes in the two cases were so diﬀerent. Further-
more, the Shah’s regime had been very eﬀective when it came to clamping down on
protests in previous years, before the revolution in 1979. What was diﬀerent about
1979? Alternatively, given how similar 2009 was to 1979, how did the Islamic Regime
avoid the Shah’s fate?
Using historical data and an original dataset on protest events during the Green
Revolution, I exploit the variation in military violence between protest events (so,
at the intra-state level within a protest movement) to show that “us versus them"
distinctions play a critical role. In fact, none of the other dominant approaches in the
212ﬁeld can account for this micro-variation—some fare better than others when it comes
to macro-variation across countries. However, at the level of the protest event, there
is no theory that can predict the variation in military violence; thus, one signiﬁcant
contribution of my work is that I develop a framework for a kind of variation that
has been ignored and not studied.
What does this mean for theory? In general, my work calls for a more focused,
detail-oriented approach to the study of protest policing. Since the Arab Spring, there
has been a tremendous amount of good work on what accounted for the variation
across states when it came to the decision to use force. Many of these works did focus
on the role of the military, highlighting the signiﬁcant eﬀect military violence had on
the success or failure of movements. In fact, this project began with the hope that it
would be extended to other countries, speciﬁcally those involved in the Arab Spring.
Applying my framework to these other countries would be fruitful in two main ways.
First, these countries would serve as out of sample tests for my theory. My theory
is very much built on the knowledge and access to information I have with respect
to the Iran case. In this sense, it is more of a theory-generating exercise than one
of theory-testing. However, based on my knowledge of the Arab cases, I believe an
213extension would be a perfect way to test whether the mechanism is valid in conditions
that are slightly diﬀerent. For example, in the Syrian case, the militia-like entity
(comparable to the Basij) is the Shabiha. The Shabiha are large, decentralized groups
of armed militia who are led by the Al-Assad family. The Syrian opposition has stated
that the Shabiha are a tool of the regime for suppressing opposition. They played a
critical role in the lead-up to the civil war, cracking down on protesters who dared to
voice their opposition against Assad. The diﬀerence between the Shabiha and Basij
is that the Basij is more institutionalized. The Basij organization is a formal entity
within the Iranian security apparatus. The Shabiha are not institutionalized in this
way, yet they play a very similar role. Thus, assessing how variation in the level
of a paramilitary’s formal relationship to the state aﬀects the type and likelihood
of violence would be a future research question. There are plenty of similar entities
across the Middle East, so focusing on this particular research agenda could lead to
a database that does not currently exist.
Another implication of my work is that security actors should be disaggregated
and studied in the context of larger historical and social processes. Protest policing
has been mainly studied through the lens of one security force actor: the police. My
214theory connects protest policing to the other literatures on regime transition and
civil war, arguing that the origins of these more signiﬁcant political outcomes may be
tied to the decisions of the government when it comes to protest policing. The Arab
Spring is a perfect example of how the origins of severe violence, civil war, and regime
transition were rooted in the levels of military violence that occurred beforehand.
Based on these cases and the Iranian ones in this work, more focus should placed on
other actors involved in protest policing, speciﬁcally actors within the armed forces.
This bring me to the main point on disaggregation. The military must be broken down
into its component parts, particularly in anocracies, in which part of the military’s
function is to protect the state from internal threat. These component parts—i.e.,
paramilitary or other militia-like entities and parallel military institutions—may have
diﬀerent functions in the context of diﬀerent kinds of threats. My theory would
suggest that these functions may be correlated with representativeness across these
bodies.
This work has also clariﬁed the concept of representativeness. By taking a histor-
ical and contextual approach vis-a-vis its disaggregation of the Iranian armed forces,
my argument has identiﬁed a kind of unrepresentativeness that has been missed in
215the more traditional approach to the concept, which has been focused on ethnicity
for the most part. The question is whether Iran is unusual in this sense. Is it simply
the case that Iran is an outlier when it comes to social cleavages? This is a limitation
of the work, in some ways. Whether the historical approach would be particularly
insightful in other cases remains to be seen. However, countries like China in which
other kinds of divisions have historically played a greater role in politics might be
good candidates.
There are three broad areas for future research. Testing this theory in other
cases, especially in diﬀerent contexts in which critical factors may vary (like the
distance between the paramilitary and the regime), is the primary area. Second,
connecting military violence during protests to police violence in a more cohesive
framework would prove fruitful. Though this work highlights the role of the military as
a signiﬁcant one, not much is said about the police’s role, which we might expect would
impact the outcome of events. What is the connection between representativeness
in the military and the strength of the police department? Furthermore, what is
representativeness like in the police? Are certain police forces unrepresentative in
certain ways? If there is variation across countries and within countries, then it is
216possible that the regime’s decision to send in the military is likely aﬀected by its
beliefs about the capacity of the police. Third, as I mentioned earlier, research on
paramilitaries, particularly with a focus on representativeness, is needed. To date,
there is no database that identiﬁes and measures the characteristics of paramilitary
groups across the world.
In the Iran case, it seems like the design of the security apparatus reﬂected a
level of agency on the part of the state. Given the multiple actors, all with varying
levels of representativeness, an argument could be made about the state anticipating
the need for a security force capable of inﬂicting severe violence on unarmed citizens
engaged in demonstrations. The successful history of social movements in Iran since
the 1800s taught the regime many lessons about the type of threat that would be the
most dangerous. The political leaders of the regime came to power on the backs of
protesters, and they are aware of their tremendous power.
However, if this is case, then why do some states fail? Why did the Shah not
anticipate such a need and design his regime’s security apparatus with that in mind?
Cases of successful revolutions, particularly in states that are not fully democratic,
hint at the limitations of agency when it comes to designing institutions that are
217capable of harsh repression. This is where I believe ideology plays a constraining
role, limiting the options available and determining preferences in ways that are not
necessarily universal—i.e., always concerned with a regime’s survival. Under the
Shah, an unrepresentative military or military-like entity was simply not possible,
given the set of beliefs that justiﬁed his claim to rule. These beliefs emphasized
the universalism of a broad, national identity. Exploiting a social cleavage was not
a possibility—it simply could not exist as a strategy for the state, no matter how
eﬀective this strategy might have been.
One of the more policy-oriented implications of this project is that the Iranian
Regime would be extremely diﬃcult to overthrow from within the country. The
structure of the security apparatus is designed to handle broad, mass protests. What’s
more, the alliance between the rural population and the religious class is deep. Since
the structure of the security apparatus takes advantage of this alliance, it is incredibly
robust to changes in other important factors like economic downturns or political
dissatisfaction.
At the same time, the level of unemployment in the country is unsustainable, so
an eventual crisis of some sort is only a matter of time. The regime has learned to
218buy time by allowing some movement in the political system. This happened in the
1990s with the election of the “liberal" Mohammad Khatemi. However, he ended
his term on a low note—none of the social, political, or economic reforms he had
promised were delivered. The current president, Hassan Rouhani, is another attempt
by the regime to move the government to the left. However, with the weakened state
of the presidency and the political in-ﬁghting, it is unlikely much will change. At the
end of the day, elections in Iran are not free—not everyone can run as a candidate.
Candidates must be approved by the Guardian Council, which is a 12-member council
of high ranking clerics. These clerics are appointed by the Supreme Leader and the
Head of the Judicial Power (who, in turn, is also appointed by the Supreme Leader.
This is one way power always loops back to the Velayat in the Iranian political
system).
What are policy suggestions for the United States given these ﬁndings? There
are two options: military and non-military. The military option is problematic for
a number of reasons, including the risk of U.S. fatalities. However, a non-military
option like increased sanctions is not going to have the intended eﬀects. These have
already been tried, and it is clear that, though the government is weakened by them,
219there is enough revenue coming in to support the security apparatus. Only when
the rural population also turns on the regime would protests in the country actually
work. This can only happen as the country prospers, and the rural areas modernize.
I believe that political change, unless there is an external attack, will come gradually
as all parts of Iran modernize and liberalize.
Protesters in 2009 were hoping for something big. Unfortunately, what they re-
ceived was unfair. Hundreds were killed and injured. Thousands were arrested, and
later disappeared. The mothers of these victims formed a group called, “Mothers
of Laleh Park." These women would meet on Saturdays in Laleh Park in Tehran.
Their principal demand was government accountability for the deaths, arrests, and
disappearances of their children. In 2011, at a meeting, these women were attacked
by over 100 Basijis. They were forced into vans and arrested. Most have been re-
leased, but a few of the leaders have been sentenced to years in the notorious Evin
Prison. These mothers symbolize the courage that is born out of desperation. They
also demonstrate just how harsh the regime can be. Understanding the source of this
tremendous capacity for perverse violence is the goal of this project. I hope that, in
some way, I have been successful.
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Figure A.1: Density of Newswires with Protest Events Over Time, 2009-2012
221Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics of Main Variables: Violence inﬂicted by Basij and
IRGC, Military Presence, and Crowd Composition (principle explanatory variable)
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Basij Violence 90 0.289 0.413 0 1
IRGC Violence 58 0.448 0.502 0 1
Regular Military Mobilization 90 0.089 0.286 0 1
Crowd Composition 90 0.667 0.474 0 1
Variable Definition Coding
Basij	 ﾠViolence The	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠcoercive	 ﾠprotest	 ﾠpolicing	 ﾠstrategies	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBasij	 ﾠthat	 ﾠresulted	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
fatalities.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠincludes	 ﾠstrategies	 ﾠlike	 ﾠshooting	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcrowd,	 ﾠbeatings,	 ﾠ
rape,	 ﾠand	 ﾠarrests.
PARA	 ﾠ=	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠintensity	 ﾠcoercive	 ﾠtactics,	 ﾠ
including	 ﾠinformal	 ﾠones,	 ﾠused	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBasij.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
"0"	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠNO	 ﾠ;	 ﾠ"1"	 ﾠ	 ﾠYES
IRGC	 ﾠViolence The	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠcoercive	 ﾠprotest	 ﾠpolicing	 ﾠstrategies	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIRGC	 ﾠthat	 ﾠresulted	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
fatalities.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠincludes	 ﾠstrategies	 ﾠlike	 ﾠshooting	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcrowd,	 ﾠbeatings,	 ﾠ
rape,	 ﾠand	 ﾠarrests.
REVGUARD87	 ﾠ=	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠintensity	 ﾠcoercive	 ﾠtactics,	 ﾠ
including	 ﾠinformal	 ﾠones,	 ﾠused	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIRGC.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
"0"	 ﾠ	 ﾠNO	 ﾠ;	 ﾠ"1"	 ﾠ	 ﾠYES
Military	 ﾠMobilization The	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠregular	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠ(Artesh)	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠprotest	 ﾠevent.	 ﾠ MILPRES	 ﾠ=	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠor	 ﾠmobilization.	 ﾠ
"0"	 ﾠ	 ﾠNO	 ﾠ(if	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmentioned,	 ﾠassume	 ﾠ"0")	 ﾠ;	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
"1"	 ﾠ	 ﾠYES
Composition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCrowd The	 ﾠestimation	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcrowd	 ﾠas	 ﾠnarrow	 ﾠor	 ﾠbroad.	 ﾠA	 ﾠbroad	 ﾠcrowd	 ﾠis	 ﾠcomposed	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠone	 ﾠsubgroup	 ﾠin	 ﾠsociety.
COMP	 ﾠ=	 ﾠcomposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprotesters.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
"0"	 ﾠ	 ﾠBROAD	 ﾠ;	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
"1"	 ﾠ	 ﾠNARROW	 ﾠ(if	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠgroup-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐for	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠ
women,	 ﾠstudents,	 ﾠethnic	 ﾠgroups,	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠ
groups-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐mentioned;	 ﾠotherwise,	 ﾠassume	 ﾠ"0").
Size	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCrowd The	 ﾠsize	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprotesting	 ﾠgroup(s)	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprotest	 ﾠevent. NUMB	 ﾠ=	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticipants.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
"1"	 ﾠ	 ﾠ100-ﾭ‐1,000	 ﾠ;	 ﾠ"2"	 ﾠ	 ﾠ1,001-ﾭ‐10,000	 ﾠ;	 ﾠ"3"	 ﾠ	 ﾠ10,001-ﾭ‐
100,000	 ﾠ;	 ﾠ"4"	 ﾠ	 ﾠ100,001-ﾭ‐1,000,0000	 ﾠ;	 ﾠ"5"	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
1,000,001-ﾭ‐2,000,000	 ﾠ;	 ﾠ"6"	 ﾠ	 ﾠover	 ﾠ2,000,000	 ﾠ
Protester	 ﾠViolence The	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠviolent	 ﾠstrategies	 ﾠby	 ﾠprotesters	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠagents	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠ
Violent	 ﾠacts	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠactions	 ﾠas	 ﾠthrowing	 ﾠrocks	 ﾠat	 ﾠstate	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠforce	 ﾠ
actors,	 ﾠhitting	 ﾠor	 ﾠstorming	 ﾠpolice/Basij/IRGC,	 ﾠand	 ﾠattacking	 ﾠstate	 ﾠagents.
PROTVOL	 ﾠ=	 ﾠprotesters	 ﾠengaged	 ﾠin	 ﾠviolent	 ﾠacts	 ﾠ
toward	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠforces.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
"0"	 ﾠ	 ﾠNO	 ﾠ;	 ﾠ"1"	 ﾠ	 ﾠYES.
GDP GDP	 ﾠper	 ﾠcapita	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprevious	 ﾠyear. GDP	 ﾠper	 ﾠcapita	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprevious	 ﾠyear.
State	 ﾠCapacity State	 ﾠFragility	 ﾠIndex,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠPolity	 ﾠIV.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠindicator	 ﾠgets	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠability	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
state	 ﾠto	 ﾠmanage	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠthreats.
SFI	 ﾠ(according	 ﾠto	 ﾠPolity	 ﾠIV).
Police	 ﾠPresence The	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolice/riot	 ﾠpolice	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠprotest	 ﾠevent. POLICE	 ﾠ=	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolice	 ﾠor	 ﾠriot	 ﾠpolice.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
"0"	 ﾠ	 ﾠNOT	 ﾠPRESENT	 ﾠ;	 ﾠ"1"	 ﾠ	 ﾠPRESENT.
Threat	 ﾠPerception The	 ﾠperceived	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠthreat	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment,	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
protesters.
PROTTHREAT	 ﾠ=	 ﾠthreatening	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
demands	 ﾠof	 ﾠprotesters.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
"0"	 ﾠ	 ﾠSlogans/chants	 ﾠwere	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcalling	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
revolutionary	 ﾠregime	 ﾠchange	 ﾠ	 ﾠ;	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
"1"	 ﾠSlogans/chants	 ﾠwere	 ﾠcalling	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
revolutionary	 ﾠregime	 ﾠchange	 ﾠ(for	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠ
"Death	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDictator"	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠone).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠDEPENDENT	 ﾠVARIABLES
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠINDEPENDENT	 ﾠVARIABLE
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠCONTROL	 ﾠVARIABLES
Figure A.2: Variable Names and Deﬁnitions, Including Coding Instructions
222ID PARA REVGUARD87 MILPRES COMP NUMB PROTVOL GDP SFI POLICE PROTTHREAT
11.6.16.2009 1 0 0 0 4 0 12,800 14 1 1*
Figure A.3: An Observation with an Example of Coding
Excerpts)from)Sources:)An)Example)of)the)Coding)of)a)Protest)Event)
!
*Please!note!that!I!have!re/typed!these!(with!full!citations)!for!easier!presentation.!
Furthermore,!not!all!sources!have!been!listed.!Moreover,!stars!(!*!)!in!the!Excel!
document!indicated!to!me!that!there!may!have!been!ambiguous!or!conflicting!
reports.!In!this!case,!there!were!conflicting!reports!about!what!kinds!of!demands!the!
protesters!were!making,!and!whether!this!could!be!characterized!as!a!“threatening”!
protest!in!the!sense!that!slogans!called!for!a!revolutionary!regime!change.!This!
probably!resulted!from!the!fact!that!slogans!or!the!nature!of!the!protest!changed!
throughout!the!day.!!
!
!
!
Photos)and)Report:)Tehran’s)Great)Green)Silence)March)
By!Syma!Sayyah,!Tehran!
06/16/2009!
Payvand'Iran'News'
!
“We!were!all!determined!to!go!together!to!Valiasar!Square!for!today’s!
demonstration!in!support!of!Mr.!Mousavi!and!Mr.!Karoubi!who!not!accept!the!
election!results!after!the!gigantic!and!unprecedented!march!yesterday!which!filled!
Tehran!from!Enghelab!Square!to!Azadi!Square.!People!wanted!to!show!that!despite!
the!bloodshed!they!believe!in!a!civil!society!and!can!and!will!follow!and!show!their!
determination!to!get!what!many!now!call!their!Stolen!Election.!From!noon!we!
started!getting!calls!and!e/mails!that!the!opposition!have!called!a!demo!at!the!same!
place!but!one!hour!earlier.!Messages!were!sent!that!the!opposition!have!called!a!
demo!at!the!same!place!but!one!hour!earlier.!Messages!were!sent!that!the!
opposition!demonstration!has!been!called!off!and!it!is!better!not!to!go.!Then!we!got!
reports!that!there!are)thugs)with)knives)among)the)crowd.!So!we!got!less!and!less!
determined!and!as!we!got!back!home!I!was!extremely!restless!and!felt!that!I!had!to!
do!something.!I!felt!ashamed!that!fear!was!preventing!me!from!taking!part…!
!
At!4:30!PM!we!headed!towards!Vanak!Square!with!thousands!of!others,!the!streets!
were!filled!with)people)young)and)old,)men)and)women)people)from)all)walks)
of)life.!!
!
Many!people!were!holding!or!wearing!something!green!and!many!wore!black!as!a!
sign!of!respect!for!the!students!who!were!killed!yesterday.!The!sense!of!solidarity!
and!determination!was!fascinating!and!fantastic.!Everybody!was!quietly!walking!up!
and!down!the!sidewalks!at!first!and!as!the!crowd!grew!the!two!sides!of!Valiasar!
Avenue!became!filled….”!
!
[Silent!march…slogans,!“Empty!hands!always!win!over!bullets,”!“Our!Protest!The!
Green!Silence!March,”!in!pictures]!
!
Le!Peuple!de!Teheran!defie!Ahmadinejad!
By!Gustavo!Kuhn!
06/16/2009!
Agence'France'Presse''(also'in'Monde)'
'
IRAN!/!Des)centaines)de)milliers!de!mécontents!ont!bravé!l'interdiction!de!
manifester!pour!dénoncer!une!«énorme!fraude!électorale».!Un)d'eux)au)moins)
aurait)été)tué.)
GUSTAVO!KUHN!AVEC!AFP!ET!AP!
Le!pouvoir!avait!interdit!la!manifestation!de!protestation!contre!la!réélection!
contestée!de!Mahmoud!Ahmadinejad.!Mais!c'était!sans!compter!sur!l'étendue!de!la!
colère!des!habitants!de!Téhéran.!Au)cri)de)«Mort)au)dictateur»,)ils!ont!été!des!
centaines!de!milliers!à!défier!les!autorités!dans!la!capitale!iranienne!pour!dénoncer!
une!«énorme!fraude!électorale».!
Mir!Hossein!Moussavi,!candidat!malheureux!du!scrutin!de!vendredi!dernier,!
a!participé!à!la!mobilisation!juché!sur!le!toit!d'une!voiture.!Contestant!sa!défaite!face!
au!dirigeant!ultraconservateur,!il!s'est!adressé!aux!manifestants!à!l'aide!d'un!porte/
voix!et!s'est!dit!«prêt!à!participer!de!nouveau!à!une!élection!présidentielle».!
Un)manifestant)tué!
Son!épouse,!Zahra!Rahnevard,!a,!quant!à!elle,!déclaré!à!l'AFP!qu'ils!«iraient!
jusqu'au!bout»!pour!faire!annuler!le!résultat!du!scrutin!du!12!juin,!qui!a!vu!
officiellement!Mahmoud!Ahmadinejad!triompher!avec!près!de!63%!des!voix.!
Le!guide!suprême,!Ali!Khamenei,!pour!qui!le!résultat!du!scrutin!s'apparente!à!une!
«vraie!fête»,!avait!appelé!l'ancien!premier!ministre!et!conservateur!modéré!à!
poursuivre!sa!contestation!par!la!seule!voie!légale.!
Pendant!la!manifestation,!qui!occupait!l'essentiel!de!l'avenue!Azadi,!lieu!
traditionnel!des!manifestations!de!commémoration!de!la!révolution!islamique!de!
1979,!la)police)antiémeute!est!restée!très!discrète!et!n'est!pas!intervenue.!Mais!à!la!
fin!du!parcours,!un!photographe!de!l'Associated!Press)a)vu)une)personne)morte)et)
plusieurs)autres)qui)semblaient)grièvement)blessées)sur)la)place)de)la)Liberté.)
Le)témoin)affirme)que)les)coups)de)feu)contre)les)manifestants)ont)été)tirés)
depuis)un)bâtiment)abritant)une)milice)proche)des)Gardiens)de)la)révolution.)
Hier!soir,!le!chef!du!Conseil!des!gardiens!de!la!constitution,!l'ayatollah!Ahmad!
Jannati,!a!déclaré!à!la!télévision!que!son!organisme!se!prononcerait!bientôt!sur!la!
demande!d'annulation!du!scrutin!présidentiel!du!candidat!Mir!Hossein!Moussavi.!
!
!
Tens)of)thousands)in)Iran)opposition)rally:)witnesses)
06/16/2009!
Agence'France'Presse!–!English!
!
Tens)of)thousands)of)supporters!of!defeated!Iranian!presidential!candidate!
Mir!Hossein!Mousavi!staged!a!protest!rally!in!Tehran!on!Wednesday!against!the!
election!results,!witnesses!said.!
Iran's!state!television!also!showed!brief!footage!of!the!rally,!a!rare!glimpse!as!
Figure A.4: Excerpts from Sources: An Example of the Coding of a Protest Event
(see earlier ﬁgure)
223the!station!has!mostly!run!shots!of!violence!and!vandalism!which!occurred!during!
earlier!protests.!
Witnesses!said)the)protesters,)young)and)old,)some)with)families,!
marched!from!central!Tehran's!Haft/e!Tir!and!were!heading!to!Vali!Asr!square!for!
what!was!billed!as)a)"silent")demonstration.!
Wearing!green!wrist/!and!head/bands!in!the!colour!of!Mousavi's!campaign,!
the!demonstrators,!including!office!workers,!carried!placards!accusing!re/elected!
President!Mahmoud!Ahmadinejad!of!having!"stolen"!their!votes!in!Friday's!poll.!
Mousavi!was!not!attending!the!march,!which!has!been!branded!"illegal"!by!the!
Iranian!authorities.!
"Election!is!not!selection,"!one!placard!read,!others!said:!"Don't)carry)
batons)in)the)name)of)Islam)and)martyrs,")and)"We)keep)silent)so)that)bullets)
can)be)heard)better,")witnesses)told)AFP.)
The!state!television!presenter!said:!"A!group!of!Mr!Mir!Hossein!Mousavi!
supporters!held!a!rally!today!evening!at!Haft/e!Tir!square."!
The!presenter!also!said!the!supporters!were!seen!carrying!banners!backing!
their!defeated!candidate,!while!footage!was!shown!of!the!marchers!holding!
placards.!
Since!the!election!result!was!announced!on!Saturday,!Tehran!has!been!
rocked!by!daily!protests!against!Ahmadinejad,!mainly!carried!out!by!supporters!of!
Mousavi!who!says!the!election!result!had!blatant!"irregularities."!
Seven)people)have)been)reported)killed)and)several)more)wounded)
during)the)protests.)
Iran!has!banned!the!foreign!media!from!reporting!on!"unauthorised"!events!
and!rallies!involving!supporters!of!Mousavi.!
!
!
Also,!research!assistants!were!encouraged!to!research!further!each!protest!event!
identified!in!the!newswires!(both!the!international!and!local!ones).!Additional!
information!gleaned!from!this!research!was!to!be!included!and!saved!(sources!that!
were!consulted!included!CNN,!MSNBC,!and!other!broadcast!media,!particularly!
transcripts!and!videos).!For!example,!RAs!were!able!to!view!videos!of!many!of!the!
protest!events!on!YouTube!and!through!CNN!iReport.!The!protest!event!coded!
below!has!video!that!is!available!on!CNN!iReport!(see!
http://ireport.cnn.com/docs/DOC/273174).!!
!
!
The 
ima
Figure A.5: (Continued) Excerpts from Sources: An Example of the Coding of a
Protest Event (see earlier ﬁgure)
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